Bravo two zero by Andy McNab

we'd lay a charge made from PE4 plastic explosive. My guess was that about 2 pounds of explosive on a 2-hour timer inside the TEL would do the trick. We'd close the door and up it would go, well after we'd ex filtrated We'd put an anti handling device on the PEas well, so that even if they found it and went to lift it, it would detonate.
        Also on the charge we would have a compromise device. This would be a grip switch that would initiate a length of safety fuse, which in turn would initiate the detonator after about 60 seconds. So if the shit hit the fan, we could just place the charge and run. There would be three different initiations on the charges, hopefully covering any eventuality: the timing device, an anti handling device-pull, pressure, or pressure release, whichever was appropriate-and a compromise device.
        It was 1600. One or two of the faces around me were beginning to look tired, and I guessed that I looked the same. We'd really motored. We knew how we were going to do the task, even down to such detail as "actions on." Actions on contact for the 4-man fire-support group were to give covering fire to allow the attack group, if possible, to complete their task and extract themselves. Actions on for the 4-man attack group were to give support to each other and attempt to complete the target attack using the compromise device. One way or another, they should extract to the ERV (emergency RV) and quickly regroup. They should then move to the patrol RV and regroup with the fire support team.
        We wouldn't know, of course, if any of this was feasible until we saw the disposition on the ground. There might be four TELs together, which would pose problems of compromise as there would be many more targets.
        Or maybe there'd be just one TEL which we couldn't get in to attack, in which case we'd do a stand-off attack with lots of firepower-but not at the expense of the patrol to take out only one objective. In a stand-off attack we wouldn't get "hands on" but would use 66s to try and destroy the target. Such an attack must be short and sharp, but whether or not to carry one out would be a decision that could only be made on the ground. It's only when you have seen the problem that you can make your appreciations and work out what you will do. We would always try a covert target attack if at all possible.
        The third option would be an air strike. Deciding between a stand-off attack and an air strike would be a fine balance, probably swayed by the numbers involved. Both, however, would advertise the fact that we were close by in the area. The compromise would be bearable if the numbers were high enough to warrant it, but if we were successful in cutting the cable, there would be no need for this at all.
        By now the place was stinking of sweat, farts, and cigarettes. There were bits of paper everywhere with pictures of Scuds and matchstick men and fire-support group movement diagrams. Planning is always exhaustive, but only because we want to work everything out to the finest detail. When we got to the TEL and the door was closed, where was the handle? How did you operate it? Which way did the door go, out or in? Was it a concertina door? Did the door hinge from the top?
        Would the door be padlocked as it is on many armored vehicles? What would we do then? People didn't know, so we studied pictures and tried to work it out. Detail, detail, detail. It's so important. You might be pushing a door when you should be pulling. Minor detail missed equals fuckup guaranteed.
        We moved on to thinking about the equipment required to execute our plans.
        You can destroy a power station with a shaped charge of 2 pounds of explosive in just the right place; you don't have to blow the whole installation into the sky. It can be done by a small specific-to-task charge, because you know the vulnerable point you're going for. With Scud we knew the vulnerable points, but not