Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 by Hector C. Bywater
Authors: Hector C. Bywater
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the Japanese were expected to send. When all these facts are given due weight, Admiral Ribley’s decision to meet the enemy outside Manila is seen to have been the soundest one that was possible under the circumstances. So long as his ships remained above water they constituted a “fleet in being,” and therefore a hindrance — albeit a feeble one — to invasion.
At dusk on March 5 an American airplane sighted the smoke of a large fleet two hundred miles due west of Cape Bogeador. On approaching to reconnoitre more closely it was chased and fired on by three machines marked with the Japanese cockade, and only escaped by its superior speed. The first shots of the war were thus fired in the clouds. A radio message from the air scout notified Admiral Ribley of the enemy’s approach. Other American planes which went up before dawn on the 6th soon made contact with the Japanese fleet. At 5 a.m. it was observed west of Lingayen Bay, steering S.S.E. The three battle-cruisers were in line ahead, with the light cruisers and destroyers screening them from submarine attack. Astern of the third battle-cruiser was the airplane carrier, Hosho , several of whose chaser machines were flying ahead of the fleet. In view of the necessity of conserving all aircraft for defence purposes, the American pilots had been ordered to avoid action, and this they did, confining themselves to long-distance observation of the enemy’s movements. Admiral Ribley by now had made his dispositions. At 8 a.m. he was 10 miles N.W. of Lubang Island. His squadron was complete save for the Cleveland , this cruiser having been sent back to Cavite on account of engine trouble, which reduced her speed to ten knots. Six submarines, detached the previous evening, were now patrolling independently off the south-west coast of Luzon, with orders to attack the enemy’s large ships if a good opportunity offered. The other six submarines were cruising between Subig Bay and Verde Island.
A report came in from the air scouts at 9.15 that the Japanese fleet was firing heavily at some unseen target, probably a submarine. The thunder of the guns was clearly audible in the American ships, where the men waited with tense nerves for the first sight of their foe. Two Japanese airplanes were now seen approaching at high speed, one of which dropped a bomb as it crossed the American ships. This missile struck the water some two hundred yards astern of the flagship. Planes from the Curtiss , which had been patrolling on the 8,000 foot level for the past hour, intercepted and shot down one of the enemy machines. At 10.20 smoke was visible from the control top of the Missoula , and a few minutes later the dim shapes of the Japanese battlecruisers loomed on the horizon. Graphic accounts of the action that now took place have been published since the war by survivors of the American squadron.
The following is an abridged version of the narrative by Lieutenant Elkins, who was present in the flagship Missoula as aide to Admiral Ribley:
We were leading the line, if you could call that a ‘line’ which included but two ships, our own and the Frederick . The Galveston , Denver , and Curtiss , being ships of no fighting power, were steaming 4,000 yards away on our port beam, where we thought they would be safe from ‘overs,’ and yet near enough, as the Admiral grimly remarked, ‘to pick us up if we go swimming.’ The destroyers were ahead of us in two groups, to port and starboard, where they were in a position to engage the Japanese torpedo craft if these should try to attack. At 10.30 the control top gave us the range as 24,000 yards. The Admiral and I were at this time standing on the after bridge.
So clear was the atmosphere that the silhouettes of the Japanese ships were sharply defined, and with our glasses we could even see the big guns in the battle-cruisers being trained. Our information was that their 14-inch had an extreme range of 23,000 yards, but this must have been
At dusk on March 5 an American airplane sighted the smoke of a large fleet two hundred miles due west of Cape Bogeador. On approaching to reconnoitre more closely it was chased and fired on by three machines marked with the Japanese cockade, and only escaped by its superior speed. The first shots of the war were thus fired in the clouds. A radio message from the air scout notified Admiral Ribley of the enemy’s approach. Other American planes which went up before dawn on the 6th soon made contact with the Japanese fleet. At 5 a.m. it was observed west of Lingayen Bay, steering S.S.E. The three battle-cruisers were in line ahead, with the light cruisers and destroyers screening them from submarine attack. Astern of the third battle-cruiser was the airplane carrier, Hosho , several of whose chaser machines were flying ahead of the fleet. In view of the necessity of conserving all aircraft for defence purposes, the American pilots had been ordered to avoid action, and this they did, confining themselves to long-distance observation of the enemy’s movements. Admiral Ribley by now had made his dispositions. At 8 a.m. he was 10 miles N.W. of Lubang Island. His squadron was complete save for the Cleveland , this cruiser having been sent back to Cavite on account of engine trouble, which reduced her speed to ten knots. Six submarines, detached the previous evening, were now patrolling independently off the south-west coast of Luzon, with orders to attack the enemy’s large ships if a good opportunity offered. The other six submarines were cruising between Subig Bay and Verde Island.
A report came in from the air scouts at 9.15 that the Japanese fleet was firing heavily at some unseen target, probably a submarine. The thunder of the guns was clearly audible in the American ships, where the men waited with tense nerves for the first sight of their foe. Two Japanese airplanes were now seen approaching at high speed, one of which dropped a bomb as it crossed the American ships. This missile struck the water some two hundred yards astern of the flagship. Planes from the Curtiss , which had been patrolling on the 8,000 foot level for the past hour, intercepted and shot down one of the enemy machines. At 10.20 smoke was visible from the control top of the Missoula , and a few minutes later the dim shapes of the Japanese battlecruisers loomed on the horizon. Graphic accounts of the action that now took place have been published since the war by survivors of the American squadron.
The following is an abridged version of the narrative by Lieutenant Elkins, who was present in the flagship Missoula as aide to Admiral Ribley:
We were leading the line, if you could call that a ‘line’ which included but two ships, our own and the Frederick . The Galveston , Denver , and Curtiss , being ships of no fighting power, were steaming 4,000 yards away on our port beam, where we thought they would be safe from ‘overs,’ and yet near enough, as the Admiral grimly remarked, ‘to pick us up if we go swimming.’ The destroyers were ahead of us in two groups, to port and starboard, where they were in a position to engage the Japanese torpedo craft if these should try to attack. At 10.30 the control top gave us the range as 24,000 yards. The Admiral and I were at this time standing on the after bridge.
So clear was the atmosphere that the silhouettes of the Japanese ships were sharply defined, and with our glasses we could even see the big guns in the battle-cruisers being trained. Our information was that their 14-inch had an extreme range of 23,000 yards, but this must have been
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