the Marne was the start of years of incessant bombardment and trench warfare. In retrospect, it was probably Germany’s one genuine chance to inflict a crushing defeat on the French. But a combination of German indecisiveness and resolute French defence resulted in what the French called ‘the miracle on the Marne’. In three days of devastating fighting, the Germans and the French each suffered a quarter of a million casualties – the highest average daily casualty rate throughout the entire war.
The Germans were forced to break off and retrace their steps through the French villages they had earlier vanquished. Although they never conceded the point, it was the Germans’ first defeat in the field and many experts believe their chance of an ultimate victory went with it. It saw more than 30 German generals surreptitiously sacked and General Erich von Falkenhayn brought in as Chief of Staff, replacing General Helmuth von Moltke who had held that position since 1906.
Falkenhayn tried to outflank the French and British armies in a series of engagements in Belgium and north-eastern France that became known as the Race to the Sea. Having failed there, in November he ordered his armies to fall back to higher ground and dig in. It was to be the start of four years of relentless, murderous trench warfare. The French and their Allies mirrored the German defences and soon both front lines were a series of trenches, separated by no-man’s land, which formed an ugly scar that ran 760 kilometres across Europe from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps.
The problem facing the commanders from both sides was simple and apparently insoluble: because of the mirror-image front lines that stretched across the continent, there were no flanks. If you can’t outflank your enemy, you must attack them head on. In that case, the conflict becomes a grim test of strength, a war of attrition, where men and machinery are thrown against each other in continually growing numbers. The tactics wound the clock back to mediaeval times, to the days of siege warfare.
Germans prepare to attack at the Battle of the Marne in September 1914. It signalled the start of four years of trench warfare and was probably Germany’s one real chance at a conclusive victory over France. But German indecisiveness and heroic French defence ended in ‘the miracle on the Marne’. In just three days, the Germans and the French each suffered a quarter of a million casualties.
General Erich von Falkenhayn took over from von Moltke as German Chief of Staff after the Battle of the Marne. He unsuccessfully tried to outflank the French and British armies in what became known as the Race to the Sea, then ordered his armies to dig in, creating a trench line that soon stretched from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps.
As each side learned from its errors, the fighting developed into a pattern. Because the Germans had adopted a defensive posture, it was normally the Allies who attacked. Ever-increasing artillery bombardments presaged an infantry attack. The bombardments were designed to destroy the opposing front-line trenches and to force the defenders to withdraw or to take shelter in their bunkers. The infantry would then attack on foot across no-man’s land, hopefully before the enemy could reset its defensive position. Usually, despite terrible casualties, the attackers were able to break into the opposing front line. Often they broke through into the second line of defensive trenches. But both sides soon developed a very effective response – counter-attacks by troops held aside from the front lines who cut off the attacking troops, encircled them and killed them or took them prisoner.
So while small gains, usually measured in metres, were made, the attacks invariably petered out as the counter-attacks recaptured the positions. The over-arching problem facing the commanders from both sides was how could they break through all three lines of the defences and continue the
The Germans were forced to break off and retrace their steps through the French villages they had earlier vanquished. Although they never conceded the point, it was the Germans’ first defeat in the field and many experts believe their chance of an ultimate victory went with it. It saw more than 30 German generals surreptitiously sacked and General Erich von Falkenhayn brought in as Chief of Staff, replacing General Helmuth von Moltke who had held that position since 1906.
Falkenhayn tried to outflank the French and British armies in a series of engagements in Belgium and north-eastern France that became known as the Race to the Sea. Having failed there, in November he ordered his armies to fall back to higher ground and dig in. It was to be the start of four years of relentless, murderous trench warfare. The French and their Allies mirrored the German defences and soon both front lines were a series of trenches, separated by no-man’s land, which formed an ugly scar that ran 760 kilometres across Europe from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps.
The problem facing the commanders from both sides was simple and apparently insoluble: because of the mirror-image front lines that stretched across the continent, there were no flanks. If you can’t outflank your enemy, you must attack them head on. In that case, the conflict becomes a grim test of strength, a war of attrition, where men and machinery are thrown against each other in continually growing numbers. The tactics wound the clock back to mediaeval times, to the days of siege warfare.
Germans prepare to attack at the Battle of the Marne in September 1914. It signalled the start of four years of trench warfare and was probably Germany’s one real chance at a conclusive victory over France. But German indecisiveness and heroic French defence ended in ‘the miracle on the Marne’. In just three days, the Germans and the French each suffered a quarter of a million casualties.
General Erich von Falkenhayn took over from von Moltke as German Chief of Staff after the Battle of the Marne. He unsuccessfully tried to outflank the French and British armies in what became known as the Race to the Sea, then ordered his armies to dig in, creating a trench line that soon stretched from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps.
As each side learned from its errors, the fighting developed into a pattern. Because the Germans had adopted a defensive posture, it was normally the Allies who attacked. Ever-increasing artillery bombardments presaged an infantry attack. The bombardments were designed to destroy the opposing front-line trenches and to force the defenders to withdraw or to take shelter in their bunkers. The infantry would then attack on foot across no-man’s land, hopefully before the enemy could reset its defensive position. Usually, despite terrible casualties, the attackers were able to break into the opposing front line. Often they broke through into the second line of defensive trenches. But both sides soon developed a very effective response – counter-attacks by troops held aside from the front lines who cut off the attacking troops, encircled them and killed them or took them prisoner.
So while small gains, usually measured in metres, were made, the attacks invariably petered out as the counter-attacks recaptured the positions. The over-arching problem facing the commanders from both sides was how could they break through all three lines of the defences and continue the
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