Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan by Caroline Fourest Page A
Authors: Caroline Fourest
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the Special
Organization. Its mission was to prepare a selected number of militants for
armed resistance. Tariq Ramadan does not deny the fact, but he describes
it as a way of preparing for self-defense, an understandable concern when
they were up against the British, who might well decide "to physically elim inate their opponents"-or in case "they refused, after repeated urgings, to
leave the country."55 The truth of the matter is that the Special Organization
was primarily engaged in sending militants to fight in Palestine. Even before
the creation of Israel in 1947, the Brotherhood sent armed squads to track
down the Jewish immigrants. Tariq Ramadan takes pride in recounting these
events: Al-Banna provided assistance to the Palestinians by sending them
an advisor and a specialist in military training, raising funds to buy weapons, and setting up training camps that he ran jointly with members of the
Special Organization. Volunteers came to Palestine in groups to support the
resistance."56 Later on, another armed group in Palestine was to claim close
links to the Brotherhood-Hamas. Its very existence suffices to refute the
idea that the Brotherhood's ideology has nothing violent or fanatic about it.
But Ramadan takes pains to explain that, in Palestine, violence has nothing
violent about it, since it is legitimate: "Hassan al-Banna was opposed to violence and approved of the use of arms only in Palestine as a way of resisting
Zionist colonialism. "57
Tariq Ramadan was well aware of the fact that his grandfather had called
for a jihad, but he vindicated him by explaining that the call was strictly limited
to situations of "legitimate defense" or "resistance in the face ofinjustice"58-
two criteria that are highly subjective. On this basis, violence was legitimate
when it was a question of facing up to Nasser, just as it was in opposing British occupation. Or just as it will be every time that any obstacle threatens
to block the Muslim Brotherhood's quest for domination. Ramadan is brazen enough to claim that the association has never been responsible for acts
of violence. Yet in March 1948, for example, a judge was assassinated for
having condemned a Muslim Brother. And on December 28 of the same
year, before al-Banna's death, the Brotherhood claimed responsibility for the
assassination of Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha.59 These deaths could not
have occurred without the Guide's knowledge.
Hassan al-B anna had, on occasion, barred activists who were in too much
of a hurry to go into action, as he did in 1938-39, not because he repudiated
the idea of an armed jihad, but because he felt the time was not ripe. During
this period, his movement was gaining ground among the people. He was intent on consolidating his political influence, and therefore sought legitimacy. If the Brotherhood were to be condemned for illegal acts, for assassinations or for setting off riots, it would disrupt the evolution of his campaign. In 1948, the Brotherhood went too far; another assassination tipped
the scales and the organization was dissolved by military decree. On November 15, a demonstration organized by the Brotherhood to honor their "martyrs" degenerated into a riot, in which two British officers were killed in their
jeep. Those in charge often lost control of the young activists that they had
fanaticized. Despite what Tariq Ramadan has said, the organization that his
grandfather created was bound to produce fundamentalists who-when it
appeared that indoctrination alone would not suffice-would be tempted,
sooner or later, to take up arms in order to achieve their objectives. However, the fact that violence was a last resort is considered by Hassan al-Banna's grandson to be proof of great moderation in their choice of tactics. He
turns the cool and calculated radicalism of his grandfather into something
more spiritual. By way of example, he cites one of al-Banna's speeches, in
which the latter tells
Organization. Its mission was to prepare a selected number of militants for
armed resistance. Tariq Ramadan does not deny the fact, but he describes
it as a way of preparing for self-defense, an understandable concern when
they were up against the British, who might well decide "to physically elim inate their opponents"-or in case "they refused, after repeated urgings, to
leave the country."55 The truth of the matter is that the Special Organization
was primarily engaged in sending militants to fight in Palestine. Even before
the creation of Israel in 1947, the Brotherhood sent armed squads to track
down the Jewish immigrants. Tariq Ramadan takes pride in recounting these
events: Al-Banna provided assistance to the Palestinians by sending them
an advisor and a specialist in military training, raising funds to buy weapons, and setting up training camps that he ran jointly with members of the
Special Organization. Volunteers came to Palestine in groups to support the
resistance."56 Later on, another armed group in Palestine was to claim close
links to the Brotherhood-Hamas. Its very existence suffices to refute the
idea that the Brotherhood's ideology has nothing violent or fanatic about it.
But Ramadan takes pains to explain that, in Palestine, violence has nothing
violent about it, since it is legitimate: "Hassan al-Banna was opposed to violence and approved of the use of arms only in Palestine as a way of resisting
Zionist colonialism. "57
Tariq Ramadan was well aware of the fact that his grandfather had called
for a jihad, but he vindicated him by explaining that the call was strictly limited
to situations of "legitimate defense" or "resistance in the face ofinjustice"58-
two criteria that are highly subjective. On this basis, violence was legitimate
when it was a question of facing up to Nasser, just as it was in opposing British occupation. Or just as it will be every time that any obstacle threatens
to block the Muslim Brotherhood's quest for domination. Ramadan is brazen enough to claim that the association has never been responsible for acts
of violence. Yet in March 1948, for example, a judge was assassinated for
having condemned a Muslim Brother. And on December 28 of the same
year, before al-Banna's death, the Brotherhood claimed responsibility for the
assassination of Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha.59 These deaths could not
have occurred without the Guide's knowledge.
Hassan al-B anna had, on occasion, barred activists who were in too much
of a hurry to go into action, as he did in 1938-39, not because he repudiated
the idea of an armed jihad, but because he felt the time was not ripe. During
this period, his movement was gaining ground among the people. He was intent on consolidating his political influence, and therefore sought legitimacy. If the Brotherhood were to be condemned for illegal acts, for assassinations or for setting off riots, it would disrupt the evolution of his campaign. In 1948, the Brotherhood went too far; another assassination tipped
the scales and the organization was dissolved by military decree. On November 15, a demonstration organized by the Brotherhood to honor their "martyrs" degenerated into a riot, in which two British officers were killed in their
jeep. Those in charge often lost control of the young activists that they had
fanaticized. Despite what Tariq Ramadan has said, the organization that his
grandfather created was bound to produce fundamentalists who-when it
appeared that indoctrination alone would not suffice-would be tempted,
sooner or later, to take up arms in order to achieve their objectives. However, the fact that violence was a last resort is considered by Hassan al-Banna's grandson to be proof of great moderation in their choice of tactics. He
turns the cool and calculated radicalism of his grandfather into something
more spiritual. By way of example, he cites one of al-Banna's speeches, in
which the latter tells
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