here that wants to do anything but forgive and not only reach out to those who have suffered a loss in that way but to reach out to the family of the man who committed these acts. 26
The Amish visited the killer’s family to express their forgiveness and even set up a fund for them. I was brought up aCatholic and always admired Jesus Christ, so why can’t I have his sense of forgiveness and resolve to turn the other cheek? And if you find it hard to believe the response of the Amish, can you more easily believe that others criticized their response as misguided and tantamount to denying the existence of evil? 27 , 28
So I argue back and forth with myself on this perspective, first arguing one side, and then the other. It sounds a little crazy, but it’s really all right to talk to yourself—as long as you don’t interrupt! And perhaps there is a bit of Jekyll and Hyde inside many of us. The ultimate challenge arises in how to reconcile these conflicting perspectives within ourselves to develop a compromise position. We’ll return to this issue further when we turn to the future of neurocriminology in the next chapter. But right now let’s return to our starting point—the two case studies that may help shape our perspective and judgment on the Jekyll-and-Hyde debate.
TURNING BACK A PAGE TO OFT
Some of us have felt the double-edged sword that neurocriminology offers up to us.PeytonTuthill forcefully felt the sharp edge of the blade. I felt the same edge, but far more lightly. Tuthill’s mother, Pat, vents against the violence done to her daughter. My Mr. Hyde rages for revenge.
Yet is there a blunter edge to the blade that can soften these retributive feelings, and give us pause for thought on punishment? Perhaps the medical model, with its Hippocratic oath of doing no harm, can help render a more benign judgment on this tortuous issue. Let’s look back both atDonta Page and also at our point of departure, Mr.Oft.
The medical information on Donta Page’s early life—as well as his brain scan in adulthood—did not deter the jury from finding him responsible and rendering him guilty of first-degree deliberate murder, first-degree felony murder, first-degree sexualassault, first-degreeburglary, and aggravatedrobbery against Peyton Tuthill. But would it make a difference in deciding whether he should live or die? In Colorado, on February 20, 2001, this question was decided at Page’s sentencing hearing by a panel of three judges who had to weigh the evidence and make a fateful decision. Would Page be held fully responsible for his acts and be executed bylethal injection? Or would they accept the biosocial argument that factors early in his life, beyond his control, led him down the path to violence? Should these facts mitigate the punishment, resulting in prison without the possibility of parole?
The panel decided not to execute him. They accepted the argument that a toxic mix of biological and social factors mitigated, to a degree, Page’s responsibility. It is what I and the defense team had argued for. But is that the right decision? Or is it nothing more than a slippery slope down to a future lawless society that knows no bounds and where all evil acts have some type of “excuse”? Where no one is responsible for anything?
Retributivists can be reassured that Page was found to be legally responsible for what he did. But what about Mr. Oft?
Should he be held responsible for his actions?
Would
you
hold him responsible? Bear in mind that in Donta Page’s case, we are talking about a correlation—not causation—between brain dysfunction and later violence. Yet in Mr. Oft’s case we come much closer to causality—the dramatic temporal sway of orbitofrontal disturbance with the sexual swing of hispedophilicpassion. What is your verdict? Take a moment to render your judgment.
I put this very question to an assembly of fourteen federal and state judges in the Federal Courthouse in Philadelphia on a cold
The Amish visited the killer’s family to express their forgiveness and even set up a fund for them. I was brought up aCatholic and always admired Jesus Christ, so why can’t I have his sense of forgiveness and resolve to turn the other cheek? And if you find it hard to believe the response of the Amish, can you more easily believe that others criticized their response as misguided and tantamount to denying the existence of evil? 27 , 28
So I argue back and forth with myself on this perspective, first arguing one side, and then the other. It sounds a little crazy, but it’s really all right to talk to yourself—as long as you don’t interrupt! And perhaps there is a bit of Jekyll and Hyde inside many of us. The ultimate challenge arises in how to reconcile these conflicting perspectives within ourselves to develop a compromise position. We’ll return to this issue further when we turn to the future of neurocriminology in the next chapter. But right now let’s return to our starting point—the two case studies that may help shape our perspective and judgment on the Jekyll-and-Hyde debate.
TURNING BACK A PAGE TO OFT
Some of us have felt the double-edged sword that neurocriminology offers up to us.PeytonTuthill forcefully felt the sharp edge of the blade. I felt the same edge, but far more lightly. Tuthill’s mother, Pat, vents against the violence done to her daughter. My Mr. Hyde rages for revenge.
Yet is there a blunter edge to the blade that can soften these retributive feelings, and give us pause for thought on punishment? Perhaps the medical model, with its Hippocratic oath of doing no harm, can help render a more benign judgment on this tortuous issue. Let’s look back both atDonta Page and also at our point of departure, Mr.Oft.
The medical information on Donta Page’s early life—as well as his brain scan in adulthood—did not deter the jury from finding him responsible and rendering him guilty of first-degree deliberate murder, first-degree felony murder, first-degree sexualassault, first-degreeburglary, and aggravatedrobbery against Peyton Tuthill. But would it make a difference in deciding whether he should live or die? In Colorado, on February 20, 2001, this question was decided at Page’s sentencing hearing by a panel of three judges who had to weigh the evidence and make a fateful decision. Would Page be held fully responsible for his acts and be executed bylethal injection? Or would they accept the biosocial argument that factors early in his life, beyond his control, led him down the path to violence? Should these facts mitigate the punishment, resulting in prison without the possibility of parole?
The panel decided not to execute him. They accepted the argument that a toxic mix of biological and social factors mitigated, to a degree, Page’s responsibility. It is what I and the defense team had argued for. But is that the right decision? Or is it nothing more than a slippery slope down to a future lawless society that knows no bounds and where all evil acts have some type of “excuse”? Where no one is responsible for anything?
Retributivists can be reassured that Page was found to be legally responsible for what he did. But what about Mr. Oft?
Should he be held responsible for his actions?
Would
you
hold him responsible? Bear in mind that in Donta Page’s case, we are talking about a correlation—not causation—between brain dysfunction and later violence. Yet in Mr. Oft’s case we come much closer to causality—the dramatic temporal sway of orbitofrontal disturbance with the sexual swing of hispedophilicpassion. What is your verdict? Take a moment to render your judgment.
I put this very question to an assembly of fourteen federal and state judges in the Federal Courthouse in Philadelphia on a cold
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