Fatal Storm by Rob Mundle Page B

that would lead the world towards new standards.
    Former Sydney to Hobart race director, Gordon Marshall, told of one big change that the Hobart racebrought to international yacht design: “We heard alarm bells in the early to mid-seventies when the lightweight, skiff-type yachts arrived on the scene. In one race only one of six of these lightweights reached Hobart. It was apparent they couldn’t handle rough conditions. In fact they were dangerous because they carried the minimum amount of ballast and the maximum amount of crew weight to keep them upright. The yachts were also extremely wide so the crew could sit out on the side and have their weight contribute towards keeping the yacht as level as possible. At one stage the hulls were becoming so wide and the keels so small they probably would have stayed upside down had they capsized.
    “We had no option but to introduce stability factors into race rules. Yachts had to prove they were stable and self-righting before being allowed to compete. It was one rule that went on to become universally accepted around the world and in turn ocean racing became safer.”
    Even in the early 1990s some people did not like the trend they were seeing in the design of yachts. In December 1990 the late Alan Payne – a legendary Australian yacht designer – had his thoughts printed in a story in The Weekend Australian. “Bad weather could turn Sydney–Hobart into a racing catastrophe. Modern yachts not safe in heavy seas.” He referred ominously to “the 100-year storm”.
    “I’m not talking about the blows they normally experience in a race where the wind gets up for a few hours then abates and everyone gets to Hobart and says how tough it was,” Payne said. “I’m talking about the extreme conditions where huge seas break. These waves can really happen in the worst conditions on these race courses [he was referring to the Melbourne to Hobart and Melbourne to Devonport races]. These are the conditions where the yachts will fail structurally, wherethey will be capsized and where rigs break. The problems are that they aren’t strong enough, or in the event of a capsize are so stable in the inverted position that they don’t want to come upright.”
    Eight years later, in the 1998 race, much of what Payne predicted could happen did happen. His theories were based on considerable research into what sea conditions would be developed by a 35-knot gale in Bass Strait over a 24-hour period. He said that it was inevitable in those conditions that every yacht would see a wave of at least 33 foot (10 metres) in height on the 150-mile fetch from Gabo Island, off the mainland, across to Flinders Island, off Tasmania’s north-east corner. In fact many of the 1998 Hobart fleet saw winds of around 70 knots – twice as strong as those on which Payne based his predictions. His calculations suggested three yachts would completely disappear, taking 22 people with them; six crew would be lost overboard; three liferafts containing 12 people would never be found and a rescue helicopter would crash while on a mission.
    It was apparent after the 1998 race that if it hadn’t been for the herculean rescue effort and the fact that much of the drama occurred in relatively close proximity to the south-east corner of the Australian mainland, Alan Payne’s predictions could well have come true. While generally accepting his comments, ocean racing authorities have always been quick to stress that the standards covering design, construction, communications and safety equipment are among the most stringent in the world.
    In the early days of racing to Hobart the oft-heard comment was “wooden yachts and iron men”. Today, many of the sailors who manned those heavily timbered craft look at the modern yachts made of fibreglass andspace age materials and mumble “plastic yachts and plastic men”. One of the greatest sailors to come out of the Hobart race, Magnus Halvorsen (who with brother Trygve won