Madison and Jefferson by Nancy Isenberg, Andrew Burstein
Authors: Nancy Isenberg, Andrew Burstein
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wretches”) who intended to seek out the invaders once British troops landed on Virginia soil. Bradford was no less appalled at the prospect, finding it incomprehensible that “the Spirit of the English” would countenance “so slavish a way of Conquering.” 27
Madison was prepared to admit that its slave population was Virginia’s greatest vulnerability, its Achilles’ heel: “If we should be subdued,” he said in June 1775, “we shall fall like Achilles by the hand of one that knows that secret.” Madison knew that free, white Virginians had created an unstablesociety, and that all their bravado, all their talk of liberty, could not hide this fact. When his paternal grandfather, Ambrose Madison, had died at the age of thirty-six, in 1732, a court determined that he had been poisoned by at least one of his slaves; three were tried, one hanged. 28
To be literal, using real slaves might be called a “slavish” way of conquering, but that is not precisely what Bradford meant. In 1775 the idea of slaves fighting their masters under sanction of the British military was an insult to the inherited sense of honor claimed by the king’s freeborn British subjects in Virginia. London had long maintained that plantation slavery could be safely managed and hitherto had done nothing to reverse or undo the arrangement. A new, “slavish” way of conquering meant setting up British Americans for destruction. Whether one looked at “slavish” conquering as race war or mere indecency, the situation was grim.
In June 1775, once Dunmore fled the governor’s palace, fearing for his life, his detractors assumed that his departure was part of a larger plan to invade Virginia. He had already kept the burgesses from meeting for over a year when the Virginia leadership finally felt compelled to establish its substitute government, the Virginia Convention. Fairfax County patriarch George Mason proceeded to devise the first serious plan for an organized military, and Patrick Henry made known his ambition to lead the First Regiment. After Henry won his colonelcy and the title of commander in chief of the Virginia militia, George Washington remarked caustically: “I think my countrymen made a Capitol mistake, when they took Henry out of the Senate to place him in the field; and pity it is, that he does not see this.” Washington believed that Henry, energetic though he was, did not reason (or strategize) as a military man should.
Meanwhile Dunmore made good on his threats, initiating raids along the coastline, harassing planters, and recruiting slaves. In November 1775 he did battle with the Princess Anne County militia, seizing its captain and securing a hold on the oceanside town of Norfolk. Victory so emboldened Dunmore that he issued the most infamous of his proclamations, charging rebellious Virginians with treason while promising freedom to all slaves and servants who flocked to his standard.
In simple terms, he had declared war on the Virginia planter class. Arming former slaves turned their great white world upside down. Dunmore’s so-called Ethiopian regiment, which helped defeat the Norfolk area militiamen, were musket-bearing slaves led by white officers, eager troops who wore the words
Liberty to Slaves
on their chests. There appeared to be more than one revolution in the offing. 29
Jefferson recognized Dunmore’s new army as a menace. Writing from Philadelphia to his college chum John Page, he concluded his letter by reprising Cato the Elder’s call in the Roman Senate, substituting Norfolk for Carthage: “
Delenda est Norfolk
”—Dunmore’s stronghold must be destroyed. A prominent planter reported to Jefferson and the Virginia delegation in Congress that Dunmore’s ships were “plying up the Rivers, plundering Plantations and using every Art to seduce the Negroes. The Person of no Man in the Colony is safe.” Pendleton likewise expressed indignation over Dunmore’s “Piratical War,” telling Jefferson
Madison was prepared to admit that its slave population was Virginia’s greatest vulnerability, its Achilles’ heel: “If we should be subdued,” he said in June 1775, “we shall fall like Achilles by the hand of one that knows that secret.” Madison knew that free, white Virginians had created an unstablesociety, and that all their bravado, all their talk of liberty, could not hide this fact. When his paternal grandfather, Ambrose Madison, had died at the age of thirty-six, in 1732, a court determined that he had been poisoned by at least one of his slaves; three were tried, one hanged. 28
To be literal, using real slaves might be called a “slavish” way of conquering, but that is not precisely what Bradford meant. In 1775 the idea of slaves fighting their masters under sanction of the British military was an insult to the inherited sense of honor claimed by the king’s freeborn British subjects in Virginia. London had long maintained that plantation slavery could be safely managed and hitherto had done nothing to reverse or undo the arrangement. A new, “slavish” way of conquering meant setting up British Americans for destruction. Whether one looked at “slavish” conquering as race war or mere indecency, the situation was grim.
In June 1775, once Dunmore fled the governor’s palace, fearing for his life, his detractors assumed that his departure was part of a larger plan to invade Virginia. He had already kept the burgesses from meeting for over a year when the Virginia leadership finally felt compelled to establish its substitute government, the Virginia Convention. Fairfax County patriarch George Mason proceeded to devise the first serious plan for an organized military, and Patrick Henry made known his ambition to lead the First Regiment. After Henry won his colonelcy and the title of commander in chief of the Virginia militia, George Washington remarked caustically: “I think my countrymen made a Capitol mistake, when they took Henry out of the Senate to place him in the field; and pity it is, that he does not see this.” Washington believed that Henry, energetic though he was, did not reason (or strategize) as a military man should.
Meanwhile Dunmore made good on his threats, initiating raids along the coastline, harassing planters, and recruiting slaves. In November 1775 he did battle with the Princess Anne County militia, seizing its captain and securing a hold on the oceanside town of Norfolk. Victory so emboldened Dunmore that he issued the most infamous of his proclamations, charging rebellious Virginians with treason while promising freedom to all slaves and servants who flocked to his standard.
In simple terms, he had declared war on the Virginia planter class. Arming former slaves turned their great white world upside down. Dunmore’s so-called Ethiopian regiment, which helped defeat the Norfolk area militiamen, were musket-bearing slaves led by white officers, eager troops who wore the words
Liberty to Slaves
on their chests. There appeared to be more than one revolution in the offing. 29
Jefferson recognized Dunmore’s new army as a menace. Writing from Philadelphia to his college chum John Page, he concluded his letter by reprising Cato the Elder’s call in the Roman Senate, substituting Norfolk for Carthage: “
Delenda est Norfolk
”—Dunmore’s stronghold must be destroyed. A prominent planter reported to Jefferson and the Virginia delegation in Congress that Dunmore’s ships were “plying up the Rivers, plundering Plantations and using every Art to seduce the Negroes. The Person of no Man in the Colony is safe.” Pendleton likewise expressed indignation over Dunmore’s “Piratical War,” telling Jefferson
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