he
had read in college. In Conrad’s tale the connection that took place on a ship
between two people who had much in common was overshadowed by circumstances
that imposed a barrier, circumstances which made this sense of connection and
identification impossibly complicated. One of the two men had, in the end, been
forced to “jump ship”—literally.
Mac had studied the remarkably
detailed file that the Agency had compiled on Huang, a personality profile and
operational summary that was far more informative than most of those available
on Chinese intelligence officers. Even before he had met Huang, Mac felt he
really knew a great deal about the real person who had been selected as his
“target.” There was an immediate and troubling sense that he could not simply
regard Huang as a depersonalized enemy “objective.”
This feeling of identification,
even empathy, had been, for Mac, the foundation of something more complex than
just an operational interaction.
MacMurphy wanted to preserve
their personal relationship, not just because of the genuine close friendship
that had developed between them, but because there might come a day when Huang
really would want to jump ship. And MacMurphy wanted him to know where he could
always find a sympathetic, helpful ear. Mac had both Huang’s and the Agency’s
best interests at heart simultaneously, even if, on the surface, the two seemed
mutually exclusive. Mac intuitively knew it was too early in Huang’s career to
make the offer.
Above all, he did not want Huang
to feel obliged to report the recruitment pitch to Beijing. That was the most
important thing. MacMurphy knew from operational intelligence disseminated
exclusively to CIA case officers in the field that it was the policy of China’s
MSS to recall immediately any officer who had been on the receiving end of an
operational approach from a hostile intelligence service.
The MSS’s reasoning was simple:
If the officer did not appear vulnerable to hostile recruitment, he would not
have been pitched in the first place. So Beijing felt it was prudent to get the
officer back behind the safety of the bamboo curtain before things could get
out of hand. Beijing took no chances on someone who might later decide to
defect, or worse, to agree to a lucrative offer to spy against the motherland
as an agent-in-place.
The policy was a closely guarded
secret among a few top MSS counterintelligence officers. They knew that if word
ever got out that an officer would be recalled if he or she reported a
recruitment pitch, pitches would quickly cease to be reported. And since
counterintelligence in Beijing could usually learn about hostile approaches to
its officers only through the officers themselves, they simply lied to the rank
and file and told them that disciplinary action would be taken only against
those officers who did not report hostile approaches.
MacMurphy knew all of this, but
he was also quite certain that Huang did not, which complicated things further
for the CIA case officer.
Chapter Sixteen
A uniformed valet at the top of
the hill directed the line of arriving cars to park at the end of a grass lot
full of diplomatic vehicles. Mac recognized several U.S. Embassy cars by the
“4” prefix on their diplomatic tags and noticed a much larger number of Russian
vehicles with the “10” prefix.
Approaching the entrance,
MacMurphy passed a group of diplomatic drivers gathered in a group in the
parking lot, smoking and gossiping about their bosses. He recognized a
chain-smoking Ethiopian security officer in their midst—which was why CIA case
officers always drove themselves. Actual Foreign Service Officers used
chauffeurs from the embassy motor pool to ferry them about. It was one of the
many small ways hostile intelligence services were able to distinguish the
spies from the real diplomats; there were other, more subtle differences.
Squaring his shoulders and
mentally girding himself, Mac entered the
had read in college. In Conrad’s tale the connection that took place on a ship
between two people who had much in common was overshadowed by circumstances
that imposed a barrier, circumstances which made this sense of connection and
identification impossibly complicated. One of the two men had, in the end, been
forced to “jump ship”—literally.
Mac had studied the remarkably
detailed file that the Agency had compiled on Huang, a personality profile and
operational summary that was far more informative than most of those available
on Chinese intelligence officers. Even before he had met Huang, Mac felt he
really knew a great deal about the real person who had been selected as his
“target.” There was an immediate and troubling sense that he could not simply
regard Huang as a depersonalized enemy “objective.”
This feeling of identification,
even empathy, had been, for Mac, the foundation of something more complex than
just an operational interaction.
MacMurphy wanted to preserve
their personal relationship, not just because of the genuine close friendship
that had developed between them, but because there might come a day when Huang
really would want to jump ship. And MacMurphy wanted him to know where he could
always find a sympathetic, helpful ear. Mac had both Huang’s and the Agency’s
best interests at heart simultaneously, even if, on the surface, the two seemed
mutually exclusive. Mac intuitively knew it was too early in Huang’s career to
make the offer.
Above all, he did not want Huang
to feel obliged to report the recruitment pitch to Beijing. That was the most
important thing. MacMurphy knew from operational intelligence disseminated
exclusively to CIA case officers in the field that it was the policy of China’s
MSS to recall immediately any officer who had been on the receiving end of an
operational approach from a hostile intelligence service.
The MSS’s reasoning was simple:
If the officer did not appear vulnerable to hostile recruitment, he would not
have been pitched in the first place. So Beijing felt it was prudent to get the
officer back behind the safety of the bamboo curtain before things could get
out of hand. Beijing took no chances on someone who might later decide to
defect, or worse, to agree to a lucrative offer to spy against the motherland
as an agent-in-place.
The policy was a closely guarded
secret among a few top MSS counterintelligence officers. They knew that if word
ever got out that an officer would be recalled if he or she reported a
recruitment pitch, pitches would quickly cease to be reported. And since
counterintelligence in Beijing could usually learn about hostile approaches to
its officers only through the officers themselves, they simply lied to the rank
and file and told them that disciplinary action would be taken only against
those officers who did not report hostile approaches.
MacMurphy knew all of this, but
he was also quite certain that Huang did not, which complicated things further
for the CIA case officer.
Chapter Sixteen
A uniformed valet at the top of
the hill directed the line of arriving cars to park at the end of a grass lot
full of diplomatic vehicles. Mac recognized several U.S. Embassy cars by the
“4” prefix on their diplomatic tags and noticed a much larger number of Russian
vehicles with the “10” prefix.
Approaching the entrance,
MacMurphy passed a group of diplomatic drivers gathered in a group in the
parking lot, smoking and gossiping about their bosses. He recognized a
chain-smoking Ethiopian security officer in their midst—which was why CIA case
officers always drove themselves. Actual Foreign Service Officers used
chauffeurs from the embassy motor pool to ferry them about. It was one of the
many small ways hostile intelligence services were able to distinguish the
spies from the real diplomats; there were other, more subtle differences.
Squaring his shoulders and
mentally girding himself, Mac entered the
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