Faith of My Fathers by John McCain Page A

that remained of the Japanese Navy in the attempt. A Northern Force with four carriers serving as a decoy was ordered to entice the offensive-minded Halsey into giving chase, leaving the Seventh Fleet exposed in Leyte Gulf.
    Meanwhile, two Japanese battleship forces, Kurita’s powerful Center Force and a Southern Force, sailed for the central Philippines. The Southern Force would enter south of Leyte through the Surigao Strait. If Halsey fell for the decoy and left his station off the San Bernardino Strait, Kurita’s Center Force would force the unprotected strait from the north, sail down the coast of Samar Island, converge with the Southern Force, and destroy the unsupported American invasion fleet.
    On the 23rd, Third Fleet aircraft located the Center Force, and Halsey prepared to do battle. The next day, he recalled my grandfather, but it was too late for him to get within range of the enemy, and Halsey was deprived of 40 percent of his air strength as he fought what is known as the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea.
    In Leyte Gulf, Admiral Kinkaid was readying his Seventh Fleet to do battle with the small Japanese Southern Force. Lacking the big carriers of the Third Fleet, the Seventh Fleet had only eighteen small, unarmored escort carriers to provide airpower with lightly armed planes and poorly trained pilots. Nevertheless, Kinkaid knew his fleet, 738 ships in all, was more than a match for the enemy force approaching from the south.
    The Japanese Northern Force had gone undetected until seventy-six of its aircraft attacked one of Halsey’s carrier groups late in the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea. Now aware that Japanese carriers were in the area, Halsey’s blood was up; he believed that “an opportunity to destroy a major portion of the enemy fleet” was at hand. He broke off the attack on Kurita’s force and ordered all of his carrier groups north to seek and annihilate Ozawa’s carriers. The decoy had succeeded. Halsey left the Seventh Fleet unguarded, vulnerable to and unaware of the threat approaching from the north.
    Halsey had not even bothered to inform Kinkaid that he had left the strait. Before he ordered his forces north, he had signaled Nimitz that he intended to form three groups of his fast battleships into a new, powerful surface task force, Task Force 34. Kinkaid had intercepted the signal and assumed that the “three groups” were carrier groups that would be left behind to guard the strait. In fact, Halsey’s decision to attack the decoy force had preempted the formation of Task Force 34, and all the ships that would have constituted it were now steaming away from the strait.
    As Kinkaid had expected, the Seventh Fleet’s cruisers, destroyers, and battleships quickly and effectively destroyed the Japanese Southern Force. But a few minutes after the last shots were fired, at dawn on October 25, Kurita’s ships began shelling one of the Seventh Fleet’s three escort carrier groups operating just north of the entrance to Leyte Gulf. This group, known by its radio call sign, “Taffy Three,” was seriously overmatched by the powerful enemy force now descending upon it. Nevertheless, the unit fought valiantly, losing one carrier, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort in the ensuing Battle of Samar Island.
    As he raced toward the Northern Force, Halsey finally formed Task Force 34, and ordered the battleships to steam ahead of the carriers. Third Fleet aircraft began attacking the Japanese carriers at eight o’clock on the morning of the 25th, and continued until evening.
    When the second strike of the day was under way, Halsey received an urgent message from Kinkaid informing him that the Seventh Fleet’s small carriers were under attack off Samar Island by a superior enemy force and pleading for assistance from Halsey’s carriers. Halsey ignored the message and continued north. He received several successive messages from Kinkaid, the last