Polyakov, he volunteered to the FBI within a year of Golitsynâs 1961 defection. In the eyes of some, Golitsynâs prediction of false defectors had become reality and Polyakovâs approach was proof of the KGB plot. First Angleton and then many others forgot, did not want to believe, or did not have the courage to point out that there was no factual basis for Golitsynâs predictions and that they could be nothing more than the ramblings of a paranoid and egotistical defector. Thus, when theCIA sent Jim F to Rangoon, he had orders to prove that Polyakov was a KGB plant.
One cannot imagine two more different personalities: Polyakov, a military man meticulous in his dress and appearance; Jim F, a civilian with nicotine-stained fingers and teeth, and, in his own words, only owning three suits in his professional career; Polyakov, an accomplished sportsman, with a passion for hunting, fishing, and other outdoor activities; Jim, more comfortable with books and an audience of like-minded dilettantes; Polyakov, an occasional social drinker; Jim, a martini man who enjoyed his silver bullets; Polyakov, an expert in the nuts and bolts world of spy gear and internal communications techniques; and Jim, the big-picture thinker who enjoyed the search for answers to âwhat ifâ questions. We can only guess at Polyakovâs personal reaction to Jim and to a lesser extent Jimâs reaction to Polyakov. Jim was always closemouthed on any discussion of Polyakov the man, and even years later would simply comment that he found Polyakov to be a cold person with beady eyes.
In sum, Jim viewed the operation as an adversarial relationship. To Polyakov it was a business partnership. He provided information the U.S. government needed and it, in turn, fulfilled his requests for career assistance and remuneration. He understood his role and recognized more than anyone the great risk he had taken when he volunteered to the U.S. government in New York in 1961. He was the agent who just happened to be a Soviet intelligence officer and Jim was his case officer. Jim asked the questions and he answered them. Totally unaware of the controversy surrounding him, the only hint of frustration Polyakov displayed during his two years with Jim was with Jimâs preoccupation with requirements on GRU Illegals operations of the 1950s.
From 1956 to 1959 Polyakov had been the GRU headquarters desk officer responsible for GRU Illegals sent to the United States, and in this position he knew their true names, false identities, and operational objectives. He even participated in their mission training. John Mabey had debriefed Polyakov on these cases in 1961â62 in New York and again during their recontact in Burma in 1966, but Jim covered the same ground in greater detail and in meeting after meeting. For Polyakov this was history, perhaps intellectually interesting but certainly not of critical or strategic importance to the United States. Some of the cases went back ten years, and none was active. The GRU Illegal in question had either returned toMoscow or was under FBI control. Polyakov felt that valuable time was being wasted; he had knowledge of many items of more importance to provide the AmericansâSoviet military and economic assistance to the North Vietnamese, Soviet-Chinese relations, GRU agent operations in Southeast Asia, GRU collection requirements against the United States, identities of GRU officers worldwide, and an array of other subjects.
The Black Hats viewed the questions about the old GRU Illegals cases quite differently. Polyakovâs responses would serve as evidence that he was under KGB control, because they had independent reporting on Polyakovâs role in the Illegals cases from Petr Semenovich Popov, a lieutenant colonel in the GRU who volunteered to the CIA in Vienna in 1952. In 1957 Popov was assigned to East Berlin, where he handled Polyakovâs GRU Illegals as they transited East Berlin en route
One cannot imagine two more different personalities: Polyakov, a military man meticulous in his dress and appearance; Jim F, a civilian with nicotine-stained fingers and teeth, and, in his own words, only owning three suits in his professional career; Polyakov, an accomplished sportsman, with a passion for hunting, fishing, and other outdoor activities; Jim, more comfortable with books and an audience of like-minded dilettantes; Polyakov, an occasional social drinker; Jim, a martini man who enjoyed his silver bullets; Polyakov, an expert in the nuts and bolts world of spy gear and internal communications techniques; and Jim, the big-picture thinker who enjoyed the search for answers to âwhat ifâ questions. We can only guess at Polyakovâs personal reaction to Jim and to a lesser extent Jimâs reaction to Polyakov. Jim was always closemouthed on any discussion of Polyakov the man, and even years later would simply comment that he found Polyakov to be a cold person with beady eyes.
In sum, Jim viewed the operation as an adversarial relationship. To Polyakov it was a business partnership. He provided information the U.S. government needed and it, in turn, fulfilled his requests for career assistance and remuneration. He understood his role and recognized more than anyone the great risk he had taken when he volunteered to the U.S. government in New York in 1961. He was the agent who just happened to be a Soviet intelligence officer and Jim was his case officer. Jim asked the questions and he answered them. Totally unaware of the controversy surrounding him, the only hint of frustration Polyakov displayed during his two years with Jim was with Jimâs preoccupation with requirements on GRU Illegals operations of the 1950s.
From 1956 to 1959 Polyakov had been the GRU headquarters desk officer responsible for GRU Illegals sent to the United States, and in this position he knew their true names, false identities, and operational objectives. He even participated in their mission training. John Mabey had debriefed Polyakov on these cases in 1961â62 in New York and again during their recontact in Burma in 1966, but Jim covered the same ground in greater detail and in meeting after meeting. For Polyakov this was history, perhaps intellectually interesting but certainly not of critical or strategic importance to the United States. Some of the cases went back ten years, and none was active. The GRU Illegal in question had either returned toMoscow or was under FBI control. Polyakov felt that valuable time was being wasted; he had knowledge of many items of more importance to provide the AmericansâSoviet military and economic assistance to the North Vietnamese, Soviet-Chinese relations, GRU agent operations in Southeast Asia, GRU collection requirements against the United States, identities of GRU officers worldwide, and an array of other subjects.
The Black Hats viewed the questions about the old GRU Illegals cases quite differently. Polyakovâs responses would serve as evidence that he was under KGB control, because they had independent reporting on Polyakovâs role in the Illegals cases from Petr Semenovich Popov, a lieutenant colonel in the GRU who volunteered to the CIA in Vienna in 1952. In 1957 Popov was assigned to East Berlin, where he handled Polyakovâs GRU Illegals as they transited East Berlin en route
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