Strange Intelligence: Memoirs of Naval Secret Service by Hector C. Bywater, H. C. Ferraby

the German coast. No ships of any importance were permitted to move without the express sanction of the Supreme War Lord, who arrogated to himself full executive control of the fleet. Thus, save for an abortive reconnaissance by a submarine flotilla and the despatch of a single minelayer towards the Thames Estuary, the entire German fleet lay idle at its moorings during the first crucial weeks of the war.
    In vain did von Tirpitz plead for the Entscheidungs-Schlacht , the decisive battle, which at the very outset might have impeached Great Britain’s command of the home seas and thus altered the subsequent course of the war.
    The Kaiser’s obstinate timidity where his ships were concernedfound support from the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg – who wanted the fleet to be kept as a bargaining asset at the peace table – and also from admirals who were jealous of von Tirpitz. Even before the war he had had contend with the enmity and intrigues of high officers who resented his unique position in the councils of the state. Between him and the chief of the Marinekabinett there existed a bitter feud, and as the department in question was empowered to make all naval appointments, subject only to the Kaiser’s approval, it followed that von Tirpitz’s recommendations were usually ignored and his protégés left out in the cold. Nor were his relations with the naval staff by any means cordial. Consequently, despite his virtual dictatorship of naval policy in regard to shipbuilding and equipment, he exercised only a very limited control over questions of personnel or strategy.
    In this lack of coordination among the heads of the naval high command, coupled with the Kaiser’s morbid dread of losing ships, we find the clue to the otherwise inexplicable management of German naval affairs during the first eighteen months of the war.
    While the dissensions prevailing at the Berlin Navy Office were known to our secret service agents, they could not possibly forecast the effect on the operations of the German fleet in time of war.
    The British Admiralty wisely prepared for all eventualities, including an immediate offensive by the High Seas Fleet, this latter being regarded as most probable. When, therefore, the long-expected conflict did eventuate, the absolute quiescence and the lack of initiative displayed by the German naval command caused much perplexity at Whitehall.
    The first fruits of our intelligence work in Germany weregarnered almost at once. Thanks to our foreknowledge of the arrangements made, not only for despatching armed liners from Germany to attack the trade routes, but also for arming and equipping for the same purpose a large number of selected German merchantmen at sea or in neutral ports on the outbreak of war, we were able to take prompt counter-measures that had the effect of nipping these plans in the bud. The fact that only one armed liner ( Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse ) left Germany in the first month of hostilities, instead of the fleet of such ships that had been earmarked for the purpose, was due in large part to the swift action taken by the British Admiralty ‘from information received’.
    This one among many concrete examples of the benefit we derived from our pre-war intelligence system in central Europe. Compared with the huge organisation built up subsequently, and presided over with conspicuous ability by Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, it was almost insignificant in personnel and resources. Yet its labours were singularly fruitful, as this book will show. That their full value has never been appreciated is no doubt due to the secrecy in which they were necessarily shrouded. But to those who knew the perils and anxieties of the service it is discouraging to find genuine intelligence work bracketed and pilloried with the comic-opera performances of amateur ‘secret service’ agents in neutral capitals during the war. It would be just as rational to introduce the pantomime policeman as a typical member of