social reform and a leading light of the London County Council. Both were members of Deedesâs deputation, along with representatives from the Society of Friends.
It is generally assumed that at this meeting a top limit was suggested for the number of children to be admitted. But there is no evidence for this and, indeed, in the parliamentary debate later in the day, Sir Samuel Hoare declared his opposition âto anything in the nature of a quotaâ. Nonetheless, the government was now prepared âto facilitate entry for all child refugees whose maintenance could be guaranteed either through their own funds or by other individualsâ. To ease the bureaucratic process a special travel document, to be issued in London for each child, removed the need for passports or visas.
As to the magic figure of 10,000, it first crops up in an offer from the Jewish community in Palestine to adopt that number of German children, an offer which was rejected by the government who were now determined to restrict Jewish emigration to Palestine to 75,000 over five years. The 10,000 target was subsequently taken over by the CBF, and accepted by the government as the maximum which could be supported by voluntary effort. But outside this general understanding no upper limit was ever set, and it was unduly assumed that re-emigration to Commonwealth countries would hold down the total supported within Britain and allow for many more than 10,000 to be saved.
By way of a postscript, attempts in the United States to emulate the British with a bill to admit 20,000 European children did not get beyond a congressional committee. One of the arguments raised against the proposal held that accepting children without their parents was contrary to the laws of God.
3
The First Transports
â
My mother was very tearful but my father put on a stiff upper lip. To me it all seemed very bewildering. It is hard to describe my feelings. I was low but not utterly desolate because I realised that all this was being done for my good. I was aware of the fact that some great act of kindness had been extended to me. Certainly I had no idea that I would not go back again or that my family would die.â
In late November 1938, less than a week after child refugees were given special status, Norman Bentwich was in Amsterdam talking with the Dutch Refugees Committee. It was a sensible move.
Of all the refugee bodies, the Dutch were best equipped to manage the first stage of the migration, the transfer to friendly territory. They were on the border closest to the heavily populated industrial Ruhr and there were extensive rail links between the two countries. In any case, hopes of establishing an alternative route through France had foundered on political vacillation (though a group led by the Rothschild and Gunzburg families were urging the French government to match the British commitment to child refugees), and the only other possibility, of sending children out from one of the German ports, was thought to depend too heavily on Nazi good will.
In the event, several
Kindertransporte
, including one of the earliest, did leave by boat from Hamburg, but the numbers were small, the children taking up spare berths in one or other of the trans-Atlantic liners calling at Southampton. Refugee ships were not a practical proposition. The Nazis were as keen as ever to get rid of their Jewish citizens but after
Kristallnacht
they were moresensitive to public awareness of how they went about it. A refugee ship could not easily disguise its function; a refugee ship crowded with children was liable to become a propaganda coup for the Jews. Far better that the refugees should go by rail. The time and place of departure could be more easily suited to the nefarious purposes of the German authorities.
If the Dutch offered the least troublesome route out of Germany, they also had the advantage of a competent welfare organisation used to dealing with young refugees,
It is generally assumed that at this meeting a top limit was suggested for the number of children to be admitted. But there is no evidence for this and, indeed, in the parliamentary debate later in the day, Sir Samuel Hoare declared his opposition âto anything in the nature of a quotaâ. Nonetheless, the government was now prepared âto facilitate entry for all child refugees whose maintenance could be guaranteed either through their own funds or by other individualsâ. To ease the bureaucratic process a special travel document, to be issued in London for each child, removed the need for passports or visas.
As to the magic figure of 10,000, it first crops up in an offer from the Jewish community in Palestine to adopt that number of German children, an offer which was rejected by the government who were now determined to restrict Jewish emigration to Palestine to 75,000 over five years. The 10,000 target was subsequently taken over by the CBF, and accepted by the government as the maximum which could be supported by voluntary effort. But outside this general understanding no upper limit was ever set, and it was unduly assumed that re-emigration to Commonwealth countries would hold down the total supported within Britain and allow for many more than 10,000 to be saved.
By way of a postscript, attempts in the United States to emulate the British with a bill to admit 20,000 European children did not get beyond a congressional committee. One of the arguments raised against the proposal held that accepting children without their parents was contrary to the laws of God.
3
The First Transports
â
My mother was very tearful but my father put on a stiff upper lip. To me it all seemed very bewildering. It is hard to describe my feelings. I was low but not utterly desolate because I realised that all this was being done for my good. I was aware of the fact that some great act of kindness had been extended to me. Certainly I had no idea that I would not go back again or that my family would die.â
In late November 1938, less than a week after child refugees were given special status, Norman Bentwich was in Amsterdam talking with the Dutch Refugees Committee. It was a sensible move.
Of all the refugee bodies, the Dutch were best equipped to manage the first stage of the migration, the transfer to friendly territory. They were on the border closest to the heavily populated industrial Ruhr and there were extensive rail links between the two countries. In any case, hopes of establishing an alternative route through France had foundered on political vacillation (though a group led by the Rothschild and Gunzburg families were urging the French government to match the British commitment to child refugees), and the only other possibility, of sending children out from one of the German ports, was thought to depend too heavily on Nazi good will.
In the event, several
Kindertransporte
, including one of the earliest, did leave by boat from Hamburg, but the numbers were small, the children taking up spare berths in one or other of the trans-Atlantic liners calling at Southampton. Refugee ships were not a practical proposition. The Nazis were as keen as ever to get rid of their Jewish citizens but after
Kristallnacht
they were moresensitive to public awareness of how they went about it. A refugee ship could not easily disguise its function; a refugee ship crowded with children was liable to become a propaganda coup for the Jews. Far better that the refugees should go by rail. The time and place of departure could be more easily suited to the nefarious purposes of the German authorities.
If the Dutch offered the least troublesome route out of Germany, they also had the advantage of a competent welfare organisation used to dealing with young refugees,
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