and the 18th and 62nd Volksgrenadier-Divisions, supported by the 9th SS Panzer-Division
Hohenstaufen
,
were
attacking the 82nd Airborne on the Vielsalm sector, where General Ridgway insisted on holding a right-angled wedge.
General Bradley was outraged to hear that Montgomery had deployed Collins’s VII Corps along the shoulder line rather than hold it back for a major counter-attack. (In fact it was Collins himself who had committed his divisions because there was no choice.) Once again it demonstrated how completely Bradley failed to understand what was really happening. With four panzer divisions attacking north and north-west, a defence line had to be secured before a counter-attack took place. First Army headquarters, which was considering a major withdrawal on the VII Corps front, even recorded that evening: ‘Despite the air’s magnificent performance today things tonight look, if anything, worse than before.’ Concern about a breakthrough by the panzer divisions to the west even prompted First Army to consider pulling back all the heavy equipment of V Corps in case of a sudden retreat.
Ridgway was livid when Montgomery overruled him once more, on this occasion by ordering Gavin’s 82nd Airborne to withdraw from Vielsalm to the base of the triangle from Trois-Ponts to Manhay. The 82nd was coming under heavy pressure from the 9th SS Panzer-Division
Hohenstaufen
, the rest of the 1st SS Panzer-Division and the 18th and 62nd Volksgrenadier-Divisions. Yet Ridgway felt insulted by the idea that the United States Army should be ordered to give ground in this way. He attributed the move to Montgomery’s obsession with ‘tidying-up the battlefield’, and protested vehemently to General Hodges, ‘but apparently received little sympathy there’ , as Hansen later acknowledged. Bradleybecame obsessed with Montgomery’s decision and harped on about it for some time to come.
Gavin, however, saw the point of the redeployment, and Montgomery was almost certainly right. The 82nd was already overstretched even before the next wave of German formations was due to arrive. Reducing their front from twenty-seven kilometres to sixteen meant a much stronger defence line. The withdrawal began that night, and ‘morale in the 82nd was not materially affected’ . Gavin’s paratroopers soon had plenty of frozen German corpses to use as sandbags in their new positions, and they refused to allow Graves Registration personnel to take them away.
Task Force Kane and a regiment of the newly arrived 17th Airborne were positioned to defend the Manhay crossroads, against what First Army headquarters still believed to be an attempt to capture American supply bases in Liège. The untried 75th Infantry Division was on its way to support Rose’s 3rd Armored Division as it attempted to extricate Task Force Hogan, surrounded at Marcouray.
The defenders at Manhay expected a fearsome attack by the
Das Reich
, but it advanced cautiously through the forests either side of the highway and occupied Odeigne. This was partly due to continuing fuel-supply problems, but mainly to avoid moving in the open on another day of brilliant sunshine. An armoured column in daylight would become easy prey for the fighter-bombers overhead, scouring the snowbound landscape for targets.
Brigadeführer Heinz Lammerding, the commander of the
Das Reich
responsible for the massacres of Tulle and Oradour-sur-Glane on their advance north to Normandy in June, was tall and arrogant with a pitted face. He was famous for his ruthlessness, like most of his officers. They even thought it funny that the
Das Reich
had murdered the inhabitants of the wrong Oradour. ‘An SS-Führer told me with a laugh’ , Heydte was secretly recorded later as saying, ‘that it had been the wrong village. “It was just too bad for them,” [he said]. It turned out afterwards that there weren’t any partisans in that village.’
As soon as dark fell and the Thunderbolt and Lightning
Hohenstaufen
,
were
attacking the 82nd Airborne on the Vielsalm sector, where General Ridgway insisted on holding a right-angled wedge.
General Bradley was outraged to hear that Montgomery had deployed Collins’s VII Corps along the shoulder line rather than hold it back for a major counter-attack. (In fact it was Collins himself who had committed his divisions because there was no choice.) Once again it demonstrated how completely Bradley failed to understand what was really happening. With four panzer divisions attacking north and north-west, a defence line had to be secured before a counter-attack took place. First Army headquarters, which was considering a major withdrawal on the VII Corps front, even recorded that evening: ‘Despite the air’s magnificent performance today things tonight look, if anything, worse than before.’ Concern about a breakthrough by the panzer divisions to the west even prompted First Army to consider pulling back all the heavy equipment of V Corps in case of a sudden retreat.
Ridgway was livid when Montgomery overruled him once more, on this occasion by ordering Gavin’s 82nd Airborne to withdraw from Vielsalm to the base of the triangle from Trois-Ponts to Manhay. The 82nd was coming under heavy pressure from the 9th SS Panzer-Division
Hohenstaufen
, the rest of the 1st SS Panzer-Division and the 18th and 62nd Volksgrenadier-Divisions. Yet Ridgway felt insulted by the idea that the United States Army should be ordered to give ground in this way. He attributed the move to Montgomery’s obsession with ‘tidying-up the battlefield’, and protested vehemently to General Hodges, ‘but apparently received little sympathy there’ , as Hansen later acknowledged. Bradleybecame obsessed with Montgomery’s decision and harped on about it for some time to come.
Gavin, however, saw the point of the redeployment, and Montgomery was almost certainly right. The 82nd was already overstretched even before the next wave of German formations was due to arrive. Reducing their front from twenty-seven kilometres to sixteen meant a much stronger defence line. The withdrawal began that night, and ‘morale in the 82nd was not materially affected’ . Gavin’s paratroopers soon had plenty of frozen German corpses to use as sandbags in their new positions, and they refused to allow Graves Registration personnel to take them away.
Task Force Kane and a regiment of the newly arrived 17th Airborne were positioned to defend the Manhay crossroads, against what First Army headquarters still believed to be an attempt to capture American supply bases in Liège. The untried 75th Infantry Division was on its way to support Rose’s 3rd Armored Division as it attempted to extricate Task Force Hogan, surrounded at Marcouray.
The defenders at Manhay expected a fearsome attack by the
Das Reich
, but it advanced cautiously through the forests either side of the highway and occupied Odeigne. This was partly due to continuing fuel-supply problems, but mainly to avoid moving in the open on another day of brilliant sunshine. An armoured column in daylight would become easy prey for the fighter-bombers overhead, scouring the snowbound landscape for targets.
Brigadeführer Heinz Lammerding, the commander of the
Das Reich
responsible for the massacres of Tulle and Oradour-sur-Glane on their advance north to Normandy in June, was tall and arrogant with a pitted face. He was famous for his ruthlessness, like most of his officers. They even thought it funny that the
Das Reich
had murdered the inhabitants of the wrong Oradour. ‘An SS-Führer told me with a laugh’ , Heydte was secretly recorded later as saying, ‘that it had been the wrong village. “It was just too bad for them,” [he said]. It turned out afterwards that there weren’t any partisans in that village.’
As soon as dark fell and the Thunderbolt and Lightning
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