upon the individual or property taxed. It is largely borne by the ultimate consumer.” He had established the charitable deduction he talked about. Tax revenues promptly behaved just as he had predicted, increasing after rate cuts, and the country moved into surplus. He too had a few standardizing projects—he made uniform the size of the various denominations of bills, a step, he estimated correctly, that would save the Treasury money. He brought the budget into balance and supervised buildings for Coolidge. And he battled for the repeal of the estate tax, perhaps thinking of the various conflicts over Frick’s grave.
As for Hoover, he had decided that, at least for a while, he could live with John L. Lewis’s idea of higher wages. He and Lewis determined that long periods of labor peace would bring economic benefits sufficient to offset the higher wages that Lewis sought. After an agreement with labor in 1924 at Jacksonville, Florida, the coal companies found themselves cornered into committing to paying higher wages.
Hoover and Lewis now had nothing but praise for each other, with Lewis, to date a movement radical, now declaring himself a free-marketeer. “It is the survival of the fittest. Many are going to be hurt, but the rule must be the greatest good for the greatest number.” Hoover openly flattered Lewis: “Mr. Lewis is more than a successful battle leader. He has a sound conception of statesmanship.” But by the mid-1920s it became clear that they had been wrong: nonunion mines were driving the companies that had gone along with the Jacksonville agreement out of business. The union men were not better paid; they were out of work. Cushing’s Survey, a newsletter, reported that Lewis assailed Hoover, saying, “You got me into this mess; it’s up to you to get me out.” He even wrote his own book, The Miner’s Fight for American Standards , a plea to Hoover. But this time Hoover did not back him up.
There had also been far smaller projects, which Hoover relished. One was strengthening the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, whose job it was to promote trade. He expanded the number of its offices across the country from six to twenty-three; a businessman could now go to any good-sized city and learn about the possibility of business abroad. As one of his biographers, Will Irwin, noted, this expansion generated an increase in inquiries about trade from 200,000 to 2.4 million. Irwin, a supporter of Hoover’s, reported that American businessmen would often tell Commerce that their resources obviated a tiresome research trip abroad: “You fellows have more than I could get in a dozen trips.”
Hoover had also created a Division of Simplified Practices, whose job it was to standardize and harmonize the distressingly fractiousand unresponsive manufacturing and construction sectors. In those days roads were often still paved in brick, and brick was a typical example: sixty-six different sizes were being produced by manufacturers when Hoover ordered research on the topic. This was sheer waste, as far as the utilitarian Hoover was concerned. He therefore pulled the nation’s paving-brick firms into a room and settled the matter; the range of sizes dropped from sixty-six to eleven. Emboldened, Hoover also looked into brick for homes; here he claimed victory outright, for the number of sizes went “from forty-four to one,” the praiseful Irvin reported. Then there were beds. Seventy-four different sizes were available; as a result of encouragement from Hoover, the figure went down to four. If these latter accomplishments had a comical aspect of “putting the fishes to bed,” Hoover did not notice.
Whether the public was ever conscious of the contrasts among all these probusiness leaders is hard to discern. In 1924 they gave Coolidge 382 electoral votes, far more than his Democratic and Progressive opponents, whose total together was 149. But Hoover was also popular. What was clear, however, was that
As for Hoover, he had decided that, at least for a while, he could live with John L. Lewis’s idea of higher wages. He and Lewis determined that long periods of labor peace would bring economic benefits sufficient to offset the higher wages that Lewis sought. After an agreement with labor in 1924 at Jacksonville, Florida, the coal companies found themselves cornered into committing to paying higher wages.
Hoover and Lewis now had nothing but praise for each other, with Lewis, to date a movement radical, now declaring himself a free-marketeer. “It is the survival of the fittest. Many are going to be hurt, but the rule must be the greatest good for the greatest number.” Hoover openly flattered Lewis: “Mr. Lewis is more than a successful battle leader. He has a sound conception of statesmanship.” But by the mid-1920s it became clear that they had been wrong: nonunion mines were driving the companies that had gone along with the Jacksonville agreement out of business. The union men were not better paid; they were out of work. Cushing’s Survey, a newsletter, reported that Lewis assailed Hoover, saying, “You got me into this mess; it’s up to you to get me out.” He even wrote his own book, The Miner’s Fight for American Standards , a plea to Hoover. But this time Hoover did not back him up.
There had also been far smaller projects, which Hoover relished. One was strengthening the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, whose job it was to promote trade. He expanded the number of its offices across the country from six to twenty-three; a businessman could now go to any good-sized city and learn about the possibility of business abroad. As one of his biographers, Will Irwin, noted, this expansion generated an increase in inquiries about trade from 200,000 to 2.4 million. Irwin, a supporter of Hoover’s, reported that American businessmen would often tell Commerce that their resources obviated a tiresome research trip abroad: “You fellows have more than I could get in a dozen trips.”
Hoover had also created a Division of Simplified Practices, whose job it was to standardize and harmonize the distressingly fractiousand unresponsive manufacturing and construction sectors. In those days roads were often still paved in brick, and brick was a typical example: sixty-six different sizes were being produced by manufacturers when Hoover ordered research on the topic. This was sheer waste, as far as the utilitarian Hoover was concerned. He therefore pulled the nation’s paving-brick firms into a room and settled the matter; the range of sizes dropped from sixty-six to eleven. Emboldened, Hoover also looked into brick for homes; here he claimed victory outright, for the number of sizes went “from forty-four to one,” the praiseful Irvin reported. Then there were beds. Seventy-four different sizes were available; as a result of encouragement from Hoover, the figure went down to four. If these latter accomplishments had a comical aspect of “putting the fishes to bed,” Hoover did not notice.
Whether the public was ever conscious of the contrasts among all these probusiness leaders is hard to discern. In 1924 they gave Coolidge 382 electoral votes, far more than his Democratic and Progressive opponents, whose total together was 149. But Hoover was also popular. What was clear, however, was that
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