which, when she submerged to periscope depth, measured sixty-five feet below the surface. Itâs not clear whether Bass, knowing the high-low layout of the minefields, simply threw caution to the wind or if he assumed that the force exerted on the anchored mines by the outflowing Kuroshio Current, which made them lean over (a phenomenon called âmine dipâ), gave him an extra margin of safety. Whichever it was, somehow the Plunger with her frozen port shaft got through in one piece.
Unlike the first raid, this time targets were plentiful. Regrettably, torpedo performance was abominable. Bass, plagued with faulty Mk 14s, managed to sink only two cargo ships. Morton, meanwhile, was bedeviled with duds, broachers, and erratic runs. His and Bassâs patrol reports are a litany of miss, miss, dud, broach, miss, miss.... Furious, Morton sought permission to end the mission and return to Pearl Harbor to have his remaining torpedoes examined. Lockwood, deeply disturbed by this unexpected turn of events, approved. So far the two forays had been miserable failures.
Back in Pearl Harbor, Morton barely contained his anger when he powwowed with Lockwood to curse the lousy torpedoes heâd lugged all the way to the Sea of Japan. His boss was sympatheticâheâd been wrestling with torpedo problems ever since taking over in Fremantle, and more than anyone, Lockwood wanted Morton to succeed. When the irate skipper insisted on going back with a load of freshly overhauled Mk 14s and a batch of new Mk 18 electrics, Lockwood gave his approval. This time he tapped the USS Sawfish (SS-276), skippered by Lieutenant Commander Eugene T. Sands, to accompany the Wahoo . The Sawfish , like the Wahoo , carried a mixed load of Mk 14s and Mk 18s.
Both submarines departed Pearl Harbor on September 10, arriving off La Pérouse via different routes. The Wahoo headed in first, then made tracks to patrol her assigned area in the southern part of the sea; the Sawfish , assigned the northern part, followed three days later. Morton had orders to conduct operations as he saw fit, after which he was to depart the area on October 21 and report his position by radio after transiting the Kuriles. The Sawfish , which during the patrol had no contact at all with the Wahoo , kept to her own schedule. Lockwood and Voge expected that the Japanese would be on guard for more submarine intruders and had so briefed Morton and Sands.
There were plenty of targets, but once again poor torpedo performance thwarted success, at least for the Sawfish . Sands made numerous attacks that should have resulted in sinkings. Instead he was plagued by duds and erratic torpedo behavior. He reported that on firing, several of his Mk 18s struck the bow torpedo tube shuttersâthe streamlined outer doors covering the tubesâ muzzlesâsending them wildly off course. Fortunately the tin fish were designed to arm only after completing a four-hundred-yard run or they might have blown the Sawfish to bits. In seven attacks on eighteen ships Sands failed to sink a single one.
On October 9, after sixteen miserable days on station, Sands, with Lockwoodâs permission, pulled out with several Mk 18s still in their tubes for the torpedo experts to examine. Making good speed through La Pérouse, the Sawfish encountered patrol boats and twice escaped a bombing by patrolling aircraft. 5
The Wahoo , meanwhile, had vanished.
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On October 5, four days before the Sawfish departed enemy waters, the Japanese news agency Domei announced the torpedoing of the eight-thousand-ton passenger steamer Konron Maru in the Tsushima Strait. Lockwood acknowledged that since there were no other subs in that area it had to have been the work of the Wahoo . Unlike the Sawfish , maybe this time her torpedoes had worked.
On October 7, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin published an article about the attack. It read in part:
An Allied submarine, slipping boldly into the waters off
Unlike the first raid, this time targets were plentiful. Regrettably, torpedo performance was abominable. Bass, plagued with faulty Mk 14s, managed to sink only two cargo ships. Morton, meanwhile, was bedeviled with duds, broachers, and erratic runs. His and Bassâs patrol reports are a litany of miss, miss, dud, broach, miss, miss.... Furious, Morton sought permission to end the mission and return to Pearl Harbor to have his remaining torpedoes examined. Lockwood, deeply disturbed by this unexpected turn of events, approved. So far the two forays had been miserable failures.
Back in Pearl Harbor, Morton barely contained his anger when he powwowed with Lockwood to curse the lousy torpedoes heâd lugged all the way to the Sea of Japan. His boss was sympatheticâheâd been wrestling with torpedo problems ever since taking over in Fremantle, and more than anyone, Lockwood wanted Morton to succeed. When the irate skipper insisted on going back with a load of freshly overhauled Mk 14s and a batch of new Mk 18 electrics, Lockwood gave his approval. This time he tapped the USS Sawfish (SS-276), skippered by Lieutenant Commander Eugene T. Sands, to accompany the Wahoo . The Sawfish , like the Wahoo , carried a mixed load of Mk 14s and Mk 18s.
Both submarines departed Pearl Harbor on September 10, arriving off La Pérouse via different routes. The Wahoo headed in first, then made tracks to patrol her assigned area in the southern part of the sea; the Sawfish , assigned the northern part, followed three days later. Morton had orders to conduct operations as he saw fit, after which he was to depart the area on October 21 and report his position by radio after transiting the Kuriles. The Sawfish , which during the patrol had no contact at all with the Wahoo , kept to her own schedule. Lockwood and Voge expected that the Japanese would be on guard for more submarine intruders and had so briefed Morton and Sands.
There were plenty of targets, but once again poor torpedo performance thwarted success, at least for the Sawfish . Sands made numerous attacks that should have resulted in sinkings. Instead he was plagued by duds and erratic torpedo behavior. He reported that on firing, several of his Mk 18s struck the bow torpedo tube shuttersâthe streamlined outer doors covering the tubesâ muzzlesâsending them wildly off course. Fortunately the tin fish were designed to arm only after completing a four-hundred-yard run or they might have blown the Sawfish to bits. In seven attacks on eighteen ships Sands failed to sink a single one.
On October 9, after sixteen miserable days on station, Sands, with Lockwoodâs permission, pulled out with several Mk 18s still in their tubes for the torpedo experts to examine. Making good speed through La Pérouse, the Sawfish encountered patrol boats and twice escaped a bombing by patrolling aircraft. 5
The Wahoo , meanwhile, had vanished.
Â
Â
On October 5, four days before the Sawfish departed enemy waters, the Japanese news agency Domei announced the torpedoing of the eight-thousand-ton passenger steamer Konron Maru in the Tsushima Strait. Lockwood acknowledged that since there were no other subs in that area it had to have been the work of the Wahoo . Unlike the Sawfish , maybe this time her torpedoes had worked.
On October 7, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin published an article about the attack. It read in part:
An Allied submarine, slipping boldly into the waters off
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