American government was aiding the movement, Brzezinski argued, and potentially it could be dangerous for the US to be seen interfering in Polish affairs. Small amounts of American money went towards launching a Solidarity-backed magazine, Kultura , and there was plenty of moral support. At first the Reagan administration was equally cautious and pledged no substantial funds, even immediately after martial law was declared. But a year later the Americans changed their minds and the CIA began funnelling large amounts of money, printing and broadcasting equipment, as well as hundreds of photocopying machines to Poland ‘for the purposes of waging underground political warfare’ according to Deputy CIA Director Robert Gates. It was channelled through the American trade union organisation, the AFL-CIO, via its European director Irving Brown, who had worked closely with American intelligence since the earliest Marshall Plan days.
Casey ‘insisted that deniability was very important for Solidarity’ as well as for the US, said Gates, so elaborate ruses to protect CIA involvement from scrutiny were worked out. The AFL-CIO handed money over to the Institute of Religious Workers, a Catholic organisation with close links to the Curia. Then the Vatican Bank, along with the Banco Ambrosiano, set up shell companies in the Bahamas and Panama in a paper trail that ended in accounts set up by the Solidarity-in-exile office in Brussels run by Jerzy Milewski. A soft-spoken physicist and Solidarity thinker, he had been in the West when General Jaruzelski launched his military coup. A charming, mild-mannered intellectual, he never imagined he would ever spend his days as a bagman for laundered money from an espionage agency, however noble the cause. He organised aid shipments to Poland, through Sweden, hidden amongst consignments of charity donations from the Catholic Church and otherwise legitimate cargo. The Prime Minister Olof Palme - a Solidarity sympathiser - had assured Reagan that Swedish Customs would turn a blind eye to exports destined for Gdansk.
Did the Polish regime know about the CIA/Vatican aid? General Władisław Pozoga, head of Polish counter-intelligence during martial law, insists, boastfully, that it did. ‘We had infiltrated the [Solidarity] underground with precision,’ he claimed. They had spies in Solidarity’s Brussels office and had agents in Sweden. His boss, the Security Minister Kiszczak, agreed. ‘Because of our agents . . . we kept track of the huge flow of printing materials being smuggled in,’ he said. ‘We could intercept messages sent to, amongst others, Lech Wałesa . . . We broke the codes and thanks to a spy in Milewski’s office all computer-coded intelligence set on . . . disks was read by the secret police.’ They let all the equipment go through and allowed the contacts to continue as a way of ‘keeping tabs on the Underground’, he insisted.
If the generals knew the extent of the material entering the country it turned into a costly mistake to allow it through unhindered. Printing machines, books and all the communications equipment it was receiving helped to keep the flame of Solidarity alive, during dark days which could easily have seen the movement destroyed. In particular, the Americans sent a clever device, developed by the CIA, which could interrupt television signals. It transmitted a unique beam which over-rode the conventional signal broadcast by state TV. The normal screen would be obscured while a prerecorded screen appeared with the Solidarity logo accompanied by a message saying the movement lived and resistance could triumph. The transmissions were aired at peak viewing periods - at half-time in soccer matches, for example. The device had limited and localised effect - only for a couple of kilometres and for a few minutes. But the broadcasts had a profound psychological impact. They showed that Solidarity was still in a position to confound and embarrass the regime.
Casey ‘insisted that deniability was very important for Solidarity’ as well as for the US, said Gates, so elaborate ruses to protect CIA involvement from scrutiny were worked out. The AFL-CIO handed money over to the Institute of Religious Workers, a Catholic organisation with close links to the Curia. Then the Vatican Bank, along with the Banco Ambrosiano, set up shell companies in the Bahamas and Panama in a paper trail that ended in accounts set up by the Solidarity-in-exile office in Brussels run by Jerzy Milewski. A soft-spoken physicist and Solidarity thinker, he had been in the West when General Jaruzelski launched his military coup. A charming, mild-mannered intellectual, he never imagined he would ever spend his days as a bagman for laundered money from an espionage agency, however noble the cause. He organised aid shipments to Poland, through Sweden, hidden amongst consignments of charity donations from the Catholic Church and otherwise legitimate cargo. The Prime Minister Olof Palme - a Solidarity sympathiser - had assured Reagan that Swedish Customs would turn a blind eye to exports destined for Gdansk.
Did the Polish regime know about the CIA/Vatican aid? General Władisław Pozoga, head of Polish counter-intelligence during martial law, insists, boastfully, that it did. ‘We had infiltrated the [Solidarity] underground with precision,’ he claimed. They had spies in Solidarity’s Brussels office and had agents in Sweden. His boss, the Security Minister Kiszczak, agreed. ‘Because of our agents . . . we kept track of the huge flow of printing materials being smuggled in,’ he said. ‘We could intercept messages sent to, amongst others, Lech Wałesa . . . We broke the codes and thanks to a spy in Milewski’s office all computer-coded intelligence set on . . . disks was read by the secret police.’ They let all the equipment go through and allowed the contacts to continue as a way of ‘keeping tabs on the Underground’, he insisted.
If the generals knew the extent of the material entering the country it turned into a costly mistake to allow it through unhindered. Printing machines, books and all the communications equipment it was receiving helped to keep the flame of Solidarity alive, during dark days which could easily have seen the movement destroyed. In particular, the Americans sent a clever device, developed by the CIA, which could interrupt television signals. It transmitted a unique beam which over-rode the conventional signal broadcast by state TV. The normal screen would be obscured while a prerecorded screen appeared with the Solidarity logo accompanied by a message saying the movement lived and resistance could triumph. The transmissions were aired at peak viewing periods - at half-time in soccer matches, for example. The device had limited and localised effect - only for a couple of kilometres and for a few minutes. But the broadcasts had a profound psychological impact. They showed that Solidarity was still in a position to confound and embarrass the regime.
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