began in his firm, tight script. After advising Halleck that McClellan should not be disturbed, he reached the point of his missive, saying that he was “very anxious” to have the western armies move soon—and not just move, but move together. Lincoln proposed that Halleck send a force down the Mississippi toward Columbus, Kentucky, where Rebel forces under Leonidas Polk had accumulated 143 artillery pieces of various vintages and descriptions at a fortress on the bluffs. Confederates had proclaimed Columbus “the Gibraltar of the West”; it was the left-flank anchor of their long defensive line strung thinly across the crucial Bluegrass State. Further, Lincoln proposed that, while Halleck moved on Columbus, Buell should take his Army of the Cumberland south from Louisville to engage the other end of the Confederate western line. The president wanted very much for Buell’s troops to liberate the Union loyalists in the mountains of eastern Tennessee.
Both missions were essential to Lincoln’s basic strategy for defeating the Rebels. His ideas had begun to take shape under the influence of McClellan’s predecessor, the old warhorse Winfield Scott. When Lincoln arrived in Washington as president, he found Scott elderly, overweight, and creaky, but still in possession of the sharp strategic mind that had once inspired the Duke of Wellington to call him “the greatest living soldier.” Lincoln and Scott had much in common: Whigs by temperament, they were both reared in border slave states (Scott was a Virginian). Both were tall and imposing; both were avid readers and sly humorists. Crucially, both men believed that secession lacked popular support in the South. The Confederacy, they felt, had been hatched by wealthy slave owners to advance their interests at the expense of ordinary Southerners. On the basis of this conviction, Scott formulated a strategy for smothering the rebellion by blockading Southern ports and sending an army to open the Mississippi, the vital artery linking North and South. With these objectives achieved, secession fever would burn itself out and Southern loyalty would reemerge. Months after Scott left Washington, the president still had in mind the twin goals of opening the Mississippi River by capturing Columbus, and bolstering Southern Unionists in eastern Tennessee.
But Lincoln’s thinking had clearly ripened through his reading and reflection on military strategy, because he also outlined an additional concept that would be essential to Union victory against the sprawling South. The Rebels had a relatively small population and a very long border to defend. The North had far more men, and more guns to arm them, and more farms to feed them. The way to bring these advantages to bear, the president had realized, was to send multiple Union armies to strike simultaneously along the Confederate line, forcing the undermanned Rebels to concentrate against one attack, thus leaving another point undefended. In his letter to Halleck, he suggested that “a real or feigned attack upon Columbus from up-river,” in coordination with Buell’s march into Tennessee, would compel the Rebels to choose. If the Confederates defended Columbus, they would be strung too thinly to hold Nashville. Conversely, if the Rebels shifted troops from Columbus to strengthen Nashville, they would be “throwing Columbus into our hands.” Then he noted, “I sent General Buell a letter similar to this.”
Lincoln was walking on thin ice here, and he knew it. As a civilian whose military experience consisted of a few weeks’ service in the Illinois state militia, who was he to instruct Old Brains and McClellan’s chum Buell in fine points of strategy? So he added a note of deference: “You and he will understand much better than I how to do it.” But Lincoln reverted to a commanding note as he closed, showing just what he thought of Halleck’s warning about too much haste: “Please do not lose time in this matter.
Both missions were essential to Lincoln’s basic strategy for defeating the Rebels. His ideas had begun to take shape under the influence of McClellan’s predecessor, the old warhorse Winfield Scott. When Lincoln arrived in Washington as president, he found Scott elderly, overweight, and creaky, but still in possession of the sharp strategic mind that had once inspired the Duke of Wellington to call him “the greatest living soldier.” Lincoln and Scott had much in common: Whigs by temperament, they were both reared in border slave states (Scott was a Virginian). Both were tall and imposing; both were avid readers and sly humorists. Crucially, both men believed that secession lacked popular support in the South. The Confederacy, they felt, had been hatched by wealthy slave owners to advance their interests at the expense of ordinary Southerners. On the basis of this conviction, Scott formulated a strategy for smothering the rebellion by blockading Southern ports and sending an army to open the Mississippi, the vital artery linking North and South. With these objectives achieved, secession fever would burn itself out and Southern loyalty would reemerge. Months after Scott left Washington, the president still had in mind the twin goals of opening the Mississippi River by capturing Columbus, and bolstering Southern Unionists in eastern Tennessee.
But Lincoln’s thinking had clearly ripened through his reading and reflection on military strategy, because he also outlined an additional concept that would be essential to Union victory against the sprawling South. The Rebels had a relatively small population and a very long border to defend. The North had far more men, and more guns to arm them, and more farms to feed them. The way to bring these advantages to bear, the president had realized, was to send multiple Union armies to strike simultaneously along the Confederate line, forcing the undermanned Rebels to concentrate against one attack, thus leaving another point undefended. In his letter to Halleck, he suggested that “a real or feigned attack upon Columbus from up-river,” in coordination with Buell’s march into Tennessee, would compel the Rebels to choose. If the Confederates defended Columbus, they would be strung too thinly to hold Nashville. Conversely, if the Rebels shifted troops from Columbus to strengthen Nashville, they would be “throwing Columbus into our hands.” Then he noted, “I sent General Buell a letter similar to this.”
Lincoln was walking on thin ice here, and he knew it. As a civilian whose military experience consisted of a few weeks’ service in the Illinois state militia, who was he to instruct Old Brains and McClellan’s chum Buell in fine points of strategy? So he added a note of deference: “You and he will understand much better than I how to do it.” But Lincoln reverted to a commanding note as he closed, showing just what he thought of Halleck’s warning about too much haste: “Please do not lose time in this matter.
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