Blowing Up Russia by Alexander Litvinenko Page A

had been dismissed from his post as secretary of the Security

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Council, Stealth could no longer count on support from state structures and was left entirely under the control of the Izmailovo criminal group. Lutsenko s only remaining serious contacts at state level were now in the UPP-URPO, which was headed by General Khokholkov. The absorption of organized criminal groups into the state s agencies of coercion had seemed a natural and logical step to the leadership of the FSB.

Unfortunately the logic of events tended more and more frequently to draw the secret services into purely criminal activity. In theory this tendency should have been countered by the USB of the FSB, but in practice, the USB was incapable of maintaining the fight against mass crime committed with the direct connivance or participation of the FSB and the SBP. The only hope left was the single remaining law enforcement agency, the criminal investigation department (UR). In January 1996, thirty-eight-year-old Vladimir Ilyich Tskhai, criminal investigation s last romantic, was transferred to MUR, the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department.

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Chapter 3

Moscow detectives take on the FSB Tskhai was made head of the Twelfth Section, which specialized in solving contract killings, and only ten months later, he was already the deputy chief of MUR (Moscow Criminal Investigation Department). He had previously worked in the Central Criminal Investigation Department (GUUR) of the Russian Ministry of the Interior. Tskhai was regarded as being an exceptionally hardworking and talented detective. He was a born detective, and there ll never be another like him, was what his friends told us. Tskhai was easy and interesting to work with, said Andrei Suprunenko, especially important cases investigator for the Moscow Public Prosecutor s Office. A competent and decent man. One of the romantics. He provided the link between the operatives and the investigators, he believed that even the most complicated cases could be untangled&

It was Tskhai who succeeded in exposing the group that produced fake identity cards from the departments of coercion. In that case, FAPSI contributed the efforts of its USB, under the leadership of Colonel Sergei Yurievich Barkovsky. In an article which was evidently commissioned by the FSB, the Moscow journalist, Alexander Khinshtein, wrote that Lazovsky himself oversaw the production of false documents, and that was why his people had cover documents from the FSB, FAPSI, GRU, and MO. However, this was not the case. Lazovsky had absolutely nothing to do with the business of forging official identity documents, which Tskhai uncovered. Naturally enough, Barkovsky doesn t even mention Lazovsky in his version of events and names entirely different people as the organizers. Here are Barkovsky s own words: Even the specialists found it rather difficult to distinguish the fakes from genuine documents. Sometimes the quality of the dud was actually better. Expert analysis showed that there was clearly just one workshop involved. Following a whole series of operational and investigative measures four, very far from ordinary people were detained.

One was the former deputy head of a section of the KGB of the USSR, who had become the head of a firm with the attractive name of Honor. Another was the head of one of the printing shops in Moscow and the former head of the printing shop of the administration of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU).

Detained together with them was a former FAPSI lieutenant who had been involved in processing passes during his period of service. It is assumed that the idea of producing counterfeit documents must have been his. And there was one very talented engraver.

From Barkovsky s account, it follows that the forgeries were not produced by bandits, but by a former member of the nomenklatura, the Soviet professional elite (from the administrative apparatus of the CC CPSU) and