been one of the Ten Commandments. But because its provisions have created formidable obstacles to rearmament and have raised difficulties for U.S.-Japan security arrangements, the article has been a source of continual embarrassment to American policy makers and Japanese government leaders.
In later years, both governments tried to disavow responsibility for the disarmament clause. On the American side, documents were released to support the argument that no one in the United States really intended that Japan should be permanently disarmed. Successive conservative governments in Japan, on the other hand, maintained that the no-war, no-arms clause did not mean at all what it said, and in any case a nation has an inherent right to self-defense. But, as we shall see, if the constitution does not mean what Article 9 says, then its framers were careless or they went to a lot of trouble to create stumbling blocks in other unrelated articles of the constitution to make it difficult to maintain viable military forces under its provisions.
Those who argue that it is a mystery how the provisions of Article 9 got into the constitution cite two American documents issued within a few months of the surrender of Japan. In the first of these, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, on October 17, 1945, in secret instructions to Mr. George C. Atcheson Jr., 1 General MacArthurâs political adviser, directed in part that the future Japanese constitution may or may not provide for an emperor, but if the emperor was retained, the constitution should include a safeguard that âany ministers for armed forces which may be permitted in the future should be civilians and all special privileges of direct access to the throne by the military shall be eliminated.â
The second of these two documents, a subsequent fourteen-page policy paper titled âReform of the Japanese Governmental System,â adopted on January 7, 1946, by the State-War-Navy Coordination Committee (SWNCC), 2 contained views similar to the instructions Secretary Byrnes sent to Atcheson. The SWNCC policy paper was sent to General MacArthur for his information. It provided the following:
Although âThe Ultimate Reform of the Government of Japanâ is to be determined by the âfreely expressed will of the Japanese people,â the Allies . . . as a part of their overall program for the demilitarization of Japan, are fully empowered to insist that Japanese basic law be so altered as to provide that in practice the government is responsible to the people, and that the civil is supreme over the military branch of the government.
SWNCC further elaborated:
Although the authority and influence of the military in Japanâs governmental structure will presumably disappear with the abolition of the Japanese Armed Forces, formal action permanently subordinating the Military Services to the Civil Government by requiring that the Minister of State of the members of the Cabinet must, in all cases, be civilians would be advisable.
From the above two cited documents, it would appear that neither Secretary Byrnes nor the SWNCC contemplated any need for a disarmament provision inthe Japanese constitution. If this was the intention of the U.S. government, then why was the controversial provision inserted in the constitution? The answer is that there were at the same time other directives and other forces at play in the United States and Japan.
On August 29, 1945, the U.S. government issued its Initial Postsurrender Policy for Japan. In this document, the supreme commander for the Allied powers was given clear and specific guidance on the basic program for the occupation and subsequent rehabilitation of the country. The policy directive in part declared,
Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic and social life. Institutions expressing the
In later years, both governments tried to disavow responsibility for the disarmament clause. On the American side, documents were released to support the argument that no one in the United States really intended that Japan should be permanently disarmed. Successive conservative governments in Japan, on the other hand, maintained that the no-war, no-arms clause did not mean at all what it said, and in any case a nation has an inherent right to self-defense. But, as we shall see, if the constitution does not mean what Article 9 says, then its framers were careless or they went to a lot of trouble to create stumbling blocks in other unrelated articles of the constitution to make it difficult to maintain viable military forces under its provisions.
Those who argue that it is a mystery how the provisions of Article 9 got into the constitution cite two American documents issued within a few months of the surrender of Japan. In the first of these, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, on October 17, 1945, in secret instructions to Mr. George C. Atcheson Jr., 1 General MacArthurâs political adviser, directed in part that the future Japanese constitution may or may not provide for an emperor, but if the emperor was retained, the constitution should include a safeguard that âany ministers for armed forces which may be permitted in the future should be civilians and all special privileges of direct access to the throne by the military shall be eliminated.â
The second of these two documents, a subsequent fourteen-page policy paper titled âReform of the Japanese Governmental System,â adopted on January 7, 1946, by the State-War-Navy Coordination Committee (SWNCC), 2 contained views similar to the instructions Secretary Byrnes sent to Atcheson. The SWNCC policy paper was sent to General MacArthur for his information. It provided the following:
Although âThe Ultimate Reform of the Government of Japanâ is to be determined by the âfreely expressed will of the Japanese people,â the Allies . . . as a part of their overall program for the demilitarization of Japan, are fully empowered to insist that Japanese basic law be so altered as to provide that in practice the government is responsible to the people, and that the civil is supreme over the military branch of the government.
SWNCC further elaborated:
Although the authority and influence of the military in Japanâs governmental structure will presumably disappear with the abolition of the Japanese Armed Forces, formal action permanently subordinating the Military Services to the Civil Government by requiring that the Minister of State of the members of the Cabinet must, in all cases, be civilians would be advisable.
From the above two cited documents, it would appear that neither Secretary Byrnes nor the SWNCC contemplated any need for a disarmament provision inthe Japanese constitution. If this was the intention of the U.S. government, then why was the controversial provision inserted in the constitution? The answer is that there were at the same time other directives and other forces at play in the United States and Japan.
On August 29, 1945, the U.S. government issued its Initial Postsurrender Policy for Japan. In this document, the supreme commander for the Allied powers was given clear and specific guidance on the basic program for the occupation and subsequent rehabilitation of the country. The policy directive in part declared,
Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic and social life. Institutions expressing the
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