had redeployed to the United States. But he did agree with Ollivant on a great deal, including that more foreign-service officers were needed to help translate military gains into better local governance. He had already advocated, in factâtogether with Ambassador Karl Eikenberry in Kabulâfor more diplomats and other civilian experts, but the State Department had yet to provide them in the full numbers needed. Although Eikenberry had expressed concern over the lack of civilian support for the tremendous military effort that would be expended to secure and rebuild villages, his superiors in Washington were slow to respond. âSending additional combat brigades will require tens of billions of dollars annually for years to come, costs not detailed in DOD charts,â Eikenberry wrote in a cable several months later. âYet an Embassy request this summer for a $2 billion increase in our budget for development and governance was analyzed and debated in great detail, only to be rejected.â
AS HE PREPARED to head to Afghanistan, Petraeus viewed the campaign in simple terms. The key to victory lay in protecting the indigenous population, not just in killing the enemy. That was the insight Petraeus stressed over and over. Killing the enemy was certainly part of his counterinsurgency doctrineâa key part. But he knew only too well that, without the support of the Afghan people, you could never kill your way out of an insurgency.
Petraeus had repeatedly warnedâat Central Command, in the press and behind closed doors in the various policy reviews over the previous two yearsâthat he never thought the situation in Afghanistan could be âturnedâ as quickly as U.S. efforts were able to help turn Iraq. The conditions were different. But President Obama was firm on July 2011 as the date by which he would begin to draw down the American surge forces. Nobody expected to create a Western democracy overnight in Afghanistan, nor was the president asking Petraeus for that. But he wanted Petraeus to create the conditions for an end state that was tolerable: an Afghanistan that could secure and govern itself sufficiently to avoid once again becoming a safe haven for al-Qaeda. Petraeus had one year.
CHAPTER 2
RESULTS, BOY
P etraeus looked out the aircraft window and saw the barren, brown Hindu Kush Mountains, outside Kabul. He felt a twinge of anticipation for the imminent landing, even though it was a familiar view. He had traveled to Afghanistan nearly a dozen times as CENTCOM commander over the past two years, and he had been here once before that, on a special assessment mission for Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld in 2005. He knew the challenges below, having worked with General McChrystal on the plan to commit significant resources to the neglected and troubled theater. Those challenges were now his to master.
His plane landed in Kabul at dusk on July 2, 2010. The smell of burning garbage lingered in the air. The shadows were long as the sun set on a warm, dry evening. U.S. ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Ambassador Mark Sedwill, NATOâs senior civilian representative in Afghanistan, and Petraeus alighted together from a blue-and-white C-40 with UNITED STATES OF AMERICA emblazoned on the fuselage. Petraeus encouraged his civilian counterparts to exit the plane first. Accompanied by aides and security officers, they walked briskly to three Black Hawk helicopters, their rotors whirling, to take them to the headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force, a five-minute flight away.
Despite the six-hour-and-forty-five-minute flight from NATO headquarters in Brussels, Petraeus was all energy the next morning when he met with Rear Admiral Greg Smith, deputy chief of staff for communications. Smith, who had been one of Petraeusâs media gurus during the surge in Iraq, and then served with him at Central Command, recorded no fewer than seventeen directives from Petraeus in his small
AS HE PREPARED to head to Afghanistan, Petraeus viewed the campaign in simple terms. The key to victory lay in protecting the indigenous population, not just in killing the enemy. That was the insight Petraeus stressed over and over. Killing the enemy was certainly part of his counterinsurgency doctrineâa key part. But he knew only too well that, without the support of the Afghan people, you could never kill your way out of an insurgency.
Petraeus had repeatedly warnedâat Central Command, in the press and behind closed doors in the various policy reviews over the previous two yearsâthat he never thought the situation in Afghanistan could be âturnedâ as quickly as U.S. efforts were able to help turn Iraq. The conditions were different. But President Obama was firm on July 2011 as the date by which he would begin to draw down the American surge forces. Nobody expected to create a Western democracy overnight in Afghanistan, nor was the president asking Petraeus for that. But he wanted Petraeus to create the conditions for an end state that was tolerable: an Afghanistan that could secure and govern itself sufficiently to avoid once again becoming a safe haven for al-Qaeda. Petraeus had one year.
CHAPTER 2
RESULTS, BOY
P etraeus looked out the aircraft window and saw the barren, brown Hindu Kush Mountains, outside Kabul. He felt a twinge of anticipation for the imminent landing, even though it was a familiar view. He had traveled to Afghanistan nearly a dozen times as CENTCOM commander over the past two years, and he had been here once before that, on a special assessment mission for Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld in 2005. He knew the challenges below, having worked with General McChrystal on the plan to commit significant resources to the neglected and troubled theater. Those challenges were now his to master.
His plane landed in Kabul at dusk on July 2, 2010. The smell of burning garbage lingered in the air. The shadows were long as the sun set on a warm, dry evening. U.S. ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Ambassador Mark Sedwill, NATOâs senior civilian representative in Afghanistan, and Petraeus alighted together from a blue-and-white C-40 with UNITED STATES OF AMERICA emblazoned on the fuselage. Petraeus encouraged his civilian counterparts to exit the plane first. Accompanied by aides and security officers, they walked briskly to three Black Hawk helicopters, their rotors whirling, to take them to the headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force, a five-minute flight away.
Despite the six-hour-and-forty-five-minute flight from NATO headquarters in Brussels, Petraeus was all energy the next morning when he met with Rear Admiral Greg Smith, deputy chief of staff for communications. Smith, who had been one of Petraeusâs media gurus during the surge in Iraq, and then served with him at Central Command, recorded no fewer than seventeen directives from Petraeus in his small
Similar Books
