Target Tokyo: Jimmy Doolittle and the Raid That Avenged Pearl Harbor by James M. Scott Page A

Philippines and Singapore. Arnold dismissed the idea. He not only felt reluctant to risk the Navy’s few aircraft carriers but also questioned Portal’s motives, given the British hunger for American planes. “I always thought that Portal mixed wishful thinking in with his reasoning concerning the Pacific aerial strategy,” Arnold wrote. “I thought he was afraid if our Air Force planned to use heavy bombers against Japan it would cut down the number he would receive.”
    In another conference that same day, Admiral Stark followed up on the possibility of launching attacks from Chinese airfields. Arnold pointed out that America did not yet have enough bombers in China and warned against launching a raid until the Air Forces could send enough planes to create significant damage. “The minimum number of bombers should be 50,” Arnold advised Stark. “Unsustained attacks would only tend to solidify the Japanese people.” With Russia out and China short on planes, America’s options appeared to dwindle, unless Arnold followed Portal’s advice and ceded the operation to the Navy. At a January 4 White House conference about the possible invasion of North Africa, Admiral King suggested shipping Army bombers aboard carriers. The idea piqued Arnold’s curiosity, as evidenced by the notes he scribbled. “By transporting these Army bombers on a carrier, it will be necessary for us to take off from the carrier,” he wrote. “We will have to try bomber takeoff from carriers. It has never been done before but we must try out and check on how long it takes.”
    Arnold’s staff started to examine the idea immediately, though focusing on the limited concept of using Army cargo planes aboard a carrier to transport fuel for an expeditionary force of naval fighters. An informal agreement between Arnold and King—described in a January 5 memo—even proposed testing various transports off a flattop. In response, analysts pulled together data on planes with wingspans under ninety feet, including true air speed, flap settings, and ground run required for takeoff as well as the height of each plane and feasibility of removing the wings to allow storage in a hangar deck. Analysts ruled out the DC-3 and DC-2 because neither plane’s wingspan would clear a carrier’s superstructure and because the fuselages were too long to ride down the aircraft elevator. The C-63was another option, but the Army simply didn’t have enough of them available yet. In a January 13 memo Arnold’s staff leveled with the general: cargo planes wouldn’t work. “It is not believed that any plane now available, which can operate from a carrier, would justify the test under consideration.”
    About this time Low and Duncan appeared in the general’s office. Rather than launch cargo planes in support of the Navy, why not use B-25s and make them raiders? The greater range of the twin-engine Army bombers would mean the carriers would not have to approach so close to Japan. If the bombers flew on to China as proposed, then the carriers could immediately turn back, further limiting the risk to America’s precious flattops. Arnold enthusiastically embraced the concept, but he wanted to run it by his staff troubleshooter, Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy Doolittle. The forty-five-year-old Doolittle had grabbed national headlines over the years as a stunt and racing pilot who Arnold knew also happened to boast master’s and doctoral degrees from the prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology. If anyone could evaluate this plan’s chance of success, Doolittle could. Arnold summoned him to his office.
    “Jim, what airplane do we have that can take off in 500 feet, carry a 2,000-pound bomb load, and fly 2,000 miles with a full crew?”
    Doolittle conducted a mental inventory of America’s arsenal, deducing that only a medium bomber would be able to lift off in that short distance. Of the four bombers he considered, three might be able to handle the