lay behind afflictions. The devil acting directly, or even disease, could also have caused the problem. 49
When the operations of witchcraft could reasonably be inferred, there still arose the question of identifying the witch. Bernard pointed out that although witches could be of either sex, they were more likely to be women than men. Ever since Eve, Satan had preferred to deal with women, who were “more credulous” and “more malicious” when displeased than men, “and so herein more fit instruments of the Divell.” More talkative than men, women were also “lesse able to hide what they know from others” and consequently “more ready to bee teachers of Witchcraft to others,” such as their children or servants. Finally, women, “proud in their rule,” would busily command whomever they could. “And therefore,” Bernard concluded, “the Divell laboureth most to make them Witches: because they, upon every light displeasure, will set him on worke, which is what he desireth.” Above all, female or male, witches were “malicious spirits, impatient people, and full of revenge.” 50
Accordingly, in cases of affliction believed to result from witchcraft Bernard listed what he termed “probabilities, as may justly cause the suspected to be questioned.” First came the propensity of the accused “to be much given to
cursing
and
imprecations,
” especially for little or no cause. If after threats, “evill [came] to happen, and this not
once,
or
twice,
to one or two, but often, and to divers persons,” then that was “a great presumption” of guilt. Another such presumption derived from “an implicit confession”—a statement by an accused that could be taken as an admission of culpability. Or perhaps the suspect had taken an inordinate interest in the afflicted person, repeatedly visiting despite being told to stay away. “The common report of neighbours of all sorts” too bore weight, particularly if the accused was “of kin to a convicted Witch,” such as a child or grandchild, sibling, niece or nephew. Similar reasoning applied as well to accused servants or people “of familiar acquaintance” with a known witch. The testimony of another witch could also be important, “for who can better discover a Witch, then [
sic
] a Witch?” Finally, if the afflicted named suspects in their fits, “and also [told] where they have been, & what they have done here or there,” or “seeme[d] to see” apparitions of the accused in their fits, “this is a great suspition.” 51
But Richard Bernard warned his readers not to jump to conclusions. He identified
presumptions
only, he stressed repeatedly. Each of the grounds for suspicion could have an innocent explanation as well as a diabolic one; for example, “rude and ill-mannered people,” especially “some of the poorer sort,” might not understand that they were not wanted at the house of an afflicted person. Likewise, “a common report” could rest “upon very weake grounds.” More important, when the afflicted in their fits saw apparitions, that was, at base, “the devils testimony, who can lye, and that more often then speake truth.” Such evidence alone would be insufficient in a capital case, for even when the devil told the truth, he did so with “lying intent,” seeking “to insnare the bloud of the innocent.” Certainly, Bernard asserted, Satan “can represent a common ordinary person, man or woman unregenerate (though no Witch) to the fantasie of vaine persons, to deceive them and others.” 52
At the end of the first quarter of the seventeenth century, Richard Bernard thus touched on many of the issues that later arose in cases of affliction in both old and New England. He intended to caution his readers against excessive credulity in dealing with witchcraft allegations, yet his advice could be, and was, taken in divergent ways. His reliance on doctors for the initial diagnosis of diabolic activity, for example, left little
When the operations of witchcraft could reasonably be inferred, there still arose the question of identifying the witch. Bernard pointed out that although witches could be of either sex, they were more likely to be women than men. Ever since Eve, Satan had preferred to deal with women, who were “more credulous” and “more malicious” when displeased than men, “and so herein more fit instruments of the Divell.” More talkative than men, women were also “lesse able to hide what they know from others” and consequently “more ready to bee teachers of Witchcraft to others,” such as their children or servants. Finally, women, “proud in their rule,” would busily command whomever they could. “And therefore,” Bernard concluded, “the Divell laboureth most to make them Witches: because they, upon every light displeasure, will set him on worke, which is what he desireth.” Above all, female or male, witches were “malicious spirits, impatient people, and full of revenge.” 50
Accordingly, in cases of affliction believed to result from witchcraft Bernard listed what he termed “probabilities, as may justly cause the suspected to be questioned.” First came the propensity of the accused “to be much given to
cursing
and
imprecations,
” especially for little or no cause. If after threats, “evill [came] to happen, and this not
once,
or
twice,
to one or two, but often, and to divers persons,” then that was “a great presumption” of guilt. Another such presumption derived from “an implicit confession”—a statement by an accused that could be taken as an admission of culpability. Or perhaps the suspect had taken an inordinate interest in the afflicted person, repeatedly visiting despite being told to stay away. “The common report of neighbours of all sorts” too bore weight, particularly if the accused was “of kin to a convicted Witch,” such as a child or grandchild, sibling, niece or nephew. Similar reasoning applied as well to accused servants or people “of familiar acquaintance” with a known witch. The testimony of another witch could also be important, “for who can better discover a Witch, then [
sic
] a Witch?” Finally, if the afflicted named suspects in their fits, “and also [told] where they have been, & what they have done here or there,” or “seeme[d] to see” apparitions of the accused in their fits, “this is a great suspition.” 51
But Richard Bernard warned his readers not to jump to conclusions. He identified
presumptions
only, he stressed repeatedly. Each of the grounds for suspicion could have an innocent explanation as well as a diabolic one; for example, “rude and ill-mannered people,” especially “some of the poorer sort,” might not understand that they were not wanted at the house of an afflicted person. Likewise, “a common report” could rest “upon very weake grounds.” More important, when the afflicted in their fits saw apparitions, that was, at base, “the devils testimony, who can lye, and that more often then speake truth.” Such evidence alone would be insufficient in a capital case, for even when the devil told the truth, he did so with “lying intent,” seeking “to insnare the bloud of the innocent.” Certainly, Bernard asserted, Satan “can represent a common ordinary person, man or woman unregenerate (though no Witch) to the fantasie of vaine persons, to deceive them and others.” 52
At the end of the first quarter of the seventeenth century, Richard Bernard thus touched on many of the issues that later arose in cases of affliction in both old and New England. He intended to caution his readers against excessive credulity in dealing with witchcraft allegations, yet his advice could be, and was, taken in divergent ways. His reliance on doctors for the initial diagnosis of diabolic activity, for example, left little
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