Discourses and Selected Writings by Epictetus, Robert Dobbin Page B

worse. Old men like us, you know, when we see children at play, like nothing better than to join them in their game. Likewise, I would be a lot more excited about joining you in serious study if I were once to see you bright-eyed and enthusiastic.
I 11 Concerning family affection
    [1] During a visit from a magistrate Epictetus, in the course of conversing, asked the man whether he had a wife and children. [2] He replied that he did. Epictetus then asked, ‘And how do you like it?’
    ‘I’m miserable,’ he said.
    So Epictetus asked, ‘How so? [3] Men don’t marry and have children in order to be miserable, but to be happy.’
    [4] ‘I’m so anxious about my poor children,’ the man said, ‘that the other day, when my little daughter was sick and appeared in danger of her life, I could not bear even to remain with her. I had to leave her side and go off until word was brought me that her condition had improved.’
    ‘Well,’ said Epictetus, ‘do you think you acted correctly in this case?’
    [5] ‘I acted naturally,’ he answered.
    ‘If you can convince me that you acted naturally, I am ready on my side to show that anything done in accord with nature is done correctly.’
    [6] ‘It’s what nearly all we fathers go through.’
    ‘I don’t dispute that reactions like yours occur,’ Epictetus said. ‘The point at issue between us is whether they ought to. [7] For by your reasoning we must allow that tumours happen for the good of the body, because they happen, and that doing wrong is in accord with nature, because all, or at least most of us, do wrong. [8] So show me how, exactly, you acted in accordance with nature.’
    ‘I don’t think I can,’ the man said. ‘Why don’t you show me instead how it is not in accordance with nature, and shouldn’t happen?’
    So Epictetus said, [9] ‘Well, if we were in any uncertainty about white and black things, what criterion would we adduce to choose between them?’
    ‘Sight,’ the man said.
    ‘And what about things hot and cold, or hard and soft -what would decide in those cases?’
    ‘Touch.’
    [10] ‘Now, since we have a difference of opinion about what is in agreement with nature and what is right and wrong, what standard should we apply here, do you think?’
    ‘I don’t know,’ the man said.
    [11] ‘Well, ignorance in discriminating between colours, smells or flavours probably does no great harm. But not to know about right and wrong, about what is natural in man’s case and what is not – is that a minor shortcoming, do you think?’
    ‘No, a very great one, I admit.’
    [12] ‘Consider now – is everything that people judge to be good and appropriate rightly judged so? Can Jews, Syrians, Egyptians and Romans all be right in the opinions they have about food, for example?’ 18
    ‘How could they?’
    [13] ‘Instead, if the opinions of the Egyptians are right, I suppose that the others are wrong. Or if the Jews are right, then the others can’t be.’
    ‘No, they cannot.’
    [14] ‘And where there is ignorance, there is also want of learning and instruction in essentials.’
    The man agreed.
    [15] ‘Once you’ve realized this, you will occupy your mind and devote all your attention toward finding that standard that discriminates between what is natural and what is not; and then apply it to particular cases as they arise.
    [16] ‘For the present, I can only offer the following by way of assistance toward solving our problem. [17] Tell me, then, do you think family affection is good and agrees with nature’s norms?’
    ‘I do.’
    ‘Can family affection be good and natural, ∗ while what agrees with reason is not good?’
    ‘Of course not.’
    [18] ‘So whatever is rational will not be in conflict with family affection.’
    ‘I suppose not.’
    ‘Because, if they were, one would be in agreement with nature while the other would have to conflict.’
    ‘Correct.’
    [19] ‘So if there’s anything out there that’s both