Dingo Firestorm by Ian Pringle

insurgents were heading for Mozambique.
    ‘We needed diplomatic clearance from the Portuguese to enter Mozambique in hot pursuit,’ recalls PB. This gave the gang a little time, but not enough, as the helicopter again proved its worth as a key counter-insurgency weapon. Diplomatic permission eventually came through, and early the next morning, the battle cry ‘contact’ came over the airwaves. Strong was engaging ZANLA. In a series of firefights over a wide area, most of the group were eventually killed or captured. ZANLA had failed again.
    Tongogara was pretty upset about these latest losses, but not as angry as his forces, who were becoming disillusioned about being sent to Rhodesia as cannon fodder. Nevertheless, it took another two years before Chitepo slowly started accepting that there was some sense in the strategy Tongogara was proposing. Chitepo finally gave the new plan his full support, and even gave the impression that it was all his idea. ‘It is useless to engage in conventional warfare with well-equipped Rhodesian and South African troops along the Zambezi,’ said Chitepo in a news interview published in the Rhodesia Herald in August 1971. Chitepo’s interview publicly signalled the switch of strategy.
    The new strategy was sound in principle, but the hot valley of the Zambezi with its sparse population did not provide Tongogara’s fish with much water. An added complication was that the Zambezi Valley was a long way from ZANLA’s training base at Itumbi. Despite the distance, however, Tongogara managed to smuggle a reconnaissance group through Zambia into the Zambezi Valley to observe the Rhodesians and establish links with friendly peasants. The group returned to Itumbi with discouraging news. Not only was the valley a physically hostile environment, but the local people were distinctly unfriendly to ZANLA and had no desire to be ‘liberated’. They also had a nasty habit of reporting the presence of insurgents to the Rhodesian authorities.
    A new plan was needed, one that would completely bypass Zambia. Tongogara realised that the best chance of success would be to abandon Zambia and instead send his forces into Rhodesia’s north-east through Tete Province in Mozambique.

6
Lessons from Sinoia
    In the wake of the Battle of Sinoia in 1966, a troubled Flight Lieutenant Peter Petter-Bowyer started applying his entrepreneurial mind to improving helicopter performance.
    ‘I took it on myself to design, build and test a decent mounting for a 7.62-mm MAG machine gun and to fit a gun sight suited to side firing in forward flight,’ recalls PB.
    PB had good hands and a natural gift for making things. At home, he made curtains and clothing for the kids, and even tailored dresses for his wife, Beryl. Born in Salisbury in 1936 to Paul and Shirley Petter-Bowyer, PB had aviation in his blood. On his father’s side there was an established tradition of naval pilots, and his great-uncle, the famous William Petter (the maiden name of Paul’s mother), had helped design the short-field Lysander aircraft of World War II fame, and later the English Electric Canberra, an aircraft that would play a key role in Rhodesia. William Petter was also a principal designer of the famous supersonic English Electric Lightning interceptor and the Folland Gnat jet trainer.
    From early boyhood, PB had wanted to become a surgeon. At the appropriate age, his parents put his name down for a place at Edinburgh University to study medicine. It was not to be, however. PB’s dream of being a surgeon started falling apart when his parents suddenly separated and divorced. Ensuing financial pressure meant that PB and his brother were transferred from a top private school to a state school, albeit a good one, in the beautiful Eastern Highlands town of Umtali.
    PB settled quickly into Umtali High and made good progress, until one day his father dropped a bombshell: ‘I am pulling you out of school.’ Without a matric exemption, PB knew he