Kirov III-Pacific Storm (Kirov Series) by John Schettler Page A

unnecessary. Was he wrong about Midway now? The more
he considered, the more Nagano’s arguments began to make sense to him. It was
the carriers, the carriers, the carriers . Every operation conceived by
the navy thus far had begun with the assignment of the vital carrier division
to be responsible as both a primary strike force and defensive covering force.
And where were the American carriers now? Were they east at Midway? Were they
in Pearl Harbor? Intelligence answered both these questions with a certain
negative. No . They were operating southeast of the Solomons, from Noumea
on New Caledonia and Suva Bay in the Fiji Islands. He wanted a decisive
engagement, but where would he find it, in the east against Midway and Pearl
Harbor, or right here in the Solomons?
    He had three carrier divisions at his
disposal now—right here, right now. There were at least three enemy carriers
operating in these waters—right here, right now. To launch his Midway operation
he would have to take all these ships home to Kure and other bases in Japan to
refuel and rearm for the long sea voyage east. Yet he could launch this
operation “FS,” as it was now being called, from his present position, right
now. And Yamashita’s plan for Darwin was also correct, he knew, though he could
not condone any further attempt to occupy the vast Australian mainland. But
Darwin could be taken easily enough, particularly with Yamashita in command.
    He sighed…What was he waiting for?
They called him the ‘Reluctant Admiral’ behind his back, though no man would
ever dare such disrespect to his face. In some ways it was true, he knew. He
had vigorously opposed the useless invasion and occupation of Manchuria, and
strongly argued against war with the United States. These were positions that
made him a very unpopular man, so unpopular at one time that he had been informed
of plots against his life. So the Navy sent him off to sea, away from the
mainland, and believed in his promise that if war ever did come, he would raise
hell…for six months…for a year he had told them, and then he could guarantee
nothing more.
    Of course they did not wish to hear
that last bit. But thus far it was the American Navy that had been most
reluctant to engage him. When Pearl Harbor was wisely canceled, he thought the
attack on the Philippines would immediately trigger their War Plan Orange, and
was surprised to see that the Americans did not rush boldly in as so many
believed they would. Nimitz and Halsey had been crafty, and very elusive.
Instead they began to build a center of gravity in the southeast, on New
Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa. They had begun moving vast amounts of equipment and
supplies to Australia, and avoided major engagements until the recent
‘Operation MO’ had forced them to fight for Port Moresby. And now he realized
that this was the only way to bring them to battle—by threatening a key base of
operations that they dearly wanted to retain.
    What did they prize now? Where were
they building strength? Midway was said to have no more than a single battalion
and a few old fighters and seaplanes in garrison. Yet at Noumea the enemy
strength was building day by day. What would he use that force for? The answer
was obvious: they would begin a drive northwest into the Solomons aimed at
eventually reaching Rabaul. From there they would be able to outflank our new
bastion at Port Moresby, and our positions at Buna and Lae in Papua New Guinea
as well. From Rabaul they would have a strong air base to strike this very
place where he sat in Hotel Yamato , pouring over his maps—the island of
Truk, Japan’s chief naval base in the Pacific.
    The longer he considered it, the more
he saw the truth in Nagano’s words, and the wisdom in Yamashita’s plan as well.
Yamamoto was a gambler in his heart, and had once remarked that ‘people who
don’t gamble aren’t worth talking to.’ He had embraced his Midway operation for
its daring element of surprise, and the