component of international politics. For the first time, collective interventionist policies were seen as a legitimate way to prevent refugee flows. For Ogata, intervention, which she welcomed, would take the form of diplomacy and the pressing of human rights concerns, with a view to making it easier for the victims of war to remain at home. But it was not always easy; moral choices arose, about whether, in effect, to collaborate in ethnic cleansing by helping people leave their countries, or to abandon the defenseless to die. Ogata acted decisively. She would help people survive, whatever the implications. She would even work with the military, if she had to, especially after aid workers began to be targeted. As she had said, she could do nothing for the dead. But neither could she always do much for the living. Rwanda proved a bitter failure for many UN agencies, UNHCR among them. Neither were the
génocidaires
halted as they killed, nor were the camps housing survivors later prevented from being militarized. The question before Ogata and her colleagues was painful: to what extent does relief make things worse by prolonging conflict?
Not everyone was sad to see Ogata leave. People had liked her personally and found her style of leadership friendly. But she had stayed a little long. By the end of the 1990s, the mood was again changing. Protection for refugees was felt to have suffered during her tenure, when so much emphasis had been placed on relief. In Kosovo, which saw the largest mass refugee movement in Europe since World War II, UNHCR was accused of having been poorly prepared and having acted too slowly. For its part, the agency felt itself to have been sidelined by states and forced to stand by while basic standards were violated and competing actors followed their own agendas. Donors moved away, preferring to invest funds directly or give to nongovernmental organizations. UNHCR was not the only agency to suffer, but between 1992 and 1997, its budget dropped by 21 percent. The principal loser, as ever, was Africa, where by 1999 UNHCR was spending just one tenth of what it spent in the Balkans. And by now Africa, with 12 percent of the world’s population, had nearly half of its displaced people.
• • •
IN JANUARY 2001, Ruud Lubbers, a former Dutch prime minister, became the ninth High Commissioner for Refugees. With political stature and confidence enabling him to meet world leaders on equal terms, Lubbers was perceived as a man able to confront Western governments over their ungenerous asylum policies and their reluctance to honor their refugee commitments; at the same time, he was decisive and clearheaded enough to reform a large and unwieldy office that had grown unaccountable during the years of major relief operations. It was hoped that he would persuade more countries to provide UNHCR’s funds, 94 percent of which still came from the United States, Japan, and the European Union, and which had fallen from $1.25 billion in 1996 to $911.6 million in 1999. In recent years, donors have taken to reneging on their promised contributions. And, what was possibly even more important than all these things, Lubbers was known to be determined to restore to UNHCR its primary function as a protector of refugees,rather than see that work sunk further in all-consuming relief operations. Hocké’s reign, say the experts, was flawed by his manner and his mistakes, but he had been right in his insistence on protection. Ogata, though admired for the tenacity with which she put the agency at the very front of the humanitarian world and kept it there, had made a fundamental mistake in letting slip the commitment to protection, so that success came to be measured in terms of how much relief could be delivered how quickly. To fill the vacuum, the many nongovernmental organizations now working with refugees had themselves begun to move into protection.
The new millennium contains huge challenges. Though refugee
génocidaires
halted as they killed, nor were the camps housing survivors later prevented from being militarized. The question before Ogata and her colleagues was painful: to what extent does relief make things worse by prolonging conflict?
Not everyone was sad to see Ogata leave. People had liked her personally and found her style of leadership friendly. But she had stayed a little long. By the end of the 1990s, the mood was again changing. Protection for refugees was felt to have suffered during her tenure, when so much emphasis had been placed on relief. In Kosovo, which saw the largest mass refugee movement in Europe since World War II, UNHCR was accused of having been poorly prepared and having acted too slowly. For its part, the agency felt itself to have been sidelined by states and forced to stand by while basic standards were violated and competing actors followed their own agendas. Donors moved away, preferring to invest funds directly or give to nongovernmental organizations. UNHCR was not the only agency to suffer, but between 1992 and 1997, its budget dropped by 21 percent. The principal loser, as ever, was Africa, where by 1999 UNHCR was spending just one tenth of what it spent in the Balkans. And by now Africa, with 12 percent of the world’s population, had nearly half of its displaced people.
• • •
IN JANUARY 2001, Ruud Lubbers, a former Dutch prime minister, became the ninth High Commissioner for Refugees. With political stature and confidence enabling him to meet world leaders on equal terms, Lubbers was perceived as a man able to confront Western governments over their ungenerous asylum policies and their reluctance to honor their refugee commitments; at the same time, he was decisive and clearheaded enough to reform a large and unwieldy office that had grown unaccountable during the years of major relief operations. It was hoped that he would persuade more countries to provide UNHCR’s funds, 94 percent of which still came from the United States, Japan, and the European Union, and which had fallen from $1.25 billion in 1996 to $911.6 million in 1999. In recent years, donors have taken to reneging on their promised contributions. And, what was possibly even more important than all these things, Lubbers was known to be determined to restore to UNHCR its primary function as a protector of refugees,rather than see that work sunk further in all-consuming relief operations. Hocké’s reign, say the experts, was flawed by his manner and his mistakes, but he had been right in his insistence on protection. Ogata, though admired for the tenacity with which she put the agency at the very front of the humanitarian world and kept it there, had made a fundamental mistake in letting slip the commitment to protection, so that success came to be measured in terms of how much relief could be delivered how quickly. To fill the vacuum, the many nongovernmental organizations now working with refugees had themselves begun to move into protection.
The new millennium contains huge challenges. Though refugee
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