thought given to its solution. In most cases the planners were restricted in their ideas of what was possible, and accepted their limitations as a matter of course.
Within the above constraints, the planners had the flexibility to determine the aircraft types to employ in each wave, what targets to hit and in what order, what weapons to use on each aircraft type against each class of target, and how fighters were to be allocated and employed. These issues were significant challenges alone.
Planning for Pre-strike Reconnaissance
The Japanese plan included submarine and aerial reconnaissance immediately prior to the attack.
A submarine would scout the Lahaina Roads anchorage off Maui a day prior to the attack and transmit a report. This would be a fairly lowrisk mission, and the information would be critical. If the fleet was located off Maui at anchor, the attack would have to be redirected and the armament mix changed. The level bombers would not be needed, and those fifty aircraft re-armed with the more lethal torpedoes. If only part of the fleet was out, the attack would have to be split and armed accordingly.
Two cruiser float planes would be launched in the pre-dawn hours before the attack. One was to scout Lahaina Roads again, presumably to check if the fleet had departed the anchorage since the submarine’s report, while the other went to Pearl Harbor for reconnaissance and to transmit a weather report.
Shortly after 0600, with hardly any light to mark a horizon for the pilots, the carriers were to launch the first wave of the attack. At 0630 the battleships and heavy cruisers would launch 16 float planes to scout to the east, south, and west. Japanese reconnaissance doctrine differed from that of the Americans, in that float planes were more used for long-range reconnaissance, while the Americans used carrier aircraft. The Japanese doctrine was good, in that it preserved the carriers’ aircraft for offensive operations, maintained unit integrity, and kept carrier decks from being tied up to recover the reconnaissance aircraft. Its weakness was that the float planes from the battleships and heavy cruisers were stored exposed to the weather, and were not as reliable. In addition, the float plane aviators got fewer hours and were not the same quality as carrier aviators.
Later, at Midway, the American system showed its warts when the three American carriers could not put together a coordinated strike, as one carrier had to delay her launch while recovering reconnaissance aircraft. But the Japanese system made the critical error. A reconnaissance float plane was delayed in launching, making it fatally late in discovering the American carriers.
The second wave would be launched at approximately 0730, one hour after the departure of the first wave.
Fuchida’s Claim Regarding Level Bombers
Fuchida was first introduced to the Pearl Harbor attack plan in a meeting with Genda in late September 1941, immediately after Fuchida was transferred to serve as the strike leader aboard Akagi .
According to Fuchida, the plan Genda showed him did not include level bombers with AP bombs. “The Japanese Navy had a terrible record of hits using this technique,” 16 scoring less than 10% hits in exercises the previous June. In addition, AP bombs had a tiny charge of explosives compared to torpedoes. Aviators in the IJN had argued for some time that level bombing was an inefficient use of resources and would not score enough hits to justify its use. At one point the First Carrier Division recommended that horizontal bombing should be abolished. 17
Fuchida, a level bombing specialist, claimed he pressed Genda to add level bombers. AP bombs, Fuchida asserted, would be needed against ships inaccessible to torpedoes. He pointed out to Genda two things: torpedo nets could protect all the ships from torpedoes, while double-berthing ships side-by-side would shield the inner battleships. 18 Fuchida claimed his arguments convinced Genda,
Within the above constraints, the planners had the flexibility to determine the aircraft types to employ in each wave, what targets to hit and in what order, what weapons to use on each aircraft type against each class of target, and how fighters were to be allocated and employed. These issues were significant challenges alone.
Planning for Pre-strike Reconnaissance
The Japanese plan included submarine and aerial reconnaissance immediately prior to the attack.
A submarine would scout the Lahaina Roads anchorage off Maui a day prior to the attack and transmit a report. This would be a fairly lowrisk mission, and the information would be critical. If the fleet was located off Maui at anchor, the attack would have to be redirected and the armament mix changed. The level bombers would not be needed, and those fifty aircraft re-armed with the more lethal torpedoes. If only part of the fleet was out, the attack would have to be split and armed accordingly.
Two cruiser float planes would be launched in the pre-dawn hours before the attack. One was to scout Lahaina Roads again, presumably to check if the fleet had departed the anchorage since the submarine’s report, while the other went to Pearl Harbor for reconnaissance and to transmit a weather report.
Shortly after 0600, with hardly any light to mark a horizon for the pilots, the carriers were to launch the first wave of the attack. At 0630 the battleships and heavy cruisers would launch 16 float planes to scout to the east, south, and west. Japanese reconnaissance doctrine differed from that of the Americans, in that float planes were more used for long-range reconnaissance, while the Americans used carrier aircraft. The Japanese doctrine was good, in that it preserved the carriers’ aircraft for offensive operations, maintained unit integrity, and kept carrier decks from being tied up to recover the reconnaissance aircraft. Its weakness was that the float planes from the battleships and heavy cruisers were stored exposed to the weather, and were not as reliable. In addition, the float plane aviators got fewer hours and were not the same quality as carrier aviators.
Later, at Midway, the American system showed its warts when the three American carriers could not put together a coordinated strike, as one carrier had to delay her launch while recovering reconnaissance aircraft. But the Japanese system made the critical error. A reconnaissance float plane was delayed in launching, making it fatally late in discovering the American carriers.
The second wave would be launched at approximately 0730, one hour after the departure of the first wave.
Fuchida’s Claim Regarding Level Bombers
Fuchida was first introduced to the Pearl Harbor attack plan in a meeting with Genda in late September 1941, immediately after Fuchida was transferred to serve as the strike leader aboard Akagi .
According to Fuchida, the plan Genda showed him did not include level bombers with AP bombs. “The Japanese Navy had a terrible record of hits using this technique,” 16 scoring less than 10% hits in exercises the previous June. In addition, AP bombs had a tiny charge of explosives compared to torpedoes. Aviators in the IJN had argued for some time that level bombing was an inefficient use of resources and would not score enough hits to justify its use. At one point the First Carrier Division recommended that horizontal bombing should be abolished. 17
Fuchida, a level bombing specialist, claimed he pressed Genda to add level bombers. AP bombs, Fuchida asserted, would be needed against ships inaccessible to torpedoes. He pointed out to Genda two things: torpedo nets could protect all the ships from torpedoes, while double-berthing ships side-by-side would shield the inner battleships. 18 Fuchida claimed his arguments convinced Genda,
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