The Age of Elegance by Arthur Bryant Page B

with orders to his divisional commanders, and, mounting his horse, galloped three miles across the stony fields to the village of Aldea Tejada where, about two miles north of the point on which the French advance-guard was moving, he had posted the 3 rd Division in reserve. Here he bade his brother-in-law, Edward P aken ham, move forward, take the heights in his front and drive everything before him. Then, before the colours could be encased and the men receive their orders to prime and load, he was on his way back to his position in the British centre. He had three hours of daylight and a chance that might never recur.
    Before him the French army was spread out on a series of low rolling hills, moving in column of march in a great semicircle westwards and on a scattered front of more than five miles. It was a sight not dissimilar to that which confronted Nelson at Trafalgar. The marching columns had their right flanks towards him. Because of the rolling and wooded nature of the country and the skill with which he had placed his own formations out of sight, they seemed unaware of the compact force which they were so hopefully passing and attempting to encircle. Indeed, misled by the westering movement of Wellington's baggage-train on the Salamanca-Rodrigo highway, Marmont was under the impression that the British army had already begun its retreat. Between his leading division, that of Thomieres, and those of Maucune, Clausel and Brennier in his centre there was a gap of more than a mile, while another of equal size separated the centre from the four scattered divisions following.
    Wellington, as always in an enemy's presence, had his force closely in hand. While his left, consisting of the ist and Light Divisions and Bock's German cavalry—just over 10,000 men—faced eastwards, the bulk of his army, which in view of the French encircling movement he had earlier in the day wheeled towards the south, was grouped around the little village of Arapiles. Here 14,000 British infantry of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Divisions, most of Cotton's cavalry, nearly 14,000 Portuguese and Espana's 3000 Spaniards—a force of some 34,000—were drawn up in line of battle within a mile of the 18,000 marching men of Marmont's centre. Further to the west another 6000 British and Portuguese, under Pakenham, were moving up from Aldea Tejada to strike at the head of Thomieres' strung-out advance-guard of 4500 infantry and attendant cavalry. The rest of the French army, more than 24,000 strong, was still coming up from the east.
    Marmont, as Wellington remarked to his Spanish aide-de-camp, was lost. Supported by D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, the 3 rd Division cut across Thomieres' line of march, in Napier's phrase, like a meteor. As it reached the summit of the plateau, it deployed and opened fire. The French were caught strung out on the march, surprised and at a hopeless disadvantage. Thomieres was killed, half his division mown down and all its guns captured. The survivors were driven back into the ranks of those behind.
    Here the British 4th and 5th Divisions, with their flanks covered by Bradford's Portuguese and Cotton's cavalry, had been moving in line across a shallow depression towards the French centre. As soon as Marmont had seen the British coming up over the opposing ridge, he had realised his mistake: Wellington was not a purely defensive

    general after all. But it was too late to retrieve it; a few minutes later, while galloping forward, he was struck down by a shell. Though his artillery, with 78 guns to the British 54, raked the oncoming scarlet lines, nothing could break that confident advance; it came on like the bore of a tidal river. Behind, in support, followed the 6th and 7th Divisions. For some reason Maucune's men awaited the attack in square, a little in rear of the crest along which they had been moving. They could not have chosen a more disastrous formation. The 5th Division, marching with review precision, breasted the