Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War by Paul Kennedy Page A
Authors: Paul Kennedy
Tags: General, History, World War II, Military, Political Science, International Relations, Technology & Engineering, Marine & Naval
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Western saloon. “At 2323 hrs Kptlt Mansek fired a FAT torpedo at a freighter of 6000 tons in the starboard column, one minute later a G 7e [torpedo] at a freighter of 7000 tons, at 2325 hrs a FAT torpedo at a tanker of 8000 tons behind her and at 2332 hrs a G 7e at a freighter of 4000 tons”: four separate torpedo launches in nine minutes. 14 The Dutch freighter
Zaaland
and its American neighbor
James Oglethorpe
were hit, the first settling in the sea and the second, controlling an onboard fire, temporarily limping on (it would be finished off by U 91 later that night).
The Allied merchant ships were, in effect, running a gauntlet, and even those steaming in the inner columns were likely to be hit if a torpedo passed between the outer lines. What did this mean more generally? There were the two lost merchant ships themselves, of course, and thus two fewer in the limited tally of hulls that could go back and forth across the Atlantic. And then there were the crews, although many of them were picked up by the destroyer HMS
Beverly
and the corvette HMS
Pennywort
—at one stage in this chaotic night, incidentally, there was only
one
escort with the main convoy for a while. But perhaps the real point to notice was that the
Zaaland
was carrying a cargo of frozen wheat, textiles, and zinc, and the
James Oglethorpe
was transporting steel, cotton, and food in its hull, and aircraft, tractors, and trucks for the U.S. Army on its deck.
It is difficult, probably impossible, sixty-five years later to enter themental world of the commanders of those four naval escorts, who were looking after such an immense responsibility (they were about to be joined that day by a fifth, HMS
Mansfield
). They did not occupy the mental space of, say, Alanbrooke, experiencing the larger worries and frustrations that filled his diaries at Casablanca and in these later desperate months. 15 Nor did they occupy the world of the common soldier, sailor, and airman, almost all of whom had been culled from civilian life into a new existence of danger, hardship, and terror in this seemingly everlasting war. The convoy escort commanders operated at the middle level—just like the German U-boat commanders—and had enormous obligations to fulfill, setbacks to deal with, and losses to swallow. c Yet it was upon this middle level that the fate of the war now depended.
At half past midnight on March 17, U 435 put a torpedo into the American freighter
William Eustis
, which stopped immediately and began to list. The convoy commander, Lieutenant Commander Luther, having just returned to the main body and aware that his fellow escorts were picking up survivors several miles behind, swept his destroyer, HMS
Volunteer
, to the rear of the convoy. There he found the wrecked
William Eustis
, with its lifeboats launched but with many of the crew swimming in the water in different directions, crying for help. This was one of those occasions when there were no obvious, good solutions—only bad ones and even worse ones. Rejecting the pleas of the master and chief engineer of the merchant ship (who had scrambled on board the destroyer) that a rescue attempt be made at dawn, Luther took on as many survivors as he could find and then, fearing a U-boat team might board the beleaguered vessels and seize vital codes and papers, he depth-charged the
William Eustis
and steamed back to the convoy.
It was still only 2:50 in the morning, and the overworked destroyer had just caught up once more with the convoy when it saw the distantblast of another freighter going down. Two hours later Captain Lieutenant Zurmuehlen of U 600 achieved one of the most accomplished torpedo attacks of the Second World War, firing a salvo of four FAT torpedoes from the bow, and then one from the rear tube, at the totally unprotected starboard flank of the convoy. Within minutes the British freighter
Irena
and the whaling depot ship
Southern Princess
had each been hit by one torpedo, and the American
Zaaland
and its American neighbor
James Oglethorpe
were hit, the first settling in the sea and the second, controlling an onboard fire, temporarily limping on (it would be finished off by U 91 later that night).
The Allied merchant ships were, in effect, running a gauntlet, and even those steaming in the inner columns were likely to be hit if a torpedo passed between the outer lines. What did this mean more generally? There were the two lost merchant ships themselves, of course, and thus two fewer in the limited tally of hulls that could go back and forth across the Atlantic. And then there were the crews, although many of them were picked up by the destroyer HMS
Beverly
and the corvette HMS
Pennywort
—at one stage in this chaotic night, incidentally, there was only
one
escort with the main convoy for a while. But perhaps the real point to notice was that the
Zaaland
was carrying a cargo of frozen wheat, textiles, and zinc, and the
James Oglethorpe
was transporting steel, cotton, and food in its hull, and aircraft, tractors, and trucks for the U.S. Army on its deck.
It is difficult, probably impossible, sixty-five years later to enter themental world of the commanders of those four naval escorts, who were looking after such an immense responsibility (they were about to be joined that day by a fifth, HMS
Mansfield
). They did not occupy the mental space of, say, Alanbrooke, experiencing the larger worries and frustrations that filled his diaries at Casablanca and in these later desperate months. 15 Nor did they occupy the world of the common soldier, sailor, and airman, almost all of whom had been culled from civilian life into a new existence of danger, hardship, and terror in this seemingly everlasting war. The convoy escort commanders operated at the middle level—just like the German U-boat commanders—and had enormous obligations to fulfill, setbacks to deal with, and losses to swallow. c Yet it was upon this middle level that the fate of the war now depended.
At half past midnight on March 17, U 435 put a torpedo into the American freighter
William Eustis
, which stopped immediately and began to list. The convoy commander, Lieutenant Commander Luther, having just returned to the main body and aware that his fellow escorts were picking up survivors several miles behind, swept his destroyer, HMS
Volunteer
, to the rear of the convoy. There he found the wrecked
William Eustis
, with its lifeboats launched but with many of the crew swimming in the water in different directions, crying for help. This was one of those occasions when there were no obvious, good solutions—only bad ones and even worse ones. Rejecting the pleas of the master and chief engineer of the merchant ship (who had scrambled on board the destroyer) that a rescue attempt be made at dawn, Luther took on as many survivors as he could find and then, fearing a U-boat team might board the beleaguered vessels and seize vital codes and papers, he depth-charged the
William Eustis
and steamed back to the convoy.
It was still only 2:50 in the morning, and the overworked destroyer had just caught up once more with the convoy when it saw the distantblast of another freighter going down. Two hours later Captain Lieutenant Zurmuehlen of U 600 achieved one of the most accomplished torpedo attacks of the Second World War, firing a salvo of four FAT torpedoes from the bow, and then one from the rear tube, at the totally unprotected starboard flank of the convoy. Within minutes the British freighter
Irena
and the whaling depot ship
Southern Princess
had each been hit by one torpedo, and the American
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