flight the gunner became uncomfortable due to the inability to stretch out his legs to relieve cramped muscles. He was more exposed to the fury of bursting flak shells than anyone else on the aircraft. Almost three-quarters of the ball hung suspended in space, creating a horror of exposure from which there was no protection.
Unknown to the bomber crews, the English and American Air Commands were at odds over the basic concept of how to conduct the air offense against Hitler-held Europe. In August 1943, the skies offered the only path the Allies could use to reach the heart of Nazi territory.
The R.A.F. was certain that night saturation bombing of industrial centers was the best method. The Americans were equally convinced that for them, with the more heavily armed B-17s, daylight strategic bombing of selected targets (by virtue of their importance to the German war machine) was a better use of men and machines. True, the R.A.F. certainly had far more war experience, and had tried daylight raids early in the war with disastrous losses. Their night bombing was built around the excellent Lancaster Bomber, which was fast, long ranged, and carried a heavier load of bombs than the B-17s. It was lightly armed, however, and not very rugged. The R.A.F. system was to send over fast target-marking planes early in the night to outline the target area with incendiary bombs that would glow brightly for hours. The Lancasters followed, one at a time, avoiding German fighters under the cover of darkness. Such tactics resulted in a saturation type of destruction hoping to hit war plants, cripple the cities, and demoralize the German workers as well.
The Americans favored the use of rugged, heavily armed bombers at high altitude because they would be above the worst flak and the effective ceiling of some of the older German fighters. They thought that the highly accurate Norden Bomb Sight would permit pinpoint accuracy of bombing against Germanyâs most vital military targets. The American view was that on night raids so many of the bombs fell outside the main target area that their effectiveness was doubtful, as far as reducing the German capacity to produce war materials.
Based on their own experience with daylight bombing raids, the R.A.F. commanders were sure that when the American bombing fleet became strong enough to begin daylight raids deep into Germany, the losses would be so disastrous that they would be unacceptable. On one night of bombing, however, the R.A.F. lost ninety-six Lancasters! So what was an acceptable loss?
General Ira Eaker, Commanding Officer of the 8th Bomber Command, was getting ready to put the high-altitude strategic bombing concept to a series of crucial tests. At a secret meeting in North Africa, President Roosevelt had given way to Prime Minister Churchillâs argument that night bombing was the best use of Allied aircraft. 5 But Mr. Churchill, in a meeting with General Eaker, gave him a little more time to prove the American bombers could invade heavily defended targets deep inside Germany (where we had not yet attempted to raid). The implication was that if those test raids failed, the American Air Force would begin a shift to the English night raid concept.
Our crew went on combat status ten days before the first of those really decisive missions was scheduled. In other words, we had arrived in England at the worst possible time of World War II for a bomber crew.
Chapter IV
Schweinfurt #1
The Ball-Bearing Plants
August 17
It was to be one of the most storied air battles of this or any other war. Some critical pages from my journal did not survive. The pages where I recorded the names, pilots, and aircraft numbers of the men in my hut who were on that raid were lost. In my early days in England I could find no writing paper of the size I needed, so I had to use the back sides of bulletins or other printed sheets. At that time I had not procured cover binders to hold these sheets together, so
Unknown to the bomber crews, the English and American Air Commands were at odds over the basic concept of how to conduct the air offense against Hitler-held Europe. In August 1943, the skies offered the only path the Allies could use to reach the heart of Nazi territory.
The R.A.F. was certain that night saturation bombing of industrial centers was the best method. The Americans were equally convinced that for them, with the more heavily armed B-17s, daylight strategic bombing of selected targets (by virtue of their importance to the German war machine) was a better use of men and machines. True, the R.A.F. certainly had far more war experience, and had tried daylight raids early in the war with disastrous losses. Their night bombing was built around the excellent Lancaster Bomber, which was fast, long ranged, and carried a heavier load of bombs than the B-17s. It was lightly armed, however, and not very rugged. The R.A.F. system was to send over fast target-marking planes early in the night to outline the target area with incendiary bombs that would glow brightly for hours. The Lancasters followed, one at a time, avoiding German fighters under the cover of darkness. Such tactics resulted in a saturation type of destruction hoping to hit war plants, cripple the cities, and demoralize the German workers as well.
The Americans favored the use of rugged, heavily armed bombers at high altitude because they would be above the worst flak and the effective ceiling of some of the older German fighters. They thought that the highly accurate Norden Bomb Sight would permit pinpoint accuracy of bombing against Germanyâs most vital military targets. The American view was that on night raids so many of the bombs fell outside the main target area that their effectiveness was doubtful, as far as reducing the German capacity to produce war materials.
Based on their own experience with daylight bombing raids, the R.A.F. commanders were sure that when the American bombing fleet became strong enough to begin daylight raids deep into Germany, the losses would be so disastrous that they would be unacceptable. On one night of bombing, however, the R.A.F. lost ninety-six Lancasters! So what was an acceptable loss?
General Ira Eaker, Commanding Officer of the 8th Bomber Command, was getting ready to put the high-altitude strategic bombing concept to a series of crucial tests. At a secret meeting in North Africa, President Roosevelt had given way to Prime Minister Churchillâs argument that night bombing was the best use of Allied aircraft. 5 But Mr. Churchill, in a meeting with General Eaker, gave him a little more time to prove the American bombers could invade heavily defended targets deep inside Germany (where we had not yet attempted to raid). The implication was that if those test raids failed, the American Air Force would begin a shift to the English night raid concept.
Our crew went on combat status ten days before the first of those really decisive missions was scheduled. In other words, we had arrived in England at the worst possible time of World War II for a bomber crew.
Chapter IV
Schweinfurt #1
The Ball-Bearing Plants
August 17
It was to be one of the most storied air battles of this or any other war. Some critical pages from my journal did not survive. The pages where I recorded the names, pilots, and aircraft numbers of the men in my hut who were on that raid were lost. In my early days in England I could find no writing paper of the size I needed, so I had to use the back sides of bulletins or other printed sheets. At that time I had not procured cover binders to hold these sheets together, so
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