connection for probably 50 per cent of that price.
I discreetly count the number of hash bricks being hidden into that little Citroën and there are at least fifty. That means this car is about to transport drugs worth well in excess of €1 million to Zaid … It seems incredible that such a small vehicle can be used to transport such a valuable shipment. But then again, it is clear that it is at this point the hashstarts to make huge amounts of money for those prepared to finance its shipments. In a sense, the ones who take the real risks – the people in that Citroën – are nothing more than mules. Zaid says the two men in the car will get €3,000 each for driving the hash up to Madrid. Like any big business, it is the money-men who stand to make the most profits. They are risking not themselves but their cash and that seems a more valuable commodity than human lives in the secret underworld of hash.
Zaid goes on to explain the costs and complications involved in getting the hash from the coastline of southern Spain to the cities of Europe. He is careful to point out that he has nothing to do with the Moroccan end of the operation, but he openly talks about who needs to be bribed to get the hash out of North Africa.
There are different methods of transport into Europe, but there is one main route from Tangier and the Rif Mountains beyond: across that already familiar stretch of water called the Strait of Gibraltar. The real players in this game deal in huge quantities and run sophisticated operations. Zaid even tells a chilling anecdote about how a gang of Dutch criminals tried to set up their own smuggling ‘hub’ in Ketama and ended up with their throats cut.
‘These guys just didn’t get it,’ explains Zaid. ‘They thought by cutting out the Moroccan transporters, they could cut their costs and make even bigger profits but they are the ones who got cut. It’s madness to try and do business inside Morocco. Leave it to the locals, I say.’
Zaid openly admits that he himself comes from a family of Moroccans who immigrated to Spain three generations earlier. ‘Look, even I who am part Moroccan know it is dangerous to step on their tails. Of course, I have used my family connections to set up a supply route. But I have been very careful not to put any Moroccans out of business during that process.’
But Zaid knows all the pitfalls when it comes to the hash business. He says he has dealt with everyone from the Brit gangsters – ‘fair and strong’ – to the Balkan underworld – ‘evil and cold’ – and he claims that a few years ago he found himself doing business with a shady bunch of Moroccans who turned out to be Al-Qaeda terrorists trying to raise cash to buy weapons.
Zaid explained: ‘It was just before 9/11 so Al-Qaeda were more open about their activities and they had a cell of Moroccans working for them out of Tangier. The idea was that a bunch of Moroccan gangsters put up 50 per cent and Al-Qaeda the other 50 per cent and they shared the profits. But my friends the Moroccans said the Al-Qaeda boys were a nightmare to deal with. They didn’t understand the complex nature of hash smuggling and expected their profits to come pouring in virtually before the first shipment reached Spain. Then one of them accused the Moroccan gangsters of ripping them off and it ended in one guy dying and two being badly injured. From that moment on, no one in Morocco would agree to do business with Al-Qaeda. Eventually they set up their own supply route from one ‘friendly’ hash farm on theother side of the Rif Mountains and transported the hash by road into Tunisia, where it was shipped across the Mediterranean to Italy.’
But Zaid says that after 9/11 Al-Qaeda’s hash-producing farm was raided by one of the area’s most powerful drug lords. After a two-day gunfight, Al-Qaeda retreated back across the border into Algeria, where it is believed they set up another hash farm. Zaid says that the
I discreetly count the number of hash bricks being hidden into that little Citroën and there are at least fifty. That means this car is about to transport drugs worth well in excess of €1 million to Zaid … It seems incredible that such a small vehicle can be used to transport such a valuable shipment. But then again, it is clear that it is at this point the hashstarts to make huge amounts of money for those prepared to finance its shipments. In a sense, the ones who take the real risks – the people in that Citroën – are nothing more than mules. Zaid says the two men in the car will get €3,000 each for driving the hash up to Madrid. Like any big business, it is the money-men who stand to make the most profits. They are risking not themselves but their cash and that seems a more valuable commodity than human lives in the secret underworld of hash.
Zaid goes on to explain the costs and complications involved in getting the hash from the coastline of southern Spain to the cities of Europe. He is careful to point out that he has nothing to do with the Moroccan end of the operation, but he openly talks about who needs to be bribed to get the hash out of North Africa.
There are different methods of transport into Europe, but there is one main route from Tangier and the Rif Mountains beyond: across that already familiar stretch of water called the Strait of Gibraltar. The real players in this game deal in huge quantities and run sophisticated operations. Zaid even tells a chilling anecdote about how a gang of Dutch criminals tried to set up their own smuggling ‘hub’ in Ketama and ended up with their throats cut.
‘These guys just didn’t get it,’ explains Zaid. ‘They thought by cutting out the Moroccan transporters, they could cut their costs and make even bigger profits but they are the ones who got cut. It’s madness to try and do business inside Morocco. Leave it to the locals, I say.’
Zaid openly admits that he himself comes from a family of Moroccans who immigrated to Spain three generations earlier. ‘Look, even I who am part Moroccan know it is dangerous to step on their tails. Of course, I have used my family connections to set up a supply route. But I have been very careful not to put any Moroccans out of business during that process.’
But Zaid knows all the pitfalls when it comes to the hash business. He says he has dealt with everyone from the Brit gangsters – ‘fair and strong’ – to the Balkan underworld – ‘evil and cold’ – and he claims that a few years ago he found himself doing business with a shady bunch of Moroccans who turned out to be Al-Qaeda terrorists trying to raise cash to buy weapons.
Zaid explained: ‘It was just before 9/11 so Al-Qaeda were more open about their activities and they had a cell of Moroccans working for them out of Tangier. The idea was that a bunch of Moroccan gangsters put up 50 per cent and Al-Qaeda the other 50 per cent and they shared the profits. But my friends the Moroccans said the Al-Qaeda boys were a nightmare to deal with. They didn’t understand the complex nature of hash smuggling and expected their profits to come pouring in virtually before the first shipment reached Spain. Then one of them accused the Moroccan gangsters of ripping them off and it ended in one guy dying and two being badly injured. From that moment on, no one in Morocco would agree to do business with Al-Qaeda. Eventually they set up their own supply route from one ‘friendly’ hash farm on theother side of the Rif Mountains and transported the hash by road into Tunisia, where it was shipped across the Mediterranean to Italy.’
But Zaid says that after 9/11 Al-Qaeda’s hash-producing farm was raided by one of the area’s most powerful drug lords. After a two-day gunfight, Al-Qaeda retreated back across the border into Algeria, where it is believed they set up another hash farm. Zaid says that the
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