Battle Story by Chris Brown Page B

air power in the whole conflict was the destruction of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse (Force Z) as they steamed toward Kuantan with the intention of disrupting reported Japanese landings there. Force Z was struck on the morning of 10 December 1941 by a succession of ‘Nell’ torpedo bombers operating from airfields in French Indo-China. Sinking the two ships was not simply a blow to the power of the navy; it was a great blow to both civilian and military morale and rather set the tone for the rest of the campaign. Of all the navies in the world, the British should have been more aware of the power of aircraft at sea since just the year before a force of obsolete Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers had destroyed one Italian battleship and severely damaged another two in an attack on Taranto.
    The Type 99 ‘Sally’, Type 99 ‘Lily’ and Mitsubishi G4M ‘Betty’ bombers, among others, were used extensively throughout the Malayan campaign. Due to poor surface-to-air communications,the army air service provided little in the way of integrated air support for troops on the ground and much of its effort was focused on bombing towns and cities. The scarcity of anti-aircraft guns and limited quantities of ammunition, coupled with the sheer overwhelming numbers of Japanese aircraft, meant that there was little the Allies could do to prevent them from attacking. Although considerable damage was done to harbour facilities in Singapore, the chief purpose of the raids was to disrupt communications and demoralise the military and civilian population, a process which became more and more successful as it became apparent that the Allies could do nothing to prevent the attacks.

    28. The rescue of Force Z survivors, 10 December 1941.
    ‘B ETTY ’
    With a top speed of about 250mph and a weapon payload of over ¾ ton, the ‘Betty’ – or Mitsubishi G4M – was comparable to other twin-engined bombers of her class, but was very vulnerable. To keep overall weight down – and consequently achieve a better speed – there was virtually no protection for the crew and the lack of self-sealing fuel tanks made the ‘Betty’ very vulnerable in combat. A number of ‘Bettys’ were used in the torpedo-bomber role against the Prince of Wales and the Repulse .

    29. An Imperial Japanese Navy Mitsubishi G4M ‘Betty’ bomber.

THE DAYS
BEFORE BATTLE
    Percival’s general policy was unsuitable and unworkable in the circumstances of late 1941, and was not especially consistent. His initial troop commitments were not particularly rational and became increasingly irrelevant as the campaign developed. The prize – at least in the British view – was the great Singapore naval base, which could only be protected if there was adequate air power available, and the air power could only be maintained and adequately deployed if there were enough airfields to support the aircraft, but defending the airfields meant a heavy commitment of army resources. The necessary aircraft were not available, so protection of the fields was, essentially, redundant from the very beginning of the campaign. In addition to airfield protection, Percival also had to find the means of repelling an invasion wherever a force might land.
    Percival did not develop a consistent policy for the campaign, but also failed to adjust his thinking to the situation, often endeavouring to make the circumstances fit the plan rather than the other way around. He alternated between plans to develop a strong defensive line, which would force the Japanese to concentrate their forces where his own troops would be able to take advantage of the superior British artillery, and a policy of slowing the Japanese advance while preparing for what hecalled ‘the main battle’ further south. Neither policy was really valid since neither gave any real consideration to what the enemy intended to do or how he intended to achieve his aims. Some of the ‘wishful thinking’ among the British command