Miami are much smaller than the ones the networks and AP used before VNS was created.
Another 3.2 points in Gore’s 7.3-point “lead” come from VNS decision makers having picked a bad exit-poll model. More than
1.3 points from this figure come from an underestimation of absentee ballots. VNS thinks absentee votes will account for 7.2
percent of the turnout, when the real figure is 12 percent. They’re also underestimating how many of these absentee ballots
will end up coming in for Bush—they guess that absentee voters will be Bush backers 22.4 percent more than regular voters,
when the actual number is 23.7 percent.
Why do they think this? Because, unlike in other states, VNS didn’t conduct any telephone polling in the Sunshine State to
get a sense of what their parameters should be. It would cost too much, they decided. 4
And then there’s the question of voters who went to the polls to cast a vote for a candidate, and for some reason that vote
didn’t count—or counted for the wrong candidate, like, say, Pat Buchanan. To the VNS exit pollers outside, there’s no way
to check if a voter who tells them they voted for Gore may have actually, officially done so.
Moreover, VNS is beset with simple incompetence, the kind of mediocrity we settle for in normal life—think 411 or the Department
of Motor Vehicles—that has disastrous consequences at moments of great importance, like Space Shuttle launchings and Election
Night projections. Shortly after 9 P.M ., one VNS operator, adding a number to Gore’s vote total in Republican Duval County, gets a little frisky with the keys.
Instead of 4,301 votes, the operator adds 43,023. Whoa, boy! Lake County totals for Gore will be inaccurately added—twice—giving
vote totals that exceeded the number of voters. But even after these figures are fixed, another vote total shortchanges Gore
4,000 votes in Brevard County, 93,318 votes instead of the actual figure 97,318. This last mistake isn’t fixed until 3:51 A.M . 5
Within a half hour, Bush is up even further, 217 electoral votes to Gore’s 167, now that Florida’s 25 electors have been stripped
from the vice president. Bush wins key second-tier swing states like Missouri, West Virginia, and New Hampshire. He’s only
53 electoral votes away from the big enchilada.But then Gore picks up California, and the race narrows even further. Soon it becomes clear: whoever wins Florida wins it
all.
Though Florida had gone for a Democratic presidential candidate only three times in forty years, demographic shifts in the
state had made it far more up for grabs. Bush’s team could never conjure a strategy for an electoral victory that didn’t include
the state; when Gore’s poll numbers started going soft and then south in states like West Virginia, Arkansas, and Tennessee,
his team, too, began to realize how important a Florida victory would be.
Gore’s selection of Lieberman as his running mate helped him shore up disproportionately Jewish and Democratic southeastern
Florida. Bush had Jeb, of course, and Jeb’s organization, and the Panhandle and western side of the peninsula. So the battle
was fought in the middle stretch of the state, between Tampa and Orlando—the fabled Interstate 4 corridor—which was full of
younger voters, high-tech workers, and transplants from other swing states, like Michigan.
Gore and the Democrats would end up spending around $8 million in the state; Bush and the Republicans $14 million. After the
Democratic convention—where aides had arranged it so Florida’s delegates would be the ones to put Gore over the top, giving
him the nomination—Gore spent fourteen days in the state, including high-profile days of debate preparation in Longboat Key.
Bush spent nine days in the state, sending his parents and Ret. Gen. “Stormin’” Norman Schwarzkopf to stump for him. He spent
his last Sunday before the election flying to four Florida
Another 3.2 points in Gore’s 7.3-point “lead” come from VNS decision makers having picked a bad exit-poll model. More than
1.3 points from this figure come from an underestimation of absentee ballots. VNS thinks absentee votes will account for 7.2
percent of the turnout, when the real figure is 12 percent. They’re also underestimating how many of these absentee ballots
will end up coming in for Bush—they guess that absentee voters will be Bush backers 22.4 percent more than regular voters,
when the actual number is 23.7 percent.
Why do they think this? Because, unlike in other states, VNS didn’t conduct any telephone polling in the Sunshine State to
get a sense of what their parameters should be. It would cost too much, they decided. 4
And then there’s the question of voters who went to the polls to cast a vote for a candidate, and for some reason that vote
didn’t count—or counted for the wrong candidate, like, say, Pat Buchanan. To the VNS exit pollers outside, there’s no way
to check if a voter who tells them they voted for Gore may have actually, officially done so.
Moreover, VNS is beset with simple incompetence, the kind of mediocrity we settle for in normal life—think 411 or the Department
of Motor Vehicles—that has disastrous consequences at moments of great importance, like Space Shuttle launchings and Election
Night projections. Shortly after 9 P.M ., one VNS operator, adding a number to Gore’s vote total in Republican Duval County, gets a little frisky with the keys.
Instead of 4,301 votes, the operator adds 43,023. Whoa, boy! Lake County totals for Gore will be inaccurately added—twice—giving
vote totals that exceeded the number of voters. But even after these figures are fixed, another vote total shortchanges Gore
4,000 votes in Brevard County, 93,318 votes instead of the actual figure 97,318. This last mistake isn’t fixed until 3:51 A.M . 5
Within a half hour, Bush is up even further, 217 electoral votes to Gore’s 167, now that Florida’s 25 electors have been stripped
from the vice president. Bush wins key second-tier swing states like Missouri, West Virginia, and New Hampshire. He’s only
53 electoral votes away from the big enchilada.But then Gore picks up California, and the race narrows even further. Soon it becomes clear: whoever wins Florida wins it
all.
Though Florida had gone for a Democratic presidential candidate only three times in forty years, demographic shifts in the
state had made it far more up for grabs. Bush’s team could never conjure a strategy for an electoral victory that didn’t include
the state; when Gore’s poll numbers started going soft and then south in states like West Virginia, Arkansas, and Tennessee,
his team, too, began to realize how important a Florida victory would be.
Gore’s selection of Lieberman as his running mate helped him shore up disproportionately Jewish and Democratic southeastern
Florida. Bush had Jeb, of course, and Jeb’s organization, and the Panhandle and western side of the peninsula. So the battle
was fought in the middle stretch of the state, between Tampa and Orlando—the fabled Interstate 4 corridor—which was full of
younger voters, high-tech workers, and transplants from other swing states, like Michigan.
Gore and the Democrats would end up spending around $8 million in the state; Bush and the Republicans $14 million. After the
Democratic convention—where aides had arranged it so Florida’s delegates would be the ones to put Gore over the top, giving
him the nomination—Gore spent fourteen days in the state, including high-profile days of debate preparation in Longboat Key.
Bush spent nine days in the state, sending his parents and Ret. Gen. “Stormin’” Norman Schwarzkopf to stump for him. He spent
his last Sunday before the election flying to four Florida
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