Scapegoat: The Death of Prince of Wales and Repulse by Dr Martin Stephen Page B

Admiral Palliser in Singapore had no reason to think Force Z would head for Kuantan following his signal of landings there. What is overlooked is that Tenedos , detached by Phillips because of its lack of endurance, did send the signal Phillips had given it confirming his return to Singapore and asking for additional destroyers to screen Force Z against Japanese submarines on the run-in to Singapore. It is inconceivable that Palliser did not have enough information to allow him to know at least roughly where Force Z was, or at the very least to arrange air cover as a contingency plan.
    ‘On the night before Prince of Wales was sunk, Phillips told me categorically, however, that he was quite convinced that in the event, fighter cover would be provided, and that his Chief of Staff, whom he had left behind on shore at Singapore, would arrange this… It seemed incredible to him that his Chief of Staff would not appreciate that he had gone to Kuantan in answer to the signal reporting the landings.’ 7
    However, of equal interest are the signals Tenedos sent out saying she was under attack from Japanese aircraft. These do not appear to have been received in Singapore.
    One conclusion, and the one most widely adopted by historians, is that the signals were indeed not received. Technologically such a thing is possible, even though they were picked up by Prince of Wales, and as far away as the Indian Ocean. If the signals had been received, air cover would surely have been sent over Kuantan. Phillips had no reason to think that the Tenedos signal had not been received in Singapore, and in the belief that it had, saw no need to break radio silence and give away his exact position, on the basis that Singapore had all the information it needed. A further factor which historians have tended to ignore is that if, as he had been told, a major landing was taking place at Kuantan, it would be reasonable to suppose that every available aircraft in Singapore would have been scrambled to be there.
    Given the chaos that was Singapore’s command structure, it has to be a possibility that the Tenedos signal was in fact received but either not communicated upwards or not acted on when it was. The latter appears to have been the case with the intercept revealing Force Z had been sighted. Yet the finger of suspicion has to point at Admiral Palliser. He had been left behind in Singapore to act as Tom Phillips’s eyes and ears and to act as the liaison officer for Force Z. Even on the undeniable evidence, history has let him off lightly. He sent a signal to Phillips stating categorically that air cover would not be available, and repeating the word ‘not’ so that there could be no misunderstanding, yet failed to either cancel this earlier message or tell Phillips that air cover was in fact available. He sent a further signal which clearly implied that such fighters as there were, were being held back for the defence of Singapore. From a host of reports of Japanese activity he chose to send a signal stating clearly that the Japanese were landing at Kuantan which happened to be a completely false report. It is sometimes said that Palliser might have been unaware of the fact that the report was false. It might equally be said that there is no record of him trying to find out either way. He apparently failed to realize that his signal would leave Phillips with no option but to head for Kuantan, and failed to organize air cover for that eventuality.
    If one believes Air Vice-Marshal Pulford, no one told him and the RAF where Force Z was; unfortunately, Pulford was ordered to leave Singapore shortly before it fell in a launch that was sunk by Japanese forces. Pulford died of starvation on the island on which he was stranded. Historians have universally assumed that Tom Phillips was to blame for the fact that Pulford claimed not to know the whereabouts of Force Z. It may well be that the brunt of the blame lay with Pulford’s own pilots.
    As we have