Dekanozov’s interview with von Weizsäcker did not occur until 9:30 P.M. Berlin time (11:30 P.M. Moscow time). Dekanozov reported the results of his talk by urgent cable, which could hardly have been transmitted and decoded before 1 or 1:30 A.M. Telephone connections between Moscow and Berlin normally were very fast—not more than ten or fifteen minutes, or a maximum of thirty minutes, being required to put through a call. Customarily, however, the embassy reported by telegraph. (Berezhkov, personal communication, March, 1968; I. F. Filippov, Zapiski o Tretiyem Reikhe , Moscow, 1966, p. 24.)
8 Kuznetsov gives the time as 2 P.M. Tyulenev’s memoirs merely indicate Saturday afternoon.
9 There is no reference to this meeting in the memoirs of such high military figures as Tyulenev, Kuznetsov, Voronov and Zhukov. Nor is it mentioned in official Soviet histories. Budyonny did not indicate precisely who was present. (Budyonny, personal communication, July, 1967.)
10 Many Soviet sources confirm that Budyonny was named Reserve Forces Commander and instructed to move reserve forces to the Dnieper River line. The Politburo decision of June 21 is reported by V. Khvostov and A. Grylev (Kommunist , No. 12, August, 1968).
11 This view is supported by the fact that at 4 A.M. , June 22, an urgent message was sent by Molotov to Dekanozov, reporting the contents of the Molotov-Schulenburg talk and specifically asking Dekanozov to raise with Ribbentrop or his deputy the three questions to which Schulenburg did not respond: what reasons Germany had for being dissatisfied with her relations with the Soviet Union, what the basis was for the rumors of impending Soviet-German war, and why Germany had not responded to the Tass statement of June 14. (V. L. Izraelyan, L. N. Kutakov, Diplomatiya Agressorov , Moscow, 1967, p. 184.) Dekanozov was never to have an opportunity to raise the questions.
12 Marshal G. I. Kulik, another Deputy Defense Commissar, was sent to the Special Western Military District. He did not arrive at Bialystok, headquarters of the Tenth Army, until late Monday, June 23. By that hour he seemed to General I. V. Boldin to be dazed and at sea. Marshal Kulik reached Bialystok only a few hours before Major General M. G. Khazelevich of the Tenth Army was killed and his army virtually destroyed. (I. V. Boldin, Stranitsii Zhizn , Moscow, 1961.)
4 ♦ The Night Wears On
WHEN THE BALTIC FLEET COMMAND GOT WORD FROM Admiral Kuznetsov that the Germans might attack in the early hours of Sunday morning, it came as no surprise. In fact, as Admiral Panteleyev, Chief of Staff, recalled, they had been expecting “minute by minute that the next telegram or telephone call would bring the dark word—war!”
It was almost midnight Saturday when Panteleyev was summoned to join his superior, Fleet Commander Admiral Tributs. “It’s happened,” he thought as he hurried out of the big war room to the Admiral’s private office. There he found Tributs with his Military Council member, Commissar M. G. Yakovlenko. Tributs was leaning back in his black-leather chair, nervously tapping his knee with a long pencil. He displayed no other sign of emotion.
“I’ve just talked with Kuznetsov,” he said without preliminaries. “Tonight we must expect an attack by Germany.”
Panteleyev dashed back to his desk and started sending alerts to all fleet units, to the Fleet Air Staff and the Administration of Rear Services and Supplies.
Actually, the fleet was not in bad shape to meet the emergency. Some progress had been made in preparing the Leningrad sea approaches to repel German attack. As early as May 7 Admiral Tributs decided to post patrol ships at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland and at all naval bases in order to intercept Nazi submarines or surface vessels. However, the cold weather, the late break-up of the ice and the persistent fog delayed Admiral Tributs in making his dispositions. It was not till the second half of May that one
8 Kuznetsov gives the time as 2 P.M. Tyulenev’s memoirs merely indicate Saturday afternoon.
9 There is no reference to this meeting in the memoirs of such high military figures as Tyulenev, Kuznetsov, Voronov and Zhukov. Nor is it mentioned in official Soviet histories. Budyonny did not indicate precisely who was present. (Budyonny, personal communication, July, 1967.)
10 Many Soviet sources confirm that Budyonny was named Reserve Forces Commander and instructed to move reserve forces to the Dnieper River line. The Politburo decision of June 21 is reported by V. Khvostov and A. Grylev (Kommunist , No. 12, August, 1968).
11 This view is supported by the fact that at 4 A.M. , June 22, an urgent message was sent by Molotov to Dekanozov, reporting the contents of the Molotov-Schulenburg talk and specifically asking Dekanozov to raise with Ribbentrop or his deputy the three questions to which Schulenburg did not respond: what reasons Germany had for being dissatisfied with her relations with the Soviet Union, what the basis was for the rumors of impending Soviet-German war, and why Germany had not responded to the Tass statement of June 14. (V. L. Izraelyan, L. N. Kutakov, Diplomatiya Agressorov , Moscow, 1967, p. 184.) Dekanozov was never to have an opportunity to raise the questions.
12 Marshal G. I. Kulik, another Deputy Defense Commissar, was sent to the Special Western Military District. He did not arrive at Bialystok, headquarters of the Tenth Army, until late Monday, June 23. By that hour he seemed to General I. V. Boldin to be dazed and at sea. Marshal Kulik reached Bialystok only a few hours before Major General M. G. Khazelevich of the Tenth Army was killed and his army virtually destroyed. (I. V. Boldin, Stranitsii Zhizn , Moscow, 1961.)
4 ♦ The Night Wears On
WHEN THE BALTIC FLEET COMMAND GOT WORD FROM Admiral Kuznetsov that the Germans might attack in the early hours of Sunday morning, it came as no surprise. In fact, as Admiral Panteleyev, Chief of Staff, recalled, they had been expecting “minute by minute that the next telegram or telephone call would bring the dark word—war!”
It was almost midnight Saturday when Panteleyev was summoned to join his superior, Fleet Commander Admiral Tributs. “It’s happened,” he thought as he hurried out of the big war room to the Admiral’s private office. There he found Tributs with his Military Council member, Commissar M. G. Yakovlenko. Tributs was leaning back in his black-leather chair, nervously tapping his knee with a long pencil. He displayed no other sign of emotion.
“I’ve just talked with Kuznetsov,” he said without preliminaries. “Tonight we must expect an attack by Germany.”
Panteleyev dashed back to his desk and started sending alerts to all fleet units, to the Fleet Air Staff and the Administration of Rear Services and Supplies.
Actually, the fleet was not in bad shape to meet the emergency. Some progress had been made in preparing the Leningrad sea approaches to repel German attack. As early as May 7 Admiral Tributs decided to post patrol ships at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland and at all naval bases in order to intercept Nazi submarines or surface vessels. However, the cold weather, the late break-up of the ice and the persistent fog delayed Admiral Tributs in making his dispositions. It was not till the second half of May that one
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