move was certainly not opportunistic. It was no doubt, however, influenced by his uncle Khairallah’s espousal of Ba’athism and by the advantage membership of the Ba’ath provided, as shown by his uncle’s appointment as Baghdad’s director of education. But Khairallah did not last long in the job. An Iraqi Communist, Saddoun al-Tikriti, denounced him as a man of unsavoury reputation and he was removed. Shortly afterwards Saddam, apparently at his uncle’s prompting or to avenge family honour, arranged to lie in wait for Saddoun outside his house and murder him by a shot to the head. It was too blatant a crime to be overlooked. Both Saddam and his uncle were arrested and taken into custody, where they remained for six months. In the absence of incriminating evidence, however, they were eventually released.
In another sense, the killing of Saddoun did Saddam no harm, rather the contrary. It conferred on him among fellow Ba’athists a reputation for ruthlessness, at a time when the party was looking for ruthless party loyalists. The Iraqi Ba’athists had been disappointed by the outcome of the 1958 revolution. Its leader, Abd al-Karem Kassem, was a regular officer of conventional views, anti-British and anti-monarchist but equally neither Nasserist nor Ba’athist in outlook. As an Iraqi nationalist, he was unwilling to see Iraq become subordinate to Egypt in an Arab socialist union and was equally resistant to the Ba’athist message of merging Iraq with its neighbouring states in a pan-Arab renaissance.
Had Kassem merely held aloof both from the Nasserists and the Ba’athists, his régime might have survived. Alarmed by the activism of the Nasserists and Ba’athists among the group of so-called Free Officers who had brought him to power, he turned to the Iraqi Communists, who in their enthusiasm for a Soviet alliance necessarily opposed both movements. In March 1959 some of the Free Officers therefore decided to stage a coup. It was an unwise move. The coup was badly organized, lacked popular support and quickly failed. Kassem took a savage revenge. Using the Iraqi Communist Party as his agency of repression, heencouraged it to hunt down and murder all the complicit Free Officers. The avengers went farther; they also killed many of the officers’ nationalist supporters and in Mosul organised a mob reprisal which lasted a week and culminated in mass executions.
The surviving Ba’athists were outraged. Not only had Kassem set back their dream of creating a pan-Arab state, by severing Iraq’s ties with the Egyptian Nasserists. He had also killed many of the men who had risked their lives in rising against the monarchy. The Ba’athists decided on revenge in their turn. Their difficulty was that, as a still tiny party of professional people and students, they lacked members who had any familiarity with violence. A general who had survived Kassem’s purge, Ahmad al-Bakr, was a Ba’athist sympathizer, however, and he had appropriate contacts. As a Tikriti, he knew Khairallah and through the uncle he met the nephew. Recognizing that Saddam could be useful to the party as a thug and enforcer, he introduced him to Ba’athist party members. Saddam was not to be admitted to the party at once but he was selected to take part in the attempted assassination of Kassem which was being prepared in the autumn of 1959.
The attempt was botched, perhaps by Saddam’s hastiness in opening fire on Kassem’s motorcade on 7 October 1959. Kassem was only wounded and recovered. Saddam may have been wounded by return fire; he certainly always claimed to have been so. In the confusion which followed the shooting he made his escape, got home to his native village and then succeeded in crossing the frontier into Syria. Once arrived in Damascus, he was sheltered by local Ba’athists and introduced to the founder of the movement, Michel Aflaq. Aflaq, impressed by what were now Saddam’s credentials as a serious revolutionary,
In another sense, the killing of Saddoun did Saddam no harm, rather the contrary. It conferred on him among fellow Ba’athists a reputation for ruthlessness, at a time when the party was looking for ruthless party loyalists. The Iraqi Ba’athists had been disappointed by the outcome of the 1958 revolution. Its leader, Abd al-Karem Kassem, was a regular officer of conventional views, anti-British and anti-monarchist but equally neither Nasserist nor Ba’athist in outlook. As an Iraqi nationalist, he was unwilling to see Iraq become subordinate to Egypt in an Arab socialist union and was equally resistant to the Ba’athist message of merging Iraq with its neighbouring states in a pan-Arab renaissance.
Had Kassem merely held aloof both from the Nasserists and the Ba’athists, his régime might have survived. Alarmed by the activism of the Nasserists and Ba’athists among the group of so-called Free Officers who had brought him to power, he turned to the Iraqi Communists, who in their enthusiasm for a Soviet alliance necessarily opposed both movements. In March 1959 some of the Free Officers therefore decided to stage a coup. It was an unwise move. The coup was badly organized, lacked popular support and quickly failed. Kassem took a savage revenge. Using the Iraqi Communist Party as his agency of repression, heencouraged it to hunt down and murder all the complicit Free Officers. The avengers went farther; they also killed many of the officers’ nationalist supporters and in Mosul organised a mob reprisal which lasted a week and culminated in mass executions.
The surviving Ba’athists were outraged. Not only had Kassem set back their dream of creating a pan-Arab state, by severing Iraq’s ties with the Egyptian Nasserists. He had also killed many of the men who had risked their lives in rising against the monarchy. The Ba’athists decided on revenge in their turn. Their difficulty was that, as a still tiny party of professional people and students, they lacked members who had any familiarity with violence. A general who had survived Kassem’s purge, Ahmad al-Bakr, was a Ba’athist sympathizer, however, and he had appropriate contacts. As a Tikriti, he knew Khairallah and through the uncle he met the nephew. Recognizing that Saddam could be useful to the party as a thug and enforcer, he introduced him to Ba’athist party members. Saddam was not to be admitted to the party at once but he was selected to take part in the attempted assassination of Kassem which was being prepared in the autumn of 1959.
The attempt was botched, perhaps by Saddam’s hastiness in opening fire on Kassem’s motorcade on 7 October 1959. Kassem was only wounded and recovered. Saddam may have been wounded by return fire; he certainly always claimed to have been so. In the confusion which followed the shooting he made his escape, got home to his native village and then succeeded in crossing the frontier into Syria. Once arrived in Damascus, he was sheltered by local Ba’athists and introduced to the founder of the movement, Michel Aflaq. Aflaq, impressed by what were now Saddam’s credentials as a serious revolutionary,
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