heroes of Korea.
On July 21, we took over the barracks vacated by the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and Sergeant Ratcliff announced that the Civil Affairs Section Annex (CASA), the cover name for our Advisory Group, was operational.
Meanwhile, on July 18, a joint American-Japanese conference was held in TÅkyÅ to determine several basic operational policies. The conference was attended by Mr. Katsuo Okazaki, cabinet secretary of the Japanese government who was later to become the first foreign minister of an independent, democratic Japan; Mr. Takeo Åhashi, the attorney general of Japan; Major General Shepard; and Colonel Howard E. Pulliam, chief of the Public Safety Division, SCAP. The conference attendees discussed and reached working agreements regarding the administrative and operational control of the force, recruiting responsibilities of the various agencies involved, and arrangements for financing the NPR. Although General MacArthur had directed the prime minister to establish the NPR, no action could be taken until the Japanese government promulgated a national ordinance. Until such an ordinance was issued, there could be no legal basis for the organization. We, of course, were eager to get moving, and both General Shepard and Colonel Pulliam pressed for an immediate governmental program. Mr. Okazaki, however, objected strenuously, pointing out that the Diet was in session and that even though the prime ministerâs party would support the government, the Socialists in the Diet were strong enough to raise a violent rumpus. Accordingly, he urged that the ordinance be delayed until after August 3, the date on which the Diet planned to adjourn. Though our forces were hard-pressed in Korea, and Japan remained unprotected against communist attack and subversion, Prime Minister Yoshida refused to be rushed. He resisted all American urgings until the Diet adjourned. Finally, on August 10, 1950, with the Diet adjourned, Yoshidaâs cabinet promulgated Cabinet Order No. 260, establishing the National Police Reserve.
The cabinet order, when issued, was a masterpiece of evasion and chicanery. No one could begin to suspect that the innocent words of Article I were intended to initiate the rearmament of Japan. This article states, âThe purpose of this Cabinet Order is to establish the National Police Reserve and to provide for theorganization thereof . . . for the purpose of supplementing the strength of the National Rural Police and Local Autonomous Police Force to the extent necessary to maintain peace and order within the country and to guarantee the public welfare.â
Given the conditions as they were in the summer of 1950, one can excuse the cabinet order as the only method the Japanese government had to comply with a SCAP directive. Japan was, after all, still an occupied country; sovereignty rested in the supreme commander for the Allied powers. Until Japan could secure a peace treaty, it could be argued that the authority of the occupying powers superseded the constitution of Japan, but that argument is sophistry.
Traditionally the constitution of a nation is a sacred document. Where it may be expedient to sidestep unpopular laws, the constitution is self-correcting through the process of amendments. Accordingly, the rearmament of Japan, undertaken as it was in the face of constitutional prohibitions, raises some awkward legal questions and stirs fundamental queries.
CHAPTER FOUR
CONSTITUTION BANS WAR
Why did Japan adopt a constitution banning war, military forces, and war potential? And faced with such a constitution, why did those in power not amend the constitution to permit legal rearmament of the nation? The answers to these questions are rooted in history.
Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which was ratified in 1946 and went into effect in 1947, renounces war, bans war potential, and prohibits the maintenance of land, sea, and air forces. Its purpose could not have been clearer if it had
On July 21, we took over the barracks vacated by the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and Sergeant Ratcliff announced that the Civil Affairs Section Annex (CASA), the cover name for our Advisory Group, was operational.
Meanwhile, on July 18, a joint American-Japanese conference was held in TÅkyÅ to determine several basic operational policies. The conference was attended by Mr. Katsuo Okazaki, cabinet secretary of the Japanese government who was later to become the first foreign minister of an independent, democratic Japan; Mr. Takeo Åhashi, the attorney general of Japan; Major General Shepard; and Colonel Howard E. Pulliam, chief of the Public Safety Division, SCAP. The conference attendees discussed and reached working agreements regarding the administrative and operational control of the force, recruiting responsibilities of the various agencies involved, and arrangements for financing the NPR. Although General MacArthur had directed the prime minister to establish the NPR, no action could be taken until the Japanese government promulgated a national ordinance. Until such an ordinance was issued, there could be no legal basis for the organization. We, of course, were eager to get moving, and both General Shepard and Colonel Pulliam pressed for an immediate governmental program. Mr. Okazaki, however, objected strenuously, pointing out that the Diet was in session and that even though the prime ministerâs party would support the government, the Socialists in the Diet were strong enough to raise a violent rumpus. Accordingly, he urged that the ordinance be delayed until after August 3, the date on which the Diet planned to adjourn. Though our forces were hard-pressed in Korea, and Japan remained unprotected against communist attack and subversion, Prime Minister Yoshida refused to be rushed. He resisted all American urgings until the Diet adjourned. Finally, on August 10, 1950, with the Diet adjourned, Yoshidaâs cabinet promulgated Cabinet Order No. 260, establishing the National Police Reserve.
The cabinet order, when issued, was a masterpiece of evasion and chicanery. No one could begin to suspect that the innocent words of Article I were intended to initiate the rearmament of Japan. This article states, âThe purpose of this Cabinet Order is to establish the National Police Reserve and to provide for theorganization thereof . . . for the purpose of supplementing the strength of the National Rural Police and Local Autonomous Police Force to the extent necessary to maintain peace and order within the country and to guarantee the public welfare.â
Given the conditions as they were in the summer of 1950, one can excuse the cabinet order as the only method the Japanese government had to comply with a SCAP directive. Japan was, after all, still an occupied country; sovereignty rested in the supreme commander for the Allied powers. Until Japan could secure a peace treaty, it could be argued that the authority of the occupying powers superseded the constitution of Japan, but that argument is sophistry.
Traditionally the constitution of a nation is a sacred document. Where it may be expedient to sidestep unpopular laws, the constitution is self-correcting through the process of amendments. Accordingly, the rearmament of Japan, undertaken as it was in the face of constitutional prohibitions, raises some awkward legal questions and stirs fundamental queries.
CHAPTER FOUR
CONSTITUTION BANS WAR
Why did Japan adopt a constitution banning war, military forces, and war potential? And faced with such a constitution, why did those in power not amend the constitution to permit legal rearmament of the nation? The answers to these questions are rooted in history.
Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which was ratified in 1946 and went into effect in 1947, renounces war, bans war potential, and prohibits the maintenance of land, sea, and air forces. Its purpose could not have been clearer if it had
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