there is a problem with Shklar’s active definition of cruelty. Passive cruelty did not figure into her conception of moral cruelty either, which she took to be “deliberate and persistent humiliation, so that the victim can eventually trust neither himself nor anyone else” ( Ordinary Vices , p. 37). Five years later, Shklar filled out her influential account of cruelty by linking it to evil: “...evil is cruelty and the fear it inspires, and the very fear of fear itself.”23 Cruelty is intrinsically evil, despite the fact that it can be instrumentally good (as in “One must be cruel to be kind”). Even passive cruelty is intentional. Schadenfreude differs from passive cruelty in the role that beliefs about desert play in the different kinds of pleasure.
Spinoza called rejoicing in the loss or misfortune of other people one of the classic symptoms of envy.24 Spinoza had malicious glee in mind, not Schadenfreude . Kafka may have disliked or disrespected his sister, but he didn’t envy her. Nonetheless, it remains that Spinoza joins a chorus of thinkers who raise moral doubts about taking pleasure in the misfortunes of others. This is a good time to ask whether there is any point to trying to defend this despised pleasure.
Yes, there is. We will feel better about ourselves if we recognize not only that people everywhere suffer, but also that people everywhere appreciate others’ suffering. Human beings may have any number of natural propensities (to envy, to deceit, to aggression) that we do well to change or control. Schadenfreude differs importantly from intrinsically bad propensities in its roots in basically harmless comedy (and in justice, which I pursue in Part Two). In comedy we flirt with all sorts of moral transgressions. We either stop short of condoning moral transgressions or challenge the seriousness of them. Schadenfreude , like comedy, verges on cruelty but stops short of it. A look at the structure of the emotion illustrates the flirtatiousness underlying some Schadenfreude (as in Kaufmann’s understanding and in Lodge’s example). Flittering between good and evil, Schadenfreude tests how playful—and how complicated—we will allow ourselves to be.
TWO: Explaining Schadenfreude
EMOTIONS LIKE REGRET, disappointment, and shame cause us pain. It might be thought that painful emotions are justified because we are bad people or because we have made a mistake. Wiser people, we may think, manage to avoid grief and shame. An advisor may tell us that we are wrong to dwell on the disappointment of having narrowly missed a spot on the Olympic team; we should instead focus on having become the sort of extraordinary athlete who could reasonably hope to qualify for the Olympic team. We can change our view of things, the advisor may tell us, and enjoy life more.
We can also agree that there are different kinds of pleasure—the kind that comes from winning an Olympic gold medal, the kind that comes from watching a good movie, and the kind that comes from exacting revenge, for example. Agreement on this point might lead naturally to an effort to establish a moral pecking order of pleasures: we might try to argue that some pleasures are morally superior to others, as John Stuart Mill does in On Liberty . Then we might try to define a person’s moral worth in terms of the pleasure he or she feels. Especially if we believe God plays an active role in our lives, we might think that people who feel morally acceptable pleasure regularly must deserve their happy existences.
Emotions such as fulfillment, success, and pride cause us pleasure. It might be thought that pleasurable emotions are justified because we are good people or because we are living wisely. We want to take pleasurable emotions as evidence of our having done something right. Even when our pleasurable emotions arise from situations over which we have no control, such as a lottery, we rejoice.
No one will deny that we tend to seek pleasure
Spinoza called rejoicing in the loss or misfortune of other people one of the classic symptoms of envy.24 Spinoza had malicious glee in mind, not Schadenfreude . Kafka may have disliked or disrespected his sister, but he didn’t envy her. Nonetheless, it remains that Spinoza joins a chorus of thinkers who raise moral doubts about taking pleasure in the misfortunes of others. This is a good time to ask whether there is any point to trying to defend this despised pleasure.
Yes, there is. We will feel better about ourselves if we recognize not only that people everywhere suffer, but also that people everywhere appreciate others’ suffering. Human beings may have any number of natural propensities (to envy, to deceit, to aggression) that we do well to change or control. Schadenfreude differs importantly from intrinsically bad propensities in its roots in basically harmless comedy (and in justice, which I pursue in Part Two). In comedy we flirt with all sorts of moral transgressions. We either stop short of condoning moral transgressions or challenge the seriousness of them. Schadenfreude , like comedy, verges on cruelty but stops short of it. A look at the structure of the emotion illustrates the flirtatiousness underlying some Schadenfreude (as in Kaufmann’s understanding and in Lodge’s example). Flittering between good and evil, Schadenfreude tests how playful—and how complicated—we will allow ourselves to be.
TWO: Explaining Schadenfreude
EMOTIONS LIKE REGRET, disappointment, and shame cause us pain. It might be thought that painful emotions are justified because we are bad people or because we have made a mistake. Wiser people, we may think, manage to avoid grief and shame. An advisor may tell us that we are wrong to dwell on the disappointment of having narrowly missed a spot on the Olympic team; we should instead focus on having become the sort of extraordinary athlete who could reasonably hope to qualify for the Olympic team. We can change our view of things, the advisor may tell us, and enjoy life more.
We can also agree that there are different kinds of pleasure—the kind that comes from winning an Olympic gold medal, the kind that comes from watching a good movie, and the kind that comes from exacting revenge, for example. Agreement on this point might lead naturally to an effort to establish a moral pecking order of pleasures: we might try to argue that some pleasures are morally superior to others, as John Stuart Mill does in On Liberty . Then we might try to define a person’s moral worth in terms of the pleasure he or she feels. Especially if we believe God plays an active role in our lives, we might think that people who feel morally acceptable pleasure regularly must deserve their happy existences.
Emotions such as fulfillment, success, and pride cause us pleasure. It might be thought that pleasurable emotions are justified because we are good people or because we are living wisely. We want to take pleasurable emotions as evidence of our having done something right. Even when our pleasurable emotions arise from situations over which we have no control, such as a lottery, we rejoice.
No one will deny that we tend to seek pleasure
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