peace in Quebec, and to the degree that the minority values peace, it accepts the compromise.
Elsewhere such compromises are more difficult to reach. Not all groups accept an obligation to respect the rights of the individuals within them. Some religious groups — ultra-Orthodox Jews, fundamentalist Muslims, and evangelical Christians, for example — have restricted the rights of women to participate fully in the rituals and decision-making processes of their faiths. These groups contend that they exist not to protect the rights of individuals but to obey the rule of God, and since God has authorized certain forms of female submission, asking these groups to respect women’s rights is to ask them to sacrifice their very identity for the sake of secular liberal principles. 12
Difficult as it is for a secular liberal like me to admit it,these religious communities have a point. So how are we to proceed? Because the state protects these groups — by providing police, social, and welfare services — it has the right to insist that the group respect the basic laws of the state. Yet the state has no right to intervene, except when the rituals involve direct physical harm to individuals. If religions ban women from parts of the ritual, it is no business of the state to enforce their participation. 13 If, on the other hand, members of religious groups seek the state’s help to leave or to exercise rights in the society outside, such as seeking an education or marrying someone of their own choosing, then the state has a duty to intervene, simply to enable those individuals to exercise the same rights as other citizens. Likewise, if individuals seek entry to a group and are barred on discriminatory grounds, they should have rights of recourse. In other words, the state should intervene to protect rights of exit and rights of entry, but not to change the character of the group. This non-interventionism is rooted in the idea that the state should be neutral when dealing with lawful ways of living.
The rights that religious groups seek are meant to preserve their cultural autonomy, while the rights sought by national groups, such as the Québécois and aboriginal peoples, are demands for political self-government. These appear to be privileges — that is, rights not granted to other groups of Canadians. How are we to think about rights as privileges?
Privileges are possible, within a rights system, when they are temporary, when they are designed to correctpast injustices. The affirmative-action programs accorded women and disadvantaged minorities are privileges in the strict sense that not all citizens have access to them. Yet these exceptions are justified, since their purpose is not to frustrate equality but to make equality a reality for all. By analogy, a majority of Canadians can accept according rights as special privileges to aboriginal Canadians and Québécois as a temporary measure to overcome past disadvantages and correct past wrongs. Quebec language legislation could be justified on the grounds that the French language needed to make up ground and establish a secure future. But once the injustice has been corrected, should the privilege become permanent? The answer depends on the state of the French language in this case. If its survival appears beyond risk or doubt, some revision of the balance between group and individual rights should be called for. Already the legislation has been changed several times to adjust these competing claims. But whether the restriction of English is justified permanently remains a matter of contention among some English-Canadian Quebecers.
There is more support among a majority of Canadians for compensatory affirmative action for aboriginal peoples. The injustices that were done to them are now common knowledge. The need to redress them is perfectly clear. The majority acknowledges it did wrong. It accepts that the minority has an entitlement to redress.
But here, too, a balance has
Elsewhere such compromises are more difficult to reach. Not all groups accept an obligation to respect the rights of the individuals within them. Some religious groups — ultra-Orthodox Jews, fundamentalist Muslims, and evangelical Christians, for example — have restricted the rights of women to participate fully in the rituals and decision-making processes of their faiths. These groups contend that they exist not to protect the rights of individuals but to obey the rule of God, and since God has authorized certain forms of female submission, asking these groups to respect women’s rights is to ask them to sacrifice their very identity for the sake of secular liberal principles. 12
Difficult as it is for a secular liberal like me to admit it,these religious communities have a point. So how are we to proceed? Because the state protects these groups — by providing police, social, and welfare services — it has the right to insist that the group respect the basic laws of the state. Yet the state has no right to intervene, except when the rituals involve direct physical harm to individuals. If religions ban women from parts of the ritual, it is no business of the state to enforce their participation. 13 If, on the other hand, members of religious groups seek the state’s help to leave or to exercise rights in the society outside, such as seeking an education or marrying someone of their own choosing, then the state has a duty to intervene, simply to enable those individuals to exercise the same rights as other citizens. Likewise, if individuals seek entry to a group and are barred on discriminatory grounds, they should have rights of recourse. In other words, the state should intervene to protect rights of exit and rights of entry, but not to change the character of the group. This non-interventionism is rooted in the idea that the state should be neutral when dealing with lawful ways of living.
The rights that religious groups seek are meant to preserve their cultural autonomy, while the rights sought by national groups, such as the Québécois and aboriginal peoples, are demands for political self-government. These appear to be privileges — that is, rights not granted to other groups of Canadians. How are we to think about rights as privileges?
Privileges are possible, within a rights system, when they are temporary, when they are designed to correctpast injustices. The affirmative-action programs accorded women and disadvantaged minorities are privileges in the strict sense that not all citizens have access to them. Yet these exceptions are justified, since their purpose is not to frustrate equality but to make equality a reality for all. By analogy, a majority of Canadians can accept according rights as special privileges to aboriginal Canadians and Québécois as a temporary measure to overcome past disadvantages and correct past wrongs. Quebec language legislation could be justified on the grounds that the French language needed to make up ground and establish a secure future. But once the injustice has been corrected, should the privilege become permanent? The answer depends on the state of the French language in this case. If its survival appears beyond risk or doubt, some revision of the balance between group and individual rights should be called for. Already the legislation has been changed several times to adjust these competing claims. But whether the restriction of English is justified permanently remains a matter of contention among some English-Canadian Quebecers.
There is more support among a majority of Canadians for compensatory affirmative action for aboriginal peoples. The injustices that were done to them are now common knowledge. The need to redress them is perfectly clear. The majority acknowledges it did wrong. It accepts that the minority has an entitlement to redress.
But here, too, a balance has
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