Seize the Moment by Richard Nixon Page B

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    In our conversation, Landsbergis mentioned that his favorite literary quotation was a line from Ibsen’s Enemy of the People: “The strongest man in the world is he who stands most alone.” The Lithuanian president personifies the concept better than almost any leader I have met. Like Charles de Gaulle in World War II, Landsbergis knew that his only source of power was his absolute inflexibility on matters of principle. His insight and personal will enabled him not just to navigate the perilous course that ultimately led to the restoration of his country’s independence after fifty-one years of Soviet occupation. In concert with Yeltsin’s Russia, he and the other democratic nationalists in the non-Russian republics served as the indispensable backstop in the victory of the August 1991 revolution.
    It was ironic that many Americans, particularly within the foreign policy elite, viewed the new nationalists in the Soviet Union with disdain or contempt. That has not been our traditional—and historically vindicated—approach to nationalism. Few other forces inspire loyalties as strong as patriotism. International stability requires the great powers to accommodate legitimate nationalist aspirations while reproaching the excesses of extremists. With the death of communism as an ideology, the force of nationalism inevitably—and rightly—has become the decisive element in defining the future of the Soviet Union.
    Since Woodrow Wilson, American presidents have recognized the legitimacy of nationalist movements around the world. At Versailles, Wilson helped oversee the birth of the new nations of Eastern Europe. Roosevelt and his immediate successors pressed Britain and France to grant their colonies independence. During the French war in Indochina, Truman and Eisenhower kept their distance in order to avoid tainting America with European imperialism. During the Suez crisis, Eisenhower forced the British, French, and Israelis to abandon their attempt to retake the canal by force. It makes nosense for the United States to have pressed for the dismantling of the British and French empires, which were based on the values of European civilization, and yet to have attempted to prop up the Soviet empire, which was based on the ideology of communism.
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    These fundamental policy errors were rooted in a misunderstanding of the Gorbachev era. Gorbachev has profoundly changed the world and the Soviet Union. But to understand him—and to comprehend why he failed—we must look not just at his actions but at why he took them.
    Many in Western media and diplomatic circles uncritically embraced Gorbachev as the champion of world peace and democracy. In 1990, Time magazine named him “man of the decade,” remarking, “He is the force behind the most momentous events of the 1980s and what he has already done will almost certainly shape the future.” One newspaper commented, “No single individual alive today has more impacted the course of modern history and directly contributed to a climate for world peace than has this Soviet President. Future historians will divide the post—World War II era in terms of ‘before Gorbachev’ and ‘after Gorbachev.’ ” Another editorialized, “Gorbachev has solidified his place as one of the world’s greatest peacemakers,” adding, “perhaps the United States could use a leader such as Mikhail Gorbachev.” Still another opined, “Gorbachev is a prophet.” He was also awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his “decisive” contributions toward easing East-West tension and advancing disarmament. Former president Reagan called the Nobel committee’s choice “wonderful,” while former prime minister Thatcher called it “terrific” and Chancellor Kohl remarked that he was “delighted.”
    For six years, Gorbachev stood at the center