during the 1770s left hardly any scarlet-jacketed soldiery in middle-colony barracks. This persisted in late 1775 although New York was the next obvious battleground once British leaders vacated their untenable position in Massachusetts. A Dutch possession until captured by the Duke of York (later James II) in 1664, New York a century later was thestrategic and military gateway to the Hudson-Champlain corridor. Regaining full control of its storied eighteenth-century north-south warpath of rivers, portages, and lakes—one army moving north from New York City, another south from Canada—would split the rebellious colonies more or less down the middle. That, of course, had become London’s plan by the summer of 1775, but the logistics of implementing it would be difficult.
Having been drawn into war before achieving readiness, Britain lacked transports to move the worn-out troops in Boston to New York before winter’s onset. Thus, as the year ended, no British regular unit was stationed in the colonies’ swing region. New York’s last company of redcoats had marched out of their barracks in July, boarding the nearby 64-gun warship
Asia
—partly, cynics said, to keep them from deserting. 22 Two other British regular units in New York—small detachments stationed at Ticonderoga and Crown Point, the once grand, now decrepit French and Indian War bastions—had been taken captive by New Englanders in May. Gage’s tardy April order to General Carleton to reinforce Ticonderoga by sending a regiment from Canada was overtaken by war. In a similar vein, combative instructions from the Cabinet sent in January 1775 by Lord Dartmouth, the American secretary—Gage was finally ordered to start moving aggressively, even at the risk of war—had been delayed initially in Whitehall, then held up by a particularly rough wintertime ocean crossing. Gage’s aides did not sign for them until April 14. On the British side, policy making for both Massachusetts and the Hudson-Champlain corridor had taken a costly winter holiday.
New York, in the meantime, was a weak link in the Revolutionary chain. Its timorous Provincial Congress was not even in charge of the May-June buildup in the province’s own northern counties. The Continental Congress, along with officers of Massachusetts and Connecticut troops actually on the scene, had most of the say. Back in February 1775, while Gage dawdled, the Massachusetts Committee of Correspondence had sent an agent to Lake Champlain and Canada—John Brown, a Pittsfield lawyer and confidant of Samuel Adams. He reported in late March that “one thing I must mention to be kept as a profound Secret, the Fort at Tyconderogo must be seised as soon as possible should hostilities be committed by the kings Troops. The people on N. Hampshire Grants have ingaged to do this Business and in my opinion they are the most proper Persons for this Jobb.” 23
When the two citadels fell in May to a small force from Connecticut,Massachusetts, and the so-called Hampshire Grants (Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys), the way to Canada opened wide. Quebec, too, had lost garrisons to reinforce Boston. But despite the spreading Patriot confrontations with British forces in Virginia and Charleston Harbor, violence was held off in the five middle colonies, save for New England–guarded upper New York. The region remained politically ambivalent. John Adams would later argue that a naïve middle-colony desire not to break with Britain had interfered with Congress’s invasion of Canada. 24 Most observers counted Loyalist politics and anti-independence sentiment strongest in New York, but caution and lingering hope for reconciliation enjoyed a vocal constituency in all five provinces. As January turned to February and March, avid independence backers like cousins Samuel and John Adams of Massachusetts and the Lee brothers of Virginia fumed at what they saw as delay and obstruction.
To committed Patriots, not least Benjamin
Having been drawn into war before achieving readiness, Britain lacked transports to move the worn-out troops in Boston to New York before winter’s onset. Thus, as the year ended, no British regular unit was stationed in the colonies’ swing region. New York’s last company of redcoats had marched out of their barracks in July, boarding the nearby 64-gun warship
Asia
—partly, cynics said, to keep them from deserting. 22 Two other British regular units in New York—small detachments stationed at Ticonderoga and Crown Point, the once grand, now decrepit French and Indian War bastions—had been taken captive by New Englanders in May. Gage’s tardy April order to General Carleton to reinforce Ticonderoga by sending a regiment from Canada was overtaken by war. In a similar vein, combative instructions from the Cabinet sent in January 1775 by Lord Dartmouth, the American secretary—Gage was finally ordered to start moving aggressively, even at the risk of war—had been delayed initially in Whitehall, then held up by a particularly rough wintertime ocean crossing. Gage’s aides did not sign for them until April 14. On the British side, policy making for both Massachusetts and the Hudson-Champlain corridor had taken a costly winter holiday.
New York, in the meantime, was a weak link in the Revolutionary chain. Its timorous Provincial Congress was not even in charge of the May-June buildup in the province’s own northern counties. The Continental Congress, along with officers of Massachusetts and Connecticut troops actually on the scene, had most of the say. Back in February 1775, while Gage dawdled, the Massachusetts Committee of Correspondence had sent an agent to Lake Champlain and Canada—John Brown, a Pittsfield lawyer and confidant of Samuel Adams. He reported in late March that “one thing I must mention to be kept as a profound Secret, the Fort at Tyconderogo must be seised as soon as possible should hostilities be committed by the kings Troops. The people on N. Hampshire Grants have ingaged to do this Business and in my opinion they are the most proper Persons for this Jobb.” 23
When the two citadels fell in May to a small force from Connecticut,Massachusetts, and the so-called Hampshire Grants (Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys), the way to Canada opened wide. Quebec, too, had lost garrisons to reinforce Boston. But despite the spreading Patriot confrontations with British forces in Virginia and Charleston Harbor, violence was held off in the five middle colonies, save for New England–guarded upper New York. The region remained politically ambivalent. John Adams would later argue that a naïve middle-colony desire not to break with Britain had interfered with Congress’s invasion of Canada. 24 Most observers counted Loyalist politics and anti-independence sentiment strongest in New York, but caution and lingering hope for reconciliation enjoyed a vocal constituency in all five provinces. As January turned to February and March, avid independence backers like cousins Samuel and John Adams of Massachusetts and the Lee brothers of Virginia fumed at what they saw as delay and obstruction.
To committed Patriots, not least Benjamin
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