they constituted the killing power against battleships or the majority of bombs against ground targets. The idea that Genda accepted a new idea to employ B5N Kates with AP bombs at this late date is not credible. It would have required a complete revision of the strike plan, which had to be near its final form.
The training program began just after Fuchida’s arrival. Training as intensive as the Japanese air groups conducted was not something that just happened, but had to be planned. Airfields had to be prepared, aircraft stationed and prepped, fuel and maintenance and weapons staged, maintenance personnel assigned, housed and fed, and other considerations. The outline of the training plan—locations, aircraft allocations, fuel and maintenance and the like—was likely promulgated well before Fuchida’s arrival. The allocations of B5N Kate bombers between torpedo and AP bombs and OCA had to have been made earlier for the training plan to be ready in late September.
Fuchida’s claim that he was responsible for including level bombers with AP bombs in the strike plan cannot be correct.
Aircraft Allocations
The aircrews were allocated their roles probably early in September. Genda allocated the numbers assigned to each task and each target area. 21 He also had the authority to draw additional aviators into the planning process, so he called in a number of experts to help formulate the tactical orders. In addition, he could bring in select Hikotaicho —translated literally as “air unit commanding officer,” a position similar to the CAG (Commander Air Group) on US carriers. Although normally there would be only one Hikotaicho assigned to a carrier, Genda changed this to as many as three per carrier or as few as none, depending on the plan’s needs.
The B5N Kate units were divided between torpedo bombers and level bombers, two very different skill sets. The late-September start allowed six weeks to resolve problems and train the aircrews for their tasks.
A Two-Wave Attack
Carrier Striking Force Operations Order No. 3 specified 351 aircraft to be launched in two waves. 22 One hundred and sixty-two were to be directed at fleet units (battleships, carriers, and cruisers), and 189 against aircraft and airfields.
If four carriers launched 90 carrier attack planes armed against battleships, the other two carriers could contribute 54 more B5N Kates, or alternately 45 to 54 D3A Val dive-bombers to the first wave. The Vals were chosen, and sent against airfields to shut them down and prevent fighters from getting into the air, and to disrupt any counterattack preparations.
1st Wave:
The first wave was to consist of 189 aircraft.
90 aircraft would go against the Pacific Fleet:
•
40 B5N Kates carrying 40 torpedoes, 24 primarily targeted against the battleships and 16 against carriers;
•
50 B5N Kates carrying 50 800kg AP Bombs, targeted against inboard battleships; 99 would be directed at enemy airfields or to attack enemy fighters in the air:
•
54 D3A Vals carrying 54 250kg GP bombs directed at airfields;
•
45 A6M Zero fighters.
2nd Wave:
The second wave was to consist of 171 aircraft:
•
81 D3A Vals carrying 81 250kg GP bombs were to go to Pearl Harbor and attack warships. They were primarily after carriers. Alternate targets were cruisers and battleships;
•
54 B5N Kates, carrying either one 250kg GP and six 60kg GP bombs or two 250kg bombs each, targeted against airfield hangars and facilities;
•
36 A6M Zeros. 23
Allocations
The following table shows aircraft allocation across the missions.
The torpedo bombers constituted only 28% of the available B5N Kate carrier attack bombers. Thirty-five percent would carry AP bombs, and the remaining 38% would attack airfields.
Of the 280 bombers, 171 (61%) were sent against fleet targets.
The aircraft assigned to offensive counter-air were allocated as follows:
•
54 first wave D3A Val dive-bombers, against the Ford Island and Wheeler
The training program began just after Fuchida’s arrival. Training as intensive as the Japanese air groups conducted was not something that just happened, but had to be planned. Airfields had to be prepared, aircraft stationed and prepped, fuel and maintenance and weapons staged, maintenance personnel assigned, housed and fed, and other considerations. The outline of the training plan—locations, aircraft allocations, fuel and maintenance and the like—was likely promulgated well before Fuchida’s arrival. The allocations of B5N Kate bombers between torpedo and AP bombs and OCA had to have been made earlier for the training plan to be ready in late September.
Fuchida’s claim that he was responsible for including level bombers with AP bombs in the strike plan cannot be correct.
Aircraft Allocations
The aircrews were allocated their roles probably early in September. Genda allocated the numbers assigned to each task and each target area. 21 He also had the authority to draw additional aviators into the planning process, so he called in a number of experts to help formulate the tactical orders. In addition, he could bring in select Hikotaicho —translated literally as “air unit commanding officer,” a position similar to the CAG (Commander Air Group) on US carriers. Although normally there would be only one Hikotaicho assigned to a carrier, Genda changed this to as many as three per carrier or as few as none, depending on the plan’s needs.
The B5N Kate units were divided between torpedo bombers and level bombers, two very different skill sets. The late-September start allowed six weeks to resolve problems and train the aircrews for their tasks.
A Two-Wave Attack
Carrier Striking Force Operations Order No. 3 specified 351 aircraft to be launched in two waves. 22 One hundred and sixty-two were to be directed at fleet units (battleships, carriers, and cruisers), and 189 against aircraft and airfields.
If four carriers launched 90 carrier attack planes armed against battleships, the other two carriers could contribute 54 more B5N Kates, or alternately 45 to 54 D3A Val dive-bombers to the first wave. The Vals were chosen, and sent against airfields to shut them down and prevent fighters from getting into the air, and to disrupt any counterattack preparations.
1st Wave:
The first wave was to consist of 189 aircraft.
90 aircraft would go against the Pacific Fleet:
•
40 B5N Kates carrying 40 torpedoes, 24 primarily targeted against the battleships and 16 against carriers;
•
50 B5N Kates carrying 50 800kg AP Bombs, targeted against inboard battleships; 99 would be directed at enemy airfields or to attack enemy fighters in the air:
•
54 D3A Vals carrying 54 250kg GP bombs directed at airfields;
•
45 A6M Zero fighters.
2nd Wave:
The second wave was to consist of 171 aircraft:
•
81 D3A Vals carrying 81 250kg GP bombs were to go to Pearl Harbor and attack warships. They were primarily after carriers. Alternate targets were cruisers and battleships;
•
54 B5N Kates, carrying either one 250kg GP and six 60kg GP bombs or two 250kg bombs each, targeted against airfield hangars and facilities;
•
36 A6M Zeros. 23
Allocations
The following table shows aircraft allocation across the missions.
The torpedo bombers constituted only 28% of the available B5N Kate carrier attack bombers. Thirty-five percent would carry AP bombs, and the remaining 38% would attack airfields.
Of the 280 bombers, 171 (61%) were sent against fleet targets.
The aircraft assigned to offensive counter-air were allocated as follows:
•
54 first wave D3A Val dive-bombers, against the Ford Island and Wheeler
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