politics by other means, it would be a far greater evil for the Irish nation.â
Col Hefferon was anxious for a first hand report of events in the north, so Capt. Kelly was sent across the border again the following month. This time he accompanied Séamus Brady, a journalist working on the governmentâs propaganda campaign. The people that they met were clamouring for arms to defend themselves, as they felt virtually defenceless against armed Unionist thugs.
Later Haughey invited Col Hefferon to Kinsealy, along with his adjutant, Capt. Kelly. Charlie was looking for advice in order to establish a committee of reputable individuals to oversee the distribution of financial relief in Northern Ireland. Capt. Kelly briefed him on the situation there.
He explained that he was due to meet between fifteen and twenty representatives from the various Defence Committees at a hotel in Bailieboro, Co. Cavan, on the weekend of 4 October. He said he needed money to cover his expenses, and Haughey instructed the Department of Finance to provide him with £500.
The captainâs activities had already aroused the suspicion of the garda special branch, which was disturbed that he had been meeting with known members of the IRA. Berry was actually in hospital for tests when he learned that the captain was due to meet with the IRA Chief of Staff Cathal Goulding and other prominent members in Bailieboro, Co. Cavan. Unable to contact either the Minister for Justice or the Taoiseach, Berry telephoned Charlie, who promptly called to the hospital.
âI told him of Capt. Kellyâs goings on and of the visit planned for Bailieboro,â Berry noted. âHe did not seem unduly perturbed about Capt. Kelly but was quite inquisitive about what I knew of Goulding. I felt reassured.â
Berry had no idea Charlie had provided money to cover the expenses of the Bailieboro meeting, and Charlie made no effort to enlighten him. This meeting was the genesis of the arms crisis itself. Berry had confided in Charlie, but the latter had not reciprocated.
At the Bailieboro meeting a plan was hatched to provide northern Republicans with guns. Capt. Kelly noted in his report, however, that this was not likely to be enough. âThe defensive aspect of operations is genuinely stressed,â he wrote on 6 October 1969, âbut there is a definite feeling, that in the last analysis, the Defence Forces will have to come to the rescue.â
Haughey did not enlighten Berry who was still in hospital when he learned what happened at Bailieboro. He was again unable to contact the Justice minister Michael Moran, who had a serious drink problem. He therefore contacted Lynch, who called at the hospital on the morning of 18 October, as Berry was undergoing tests.
âI told him of Capt. Kellyâs prominent part in the Bailieboro meeting with known members of the IRA, of his possession of a wad of money, of his standing drinks and of the sum of money â £50,000 â that would be available for the purchase of arms,â Berry noted. Lynch later denied Berryâs account, but this was apparently one of those occasions on which he was suffering from his infamous forgetfulness. He actually told Gibbons about Berryâs report, and the Minister for Defence, in turn, questioned Col Hefferon, but that was apparently the end of the matter. When this information came out a decade later Gibbons stated that as of âOctober-November 1969ââ he informed the Taoiseach, âthat there were questionable activities on the part of certain members of the government making contact with people they should not make contact with.â This was not a great secret at the time. The United Irishman , the mouthpiece for the IRA, accused Charlie and Blaney of promising help to Nationalists in order to undermine the standing of the IRA north of the border. Some people later contended that the two politicians were responsible for the split that
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