The Art of War by Sun Tzu & James Clavell

cunning and resource of Tzu-fang himself would be expended in vain against the enormous strength of those two positions.”
    Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.
    Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.
    Ground that forms the key to three contiguous states, so that he who occupies it first has most of the empire at his command, is ground of intersecting highways.
    When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground.
    Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.
    Ground that is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed-in ground.
    Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay: this is desperate ground.
    On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not.
    On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way. On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies.
    On serious ground, gather in plunder. In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.
    On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.
    On desperate ground, fight.
    Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy’s front and rear; to prevent cooperation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men. When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from concentrating; even when their forces were united, they managed to keep them in disorder. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still.
    If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, say: “Begin by seizing something that your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will.”
    Rapidity is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.
In A.D. 227, Meng Ta, governor of Hsin-ch’eng under the Wei emperor, Wen Ti, was meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, prime minister of that state. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was then military governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta’s treachery, he at once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import.
    Ssu-ma’s officers came to him and said: “If Meng Ta has leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly investigated before we make a move.”
    Ssu-ma I replied: “Meng Ta is an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once, while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask.”
    Then, by a series of forced marches, he brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch’eng within the space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu-ko Liang: “Wan is 1,200 li from here. When the news of my revolt reaches Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his Imperial Master, but it will be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that time my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to come himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are not worth troubling about.”
    The next letter, however, was filled with consternation: “Though only eight days have passed since I threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city gates. What miraculous rapidity is this!” A fortnight later, Hsin-ch’eng had fallen and Meng Ta had lost his head.
    In A.D. 621, Li Ching was sent from K’uei-chou in Ssu-ch’uan to reduce the successful rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as