Attila by Ross Laidlaw

field forces withdrawn to Gaul, Britain was under attack from Saxons, Picts, and Scots from Ireland; Hispania was overrun by Suevi and Vandals and, for the time being at least, virtually lost to the empire. But Africa and Italy were still secure, and so, if precariously, was most of Gaul. It was of vital importance that whoever ruled the West should shape his strategy according to the new realities. Constantius, Honorius’ co-emperor, had coped superbly, pacifying the powerful Visigoths by granting them, after their many years of wandering, a homeland in Aquitania, 2 and halting the Burgundian encroachment into imperial territory, just west of the Rhenus. But Constantius was dead these six years, and Rome’s federate ‘guests’ grown restive once again. The former north–south axis of power, Mediolanum to Augusta Treverorum, 3 had gone for good, thanks to the increase of Frankish raids into the Belgic provinces. The new axis was east–west, Ravenna to Arelate in Provincia, 4 a situation which he, Aetius, was well placed to exploit re his ability to influence the government.
    â€˜Who would you choose to rule the West, my beauty,’ he chuckled to Bucephalus, ‘myself or Boniface?’ The horse’s ears pricked up as if in empathy. ‘You might be wise to pick the Count of Africa. For if your master wins, one thing is sure – cavalry will be hard-used as never before.’
    Boniface was the last person who should hold the reins of power. His approach to dealing with barbarians was head-on confrontation, an outdated strategy almost bound to fail. The tribes settled within the empire were too entrenched and numerous to be removed by force – unless the West received massive military backing from the East. Which wasn’t going to happen; those days had ended with the death of Theodosius. He, Aetius, on the other hand
knew
barbarians, having in his boyhood been a hostage first of Alaric, then of the Huns. He could sense when it was politic to make concessions to them and when to apply pressure, the right moment to be diplomatic, or to take an uncompromising stand. And he fully grasped one all-important fact: the power of barbarians could often be neutralized by pitting them against each other; Huns against Visigoths, Visigoths against Suevi, et cetera. This called for skill and cunning based on understanding of the barbarian mind – something he, Aetius, possessed in abundance, his rival not at all. Boniface was good at killing barbarians; of handling them, he knew little and cared less.
    As in a game of
ludus latrunculorum
or ‘soldiers’, Aetius reviewed the relative strengths and weaknesses of himself and his rival as regards the coming struggle. On the surface, Boniface appeared to have one supreme advantage, the confidence of Placidia. But Boniface was in Africa, whereas Aetius was here in Ravenna, able to exert all his considerable charm and powers of persuasion to poison the Augusta’s mind against her favourite. By posing as her devoted friend and ally (even to the extent of being pleasant to the royal bratling), he had, over the past few weeks, gradually melted her hostility and won her trust. This had enabled him to undermine Boniface by means of hints and innuendo, reporting ‘rumours’ that he was secretly plotting against her and stirring up sedition among courtiers and army officers. And his efforts had now been crowned with success, it would seem.
    Boniface was too honourable and trusting for his own good, Aetius thought with a twinge of conscience. Totally loyal and incorruptible himself, the Count of Africa was naive enough toascribe those qualities to those in whom he put his trust. What he failed to understand – and herein lay his great weakness – was that most men (and women) were weak and could be manipulated, given enough pressure or inducement. Yes, politics was a dirty game; there were times when Aetius found it hard to