blackouts. Their tactical leaders are not trained to make decisions, only carry out orders.
Well over a million troops either fled or surrendered. The remaining Vietnamese troops suffered huge losses.
As for the ground war, first we had to get there.
There were nasty surprises that could be waiting for the fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin. The PAV Navy had a substantial mine inventory including some allied ones that they had repurposed from V1. As much as they did not like it the US Naval command in the gulf was going to have to deal with it.
“Two more warships have struck mines.” Dickens told me.
“Who?” I asked. As the air war slowed down I was picking up extra duties supporting the Navy until things got busy again.
“The USS Princeton and the USS Tripoli,” Dickens told me.
“I thought they were supposed to stay away from the coast until we were sure they were clear. What the hell were they thinking? Where did it happen?”
An ensign named Edwards that worked as Dickens aide pointed at two spots on the chart.
“That’s almost in the shipping lanes. We thought those places were clear. Something is very wrong.” Dickens explained.
“Is our entire reconnaissance concept faulty?” I asked.
Dickens examined the charts showing the relative positions of our ships. Then he compared them to the satellite photos
“What are all these other boats doing?” Dickens asked.
“They’re gunboats, resupply ships, tankers, etc.” Edwards responded.
“Have we been monitoring them?” I asked.
“Of course,” Edwards said.
“Have we been monitoring them for minelaying activities?” Dickens asked.
No one answered that one.
“We fucked up.” Dickens said.
Vietnam had three specialized minelayers. They were vintage ex-Soviet T-43 class sweeper/minelayers. We assumed that they alone would lay the mines, so that by tracking the T-43s the fields could also be charted.
That was where we made our mistake.
While the T-43s roamed the northern shores, numerous Vietnamese small craft were also at sea. Many of them were acting as improvised minelayers. This also included civilian vessels conscripted into service. They were laying the fields right under our noses. It accounted for explosions on two U.S. warships including the Missouri.
“This is a kick in the balls.” Dickens said.
We could not even take solace in the minelaying being MILDEC. It was just standard operating procedure for the PAV Navy. A world where everything could be nationalized with the swipe of a pen was a foreign concept to Americans. It never occurred to us that once the fishermen pulled in their catch they would be leaving something behind for us.
It really should not have been a complete surprise. There were precedents. During the Iran-Iraq War the Iranians used any ship they could press into service to lay down mines. It was less motivated by deception and more a move based on quantity. The conventional minelayers could just not dispense the number of mines required quickly enough.
“What are we going to do?” I asked. Navy operations were really out of my depth.
Dickens explained that we had a couple of options available. Mine hunting with submersibles was one option. It was possible to spot mines underwater. The drawback of mine hunting, especially with underwater vehicles, was that high rates of false indications were likely to occur. The other option, mine clearance, was equally effective and equally undesirable. Mine clearance would have to be carried out before hostilities, especially beach landings began. This meant that it would have to be covert. Anything else would identify U.S. intentions and insertion points to the enemy just as if they sent the Vietnamese Navy a copy of coalition invasion plans.
The best solution seemed to be to avoid potentially mined areas altogether. After an invasion force had landed and hostilities moved
Well over a million troops either fled or surrendered. The remaining Vietnamese troops suffered huge losses.
As for the ground war, first we had to get there.
There were nasty surprises that could be waiting for the fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin. The PAV Navy had a substantial mine inventory including some allied ones that they had repurposed from V1. As much as they did not like it the US Naval command in the gulf was going to have to deal with it.
“Two more warships have struck mines.” Dickens told me.
“Who?” I asked. As the air war slowed down I was picking up extra duties supporting the Navy until things got busy again.
“The USS Princeton and the USS Tripoli,” Dickens told me.
“I thought they were supposed to stay away from the coast until we were sure they were clear. What the hell were they thinking? Where did it happen?”
An ensign named Edwards that worked as Dickens aide pointed at two spots on the chart.
“That’s almost in the shipping lanes. We thought those places were clear. Something is very wrong.” Dickens explained.
“Is our entire reconnaissance concept faulty?” I asked.
Dickens examined the charts showing the relative positions of our ships. Then he compared them to the satellite photos
“What are all these other boats doing?” Dickens asked.
“They’re gunboats, resupply ships, tankers, etc.” Edwards responded.
“Have we been monitoring them?” I asked.
“Of course,” Edwards said.
“Have we been monitoring them for minelaying activities?” Dickens asked.
No one answered that one.
“We fucked up.” Dickens said.
Vietnam had three specialized minelayers. They were vintage ex-Soviet T-43 class sweeper/minelayers. We assumed that they alone would lay the mines, so that by tracking the T-43s the fields could also be charted.
That was where we made our mistake.
While the T-43s roamed the northern shores, numerous Vietnamese small craft were also at sea. Many of them were acting as improvised minelayers. This also included civilian vessels conscripted into service. They were laying the fields right under our noses. It accounted for explosions on two U.S. warships including the Missouri.
“This is a kick in the balls.” Dickens said.
We could not even take solace in the minelaying being MILDEC. It was just standard operating procedure for the PAV Navy. A world where everything could be nationalized with the swipe of a pen was a foreign concept to Americans. It never occurred to us that once the fishermen pulled in their catch they would be leaving something behind for us.
It really should not have been a complete surprise. There were precedents. During the Iran-Iraq War the Iranians used any ship they could press into service to lay down mines. It was less motivated by deception and more a move based on quantity. The conventional minelayers could just not dispense the number of mines required quickly enough.
“What are we going to do?” I asked. Navy operations were really out of my depth.
Dickens explained that we had a couple of options available. Mine hunting with submersibles was one option. It was possible to spot mines underwater. The drawback of mine hunting, especially with underwater vehicles, was that high rates of false indications were likely to occur. The other option, mine clearance, was equally effective and equally undesirable. Mine clearance would have to be carried out before hostilities, especially beach landings began. This meant that it would have to be covert. Anything else would identify U.S. intentions and insertion points to the enemy just as if they sent the Vietnamese Navy a copy of coalition invasion plans.
The best solution seemed to be to avoid potentially mined areas altogether. After an invasion force had landed and hostilities moved
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