increase in operations and the numbers of peacekeepers deployed on them worldwide, as well as an acute escalation in the operationsâ complexity. It was at this time that I was transferred to the UN peacekeeping office at the UNâs New York headquarters. I came from my previous post as controller of the UN, in the Department of Management, before which I had served as head of UN Human Resources and director of the Budget. I was to support Marrack Goulding from the newly created post of deputy head of the department.
â
T he possibility of deploying field missions without the full consent of all belligerent parties meant there was a need to be prepared, if necessary, to use force. This simple fact meant that peacekeeping troops would be in need of a very different range of capabilities than usual if they faced armed factions opposed to the aims of the missionâs mandate. This also meant troop-contributing countries might need to accept very different levels of risk, as well as to provide much higher levels of political commitment, attention, and responsiveness alongside the Security Council. This, however, was poorly recognized. The gulf between ends and means began to widen fatefully.
In 1992, the Security Council neglected to consciously create or review the possibilities of a distinctive new set of governing principles and structures for UN peacekeeping. Instead, all the legacy structures and doctrine of UN peacekeeping from the Cold War were carried into this new era.
This meant that the old and creaking Cold War machinery of peacekeeping was being turned to situations for which it was never intended. Peacekeeping had been cobbled together out of the limited possibilities presented within the political constraints of the UN system during the Cold War. The idea that the UN should have its own troops, commanded entirely by its Secretariat, was never accepted by the UNâs member states. As a result, UN peacekeeping operated under a tripartite governing structure, among which relationships and authority over operations were unclear at the best of times. First, there was the Security Council, which had the power to bring into force a UN field operation, and was responsible for determining its mandate, objectives, and parameters as part of an ongoing supervisory role. Second, there was the UN Secretariat, the administrative body of the UN, which had responsibility for overseeing the day-to-day management of these operations, particularly through DPKO and the office of the secretary-general. And third, there were the troop-contributing countries, which retained authority over the forces they deployed on UN missions, and in practice remained in ultimate command of their own troops.
Peacekeeping was therefore reliant upon an often conflicted intergovernmental body for its political master, in the form of the Security Council, while its logistics and administration were run by a UN department whose authority was unclear. And, worse, missions were entirely dependent upon multiple troop-contributing countries whose troops took decisive orders only from their own governments. The chain of command was confused and decision-making responsibility fragmented, with unity of purpose often absent between these three parts.
In traditional peacekeeping during the Cold War, this had often led to slow and disorganized deployments, problems in the direction of troops, and great difficulty in equipping and sustaining the force. But most of these problems had been in field missions in relatively stable environments involving the monitoring of clearly delineated boundaries between warring countries, as I witnessed personally in 1973 in Egypt. The inherent weaknesses in the system of peacekeeping operations were never exposed in such missions in so serious a manner as to produce any momentum for reform. The system was sufficient to allow the deployment of peacekeeping forces, regardless of any shortcomings along the way.
The
â
T he possibility of deploying field missions without the full consent of all belligerent parties meant there was a need to be prepared, if necessary, to use force. This simple fact meant that peacekeeping troops would be in need of a very different range of capabilities than usual if they faced armed factions opposed to the aims of the missionâs mandate. This also meant troop-contributing countries might need to accept very different levels of risk, as well as to provide much higher levels of political commitment, attention, and responsiveness alongside the Security Council. This, however, was poorly recognized. The gulf between ends and means began to widen fatefully.
In 1992, the Security Council neglected to consciously create or review the possibilities of a distinctive new set of governing principles and structures for UN peacekeeping. Instead, all the legacy structures and doctrine of UN peacekeeping from the Cold War were carried into this new era.
This meant that the old and creaking Cold War machinery of peacekeeping was being turned to situations for which it was never intended. Peacekeeping had been cobbled together out of the limited possibilities presented within the political constraints of the UN system during the Cold War. The idea that the UN should have its own troops, commanded entirely by its Secretariat, was never accepted by the UNâs member states. As a result, UN peacekeeping operated under a tripartite governing structure, among which relationships and authority over operations were unclear at the best of times. First, there was the Security Council, which had the power to bring into force a UN field operation, and was responsible for determining its mandate, objectives, and parameters as part of an ongoing supervisory role. Second, there was the UN Secretariat, the administrative body of the UN, which had responsibility for overseeing the day-to-day management of these operations, particularly through DPKO and the office of the secretary-general. And third, there were the troop-contributing countries, which retained authority over the forces they deployed on UN missions, and in practice remained in ultimate command of their own troops.
Peacekeeping was therefore reliant upon an often conflicted intergovernmental body for its political master, in the form of the Security Council, while its logistics and administration were run by a UN department whose authority was unclear. And, worse, missions were entirely dependent upon multiple troop-contributing countries whose troops took decisive orders only from their own governments. The chain of command was confused and decision-making responsibility fragmented, with unity of purpose often absent between these three parts.
In traditional peacekeeping during the Cold War, this had often led to slow and disorganized deployments, problems in the direction of troops, and great difficulty in equipping and sustaining the force. But most of these problems had been in field missions in relatively stable environments involving the monitoring of clearly delineated boundaries between warring countries, as I witnessed personally in 1973 in Egypt. The inherent weaknesses in the system of peacekeeping operations were never exposed in such missions in so serious a manner as to produce any momentum for reform. The system was sufficient to allow the deployment of peacekeeping forces, regardless of any shortcomings along the way.
The
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