Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis by James Rickards Page A
Authors: James Rickards
Tags: Business & Economics
Ads: Link
that almost all of the U.S. gold hoard is located not in civilian bank vaults but on military bases—Fort Knox in Kentucky and West Point along the Hudson River in New York. That says something about the connection of national wealth and national security.
The 1930s currency devaluations led quickly to Japan’s invasions in Asia and Germany’s attacks in Europe. The 1970s currency devaluations led quickly to the worst period of inflation in modern history. The United States was now entering a period of financial danger, similar to the 1930s and the 1970s. The Pentagon’s financial war game was ahead of its time, but only slightly, and seemed like part of the preparation for more dire days ahead—more of a beginning than the end to a new world of financial threats.
PART TWO
CURRENCY WARS
CHAPTER 3
Reflections on a Golden Age
“We’re in the midst of an international currency war.”
Guido Mantega, Finance Minister of Brazil,
September 27, 2010
“I don’t like the expression . . . currency war.”
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director, IMF,
November 18, 2010
A currency war, fought by one country through competitive devaluations of its currency against others, is one of the most destructive and feared outcomes in international economics. It revives ghosts of the Great Depression, when nations engaged in beggar-thy-neighbor devaluations and imposed tariffs that collapsed world trade. It recalls the 1970s, when the dollar price of oil quadrupled because of U.S. efforts to weaken the dollar by breaking its link to gold. Finally, it reminds one of crises in UK pounds sterling in 1992, Mexican pesos in 1994 and the Russian ruble in 1998, among other disruptions. Whether prolonged or acute, these and other currency crises are associated with stagnation, inflation, austerity, financial panic and other painful economic outcomes. Nothing positive ever comes from a currency war.
So it was shocking and disturbing to global financial elites to hear the Brazilian finance minister, Guido Mantega, flatly declare in late September 2010 that a new currency war had begun. Of course, the events and pressures that gave rise to Mantega’s declaration were not new or unknown to these elites. International tension on exchange rate policy and, by extension, interest rates and fiscal policy had been building even before the depression that began in late 2007. China had been repeatedly accused by its major trading partners of manipulating its currency, the yuan, to an artificially low level and of accumulating excess reserves of U.S. Treasury debt in the process. The Panic of 2008, however, cast the exchange rate disputes in a new light. Suddenly, instead of expanding, the economic pie began to shrink and countries formerly content with their share of a growing pie began to fight over the crumbs.
Despite the obvious global financial pressures that had built up by 2010, it was still considered taboo in elite circles to mention currency wars. Instead international monetary experts used phrases like “rebalancing” and “adjustment” to describe their efforts to realign exchange rates to achieve what were thought by some to be desired goals. Employing euphemisms did not abate the tension in the system.
At the heart of every currency war is a paradox. While currency wars are fought internationally, they are driven by domestic distress. Currency wars begin in an atmosphere of insufficient internal growth. The country that starts down this road typically finds itself with high unemployment, low or declining growth, a weak banking sector and deteriorating public finances. In these circumstances it is difficult to generate growth through purely internal means and the promotion of exports through a devalued currency becomes the growth engine of last resort. To see why, it is useful to recall the four basic components of growth in gross domestic product, GDP. These components are consumption
The 1930s currency devaluations led quickly to Japan’s invasions in Asia and Germany’s attacks in Europe. The 1970s currency devaluations led quickly to the worst period of inflation in modern history. The United States was now entering a period of financial danger, similar to the 1930s and the 1970s. The Pentagon’s financial war game was ahead of its time, but only slightly, and seemed like part of the preparation for more dire days ahead—more of a beginning than the end to a new world of financial threats.
PART TWO
CURRENCY WARS
CHAPTER 3
Reflections on a Golden Age
“We’re in the midst of an international currency war.”
Guido Mantega, Finance Minister of Brazil,
September 27, 2010
“I don’t like the expression . . . currency war.”
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director, IMF,
November 18, 2010
A currency war, fought by one country through competitive devaluations of its currency against others, is one of the most destructive and feared outcomes in international economics. It revives ghosts of the Great Depression, when nations engaged in beggar-thy-neighbor devaluations and imposed tariffs that collapsed world trade. It recalls the 1970s, when the dollar price of oil quadrupled because of U.S. efforts to weaken the dollar by breaking its link to gold. Finally, it reminds one of crises in UK pounds sterling in 1992, Mexican pesos in 1994 and the Russian ruble in 1998, among other disruptions. Whether prolonged or acute, these and other currency crises are associated with stagnation, inflation, austerity, financial panic and other painful economic outcomes. Nothing positive ever comes from a currency war.
So it was shocking and disturbing to global financial elites to hear the Brazilian finance minister, Guido Mantega, flatly declare in late September 2010 that a new currency war had begun. Of course, the events and pressures that gave rise to Mantega’s declaration were not new or unknown to these elites. International tension on exchange rate policy and, by extension, interest rates and fiscal policy had been building even before the depression that began in late 2007. China had been repeatedly accused by its major trading partners of manipulating its currency, the yuan, to an artificially low level and of accumulating excess reserves of U.S. Treasury debt in the process. The Panic of 2008, however, cast the exchange rate disputes in a new light. Suddenly, instead of expanding, the economic pie began to shrink and countries formerly content with their share of a growing pie began to fight over the crumbs.
Despite the obvious global financial pressures that had built up by 2010, it was still considered taboo in elite circles to mention currency wars. Instead international monetary experts used phrases like “rebalancing” and “adjustment” to describe their efforts to realign exchange rates to achieve what were thought by some to be desired goals. Employing euphemisms did not abate the tension in the system.
At the heart of every currency war is a paradox. While currency wars are fought internationally, they are driven by domestic distress. Currency wars begin in an atmosphere of insufficient internal growth. The country that starts down this road typically finds itself with high unemployment, low or declining growth, a weak banking sector and deteriorating public finances. In these circumstances it is difficult to generate growth through purely internal means and the promotion of exports through a devalued currency becomes the growth engine of last resort. To see why, it is useful to recall the four basic components of growth in gross domestic product, GDP. These components are consumption
Similar Books
