aggressive defense, the plan Lockwood and Voge devised called for only a four-day hit-and-run raid that might just catch the Japanese napping and that would end before they could rouse their antisubmarine forces in strength. In May, Lockwood submitted his plan to Admiral King and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet (CinCPac), for approval. A week later it came back with just one word over the admiralsâ signatures: âApproved.â
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In early July 1943, three submarines departed from Pearl Harbor bound for what some observers believed was a suicide mission into virtually unknown territory. Lockwood didnât agree, though the uncertainty of it all stoked his three-pack-a-day habit. Two of the three subs were the older prewar-built USS Plunger (SS-179), commanded by Lieutenant Commander Raymond H. Bass, and the USS Permit (SS-178), commanded by Commander Wreford G. âMoonâ Chapple. The third sub was the new-construction USS Lapon (SS-260), making her first war patrol under Lieutenant Commander Oliver G. Kirk. Bass and Chapple were seasoned skippers with exemplary combat records; Kirk, also a veteran, had less combat experience than either Bass or Chapple. Another submarine, the big, old prewar USS Narwhal (SS-167), skippered by Commander Frank D. Latta, was dispatched to create a diversion by bombarding the island of Matsuwa To in the Kurile Islands northeast of La Pérouse Strait. Shells lobbed ashore from her twin six-inch guns would keep the Japanese busy and help the three subs make their getaway after completing their mission.
The Sea of Okhotsk, even in summer, is cold and fogbound. The subs groped their way west through the Kuriles for La Pérouse Strait, where they made their run-in on the surface at night at full speed, dodging fishing craft and navigating the safe channel by sheer guesswork. Most but not all of the Russian ships they saw had their running lights on to identify themselves as neutrals. Since none of the subs hit a mine, they and Lockwood had evidently guessed right about the location of the safe channel and the depth of sown mines. Bass, Chapple, and Kirk agreed that it was a hair-raising trip.
The submarines took up their assigned areas and at the appointed hour (Chapple in the Permit jumped the gun) began looking for ships to torpedo. As it turned out bad weather and intermittent problems with the raidersâ vital SJ radar spoiled any chances they may have had to wreak havoc on the Japanese. Not only that, targets worthy of torpedoes proved scarce: Lockwoodâs suspicion that the bulk of the Japanese merchant marine was busy in the greater Pacific turned out to be correct. The Permit and the Plunger sank only three ships totaling roughly five thousand tons; the Lapon , already bedeviled by SJ radar problems, suffered from an inoperative Fathometer, which impeded skipper Kirkâs determination to hunt for targets in foggy coastal waters off the coast of Korea. As it was, the Lapon encountered only sampans. Complicating matters, the Permit shot up a Russian trawler by mistake off Karafuto. Chapple, realizing his error, pulled thirteen survivors, including five women, from the frigid water. He considered landing them on Russian Kamchatka, but after a flurry of radio messages to Pearl Harbor, Chapple was ordered instead to off-load his passengers in Dutch Harbor, Alaska, to avoid a direct confrontation with angry Soviet authorities.
All in all, the first foray by U.S. subs into the Sea of Japan didnât break the empireâs back. Lockwoodâs endorsement to the Lapon âs patrol report said it best: âResults were disappointing. 22 days of foggy weather did much to render operations difficult.... Contacts were meager.â 3
As for the Narwhal , delayed by lousy weather, she arrived off Matsuwa To long after the three raiding subs had departed for home. Nevertheless, Latta swung into action. After
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In early July 1943, three submarines departed from Pearl Harbor bound for what some observers believed was a suicide mission into virtually unknown territory. Lockwood didnât agree, though the uncertainty of it all stoked his three-pack-a-day habit. Two of the three subs were the older prewar-built USS Plunger (SS-179), commanded by Lieutenant Commander Raymond H. Bass, and the USS Permit (SS-178), commanded by Commander Wreford G. âMoonâ Chapple. The third sub was the new-construction USS Lapon (SS-260), making her first war patrol under Lieutenant Commander Oliver G. Kirk. Bass and Chapple were seasoned skippers with exemplary combat records; Kirk, also a veteran, had less combat experience than either Bass or Chapple. Another submarine, the big, old prewar USS Narwhal (SS-167), skippered by Commander Frank D. Latta, was dispatched to create a diversion by bombarding the island of Matsuwa To in the Kurile Islands northeast of La Pérouse Strait. Shells lobbed ashore from her twin six-inch guns would keep the Japanese busy and help the three subs make their getaway after completing their mission.
The Sea of Okhotsk, even in summer, is cold and fogbound. The subs groped their way west through the Kuriles for La Pérouse Strait, where they made their run-in on the surface at night at full speed, dodging fishing craft and navigating the safe channel by sheer guesswork. Most but not all of the Russian ships they saw had their running lights on to identify themselves as neutrals. Since none of the subs hit a mine, they and Lockwood had evidently guessed right about the location of the safe channel and the depth of sown mines. Bass, Chapple, and Kirk agreed that it was a hair-raising trip.
The submarines took up their assigned areas and at the appointed hour (Chapple in the Permit jumped the gun) began looking for ships to torpedo. As it turned out bad weather and intermittent problems with the raidersâ vital SJ radar spoiled any chances they may have had to wreak havoc on the Japanese. Not only that, targets worthy of torpedoes proved scarce: Lockwoodâs suspicion that the bulk of the Japanese merchant marine was busy in the greater Pacific turned out to be correct. The Permit and the Plunger sank only three ships totaling roughly five thousand tons; the Lapon , already bedeviled by SJ radar problems, suffered from an inoperative Fathometer, which impeded skipper Kirkâs determination to hunt for targets in foggy coastal waters off the coast of Korea. As it was, the Lapon encountered only sampans. Complicating matters, the Permit shot up a Russian trawler by mistake off Karafuto. Chapple, realizing his error, pulled thirteen survivors, including five women, from the frigid water. He considered landing them on Russian Kamchatka, but after a flurry of radio messages to Pearl Harbor, Chapple was ordered instead to off-load his passengers in Dutch Harbor, Alaska, to avoid a direct confrontation with angry Soviet authorities.
All in all, the first foray by U.S. subs into the Sea of Japan didnât break the empireâs back. Lockwoodâs endorsement to the Lapon âs patrol report said it best: âResults were disappointing. 22 days of foggy weather did much to render operations difficult.... Contacts were meager.â 3
As for the Narwhal , delayed by lousy weather, she arrived off Matsuwa To long after the three raiding subs had departed for home. Nevertheless, Latta swung into action. After
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