their team is ahead?
Yet you almost never see a manager use his bullpen ace before the eighth inning. Why? Because, again, what manager wants to subject himself to the inevitable roasting if this strategy fails? If your closer isn’t available to seal the game and you happen to lose … well, managers have been fired for lesser offenses. (Keep in mind, too, that closers like to accumulate “saves”—which occurif they are the last one pitching—since saves translate into dollars in the free agent market.)
Even inhockey, one can seeloss aversion affecting coaching strategy. “Pulling the goalie” and putting another potential goal scorer on the ice near the end of a game when your team is losing decidedly improves your chances of scoring a goal and tying the game, but it also increases the risk that with the net empty, an opponent will score first and put the game out of reach. We found that NHL teams pull their goalies too late (on average with only 1:08 left in the game when down by one goal and with 1:30 left when down by two goals). By our calculations, pulling the goalie one minute or even two minutes earlier would increase the chances of tying the game from 11.6 percent to 17.6 percent. Over the course of a season that would mean almost an extra win per year. Why do teams wait so long to pull the goalie? Coaches are so averse to the potential loss of an empty-net goal—and the ridicule and potential job loss that accompany it—that they wait until the last possible moment, which actually reduces their chances of winning.
When
do
we see coaches take risks? Well, when do we take risks in everyday life? Usually when there’s little or nothing to lose. You’re less likely to be loss-averse when you
expect
to lose. Think of your buddy in Vegas who’s getting crushed at the tables. Already down $1,000, he’ll take uncharacteristic risks, doubling down when he might otherwise fold, in hopes of winning it back. How many times have you gotten lost driving the back roads and taken a few turns based on intuition rather than consult your map or GPS? “Hey, why not? I’m lost already.” For that matter, how many schlubs have overreached around the time of last call, figuring that if they get shot down, they’re no worse for it?
Coaches are subject to the same thinking: In the face of desperation, or a nearly certain loss, they’ll adopt an unconventional strategy. They’ll go for it on fourth down when their team is trailing late in the game. They’ll pull the goalie with a minute left. They’ll break the rotation and use their ace pitcher in the seventh game of a World Series. Why not?
Consider how the forward pass became a part of football. It waslegalized in 1906 but hardly ever deployed until 1913, seven years later, when a small, obscure Midwestern school, Notre Dame, had to travel east to face mighty Army, a heavily favored powerhouse. With little to lose, the Fighting Irish coach,Jesse Harper, decided to employ this risky, newfangled strategy by using his quarterback, Charlie “Gus” Dorais, and his end, a kid namedKnute Rockne. The summer before, Dorais and Rockne had been lifeguards on a Lake Erie beach near Sandusky, Ohio, who passed the time throwing a football back and forth. The Army players were stunned as the Irish threw for 243 yards, which was unheard of at the time. Notre Dame won easily, 35–13. After that, the Irish no longer resided in college football obscurity, Dorais and Rockne became one of the first and best passing tandems of all time, and the forward pass was here to stay. Dorais and Rockne would both go on to become revered Hall of Fame coaches, in large part because they continued deploying their passing tactics at the coaching level.
In the rare instances when coaches in sports embrace risk systematically—not in the face of desperation but as a rule—there is a common characteristic. It has nothing to do with birth order or brain type or level of education. Rather,
Yet you almost never see a manager use his bullpen ace before the eighth inning. Why? Because, again, what manager wants to subject himself to the inevitable roasting if this strategy fails? If your closer isn’t available to seal the game and you happen to lose … well, managers have been fired for lesser offenses. (Keep in mind, too, that closers like to accumulate “saves”—which occurif they are the last one pitching—since saves translate into dollars in the free agent market.)
Even inhockey, one can seeloss aversion affecting coaching strategy. “Pulling the goalie” and putting another potential goal scorer on the ice near the end of a game when your team is losing decidedly improves your chances of scoring a goal and tying the game, but it also increases the risk that with the net empty, an opponent will score first and put the game out of reach. We found that NHL teams pull their goalies too late (on average with only 1:08 left in the game when down by one goal and with 1:30 left when down by two goals). By our calculations, pulling the goalie one minute or even two minutes earlier would increase the chances of tying the game from 11.6 percent to 17.6 percent. Over the course of a season that would mean almost an extra win per year. Why do teams wait so long to pull the goalie? Coaches are so averse to the potential loss of an empty-net goal—and the ridicule and potential job loss that accompany it—that they wait until the last possible moment, which actually reduces their chances of winning.
When
do
we see coaches take risks? Well, when do we take risks in everyday life? Usually when there’s little or nothing to lose. You’re less likely to be loss-averse when you
expect
to lose. Think of your buddy in Vegas who’s getting crushed at the tables. Already down $1,000, he’ll take uncharacteristic risks, doubling down when he might otherwise fold, in hopes of winning it back. How many times have you gotten lost driving the back roads and taken a few turns based on intuition rather than consult your map or GPS? “Hey, why not? I’m lost already.” For that matter, how many schlubs have overreached around the time of last call, figuring that if they get shot down, they’re no worse for it?
Coaches are subject to the same thinking: In the face of desperation, or a nearly certain loss, they’ll adopt an unconventional strategy. They’ll go for it on fourth down when their team is trailing late in the game. They’ll pull the goalie with a minute left. They’ll break the rotation and use their ace pitcher in the seventh game of a World Series. Why not?
Consider how the forward pass became a part of football. It waslegalized in 1906 but hardly ever deployed until 1913, seven years later, when a small, obscure Midwestern school, Notre Dame, had to travel east to face mighty Army, a heavily favored powerhouse. With little to lose, the Fighting Irish coach,Jesse Harper, decided to employ this risky, newfangled strategy by using his quarterback, Charlie “Gus” Dorais, and his end, a kid namedKnute Rockne. The summer before, Dorais and Rockne had been lifeguards on a Lake Erie beach near Sandusky, Ohio, who passed the time throwing a football back and forth. The Army players were stunned as the Irish threw for 243 yards, which was unheard of at the time. Notre Dame won easily, 35–13. After that, the Irish no longer resided in college football obscurity, Dorais and Rockne became one of the first and best passing tandems of all time, and the forward pass was here to stay. Dorais and Rockne would both go on to become revered Hall of Fame coaches, in large part because they continued deploying their passing tactics at the coaching level.
In the rare instances when coaches in sports embrace risk systematically—not in the face of desperation but as a rule—there is a common characteristic. It has nothing to do with birth order or brain type or level of education. Rather,
Similar Books
